DISSERTATIONS,

I. Concerning the End for which GOD created the World.

II. The Nature of true Virtue.

By the late Reverend, Learned and Pious

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M.DCC.LXXV.
THE AUTHOR HAD DESIGNED THESE DISSERTATIONS FOR THE PUBLIC VIEW; AND WROTE THEM OUT AS THEY NOW APPEAR: THOUGH 'TIS PROBABLE, THAT IF HIS LIFE HAD BEEN SPARED, HE WOULD HAVE REVISED THEM AND RENDERED THEM IN SOME RESPECTS MORE COMPLETE.

SOME NEW SENTIMENTS, HERE AND THERE, MIGHT PROBABLY HAVE BEEN ADDED; AND SOME PASSAGES BRIGHTENED WITH FARTHER ILLUSTRATIONS. THIS MAY BE CONJECTURED FROM SOME BRIEF HINTS, OR SENTIMENTS MINUTED DOWN, ON LOOSE PAPERS, FOUND IN THE MANUSCRIPTS.

BUT THESE SENTIMENTS CONCISELY SKETCH'D OUT, WHICH, 'TIS THOUGHT, THE AUTHOR INTENDED TO ENLARGE, AND DIGEST INTO THE BODY OF THE WORK, —— CANNOT BE SO AMPLIFIED BY ANY OTHER HAND, AS TO DO JUSTICE TO THE AUTHOR: 'TIS THEREFORE PROBABLY BEST THAT NOTHING OF THIS KIND SHOULD BE ATTEMPTED.

AS THESE DISSERTATIONS WERE MORE ESPECIALLY DESIGNED FOR THE LEARNED AND INQUISTIVE, 'TIS EXPECTED THAT THE JUDICIOUS AND CANDID WILL NOT BE DISPOSED TO OBJECT THAT THE MANNER IN WHICH THESE SUBJECTS ARE TREATED, IS SOMETHING ABOVE THE LEVEL OF COMMON READERS. FOR THOUGH A SUPERFICIAL WAY OF DISCOURSE AND LOOSE HARRANGUES MAY WELL ENOUGH SUIT SOME SUBJECTS, AND ANSWER SOME VALUABLE PURPOSES; YET OTHER SUBJECTS DEMAND MORE CLOSENESS AND ACCURACY. AND IF AN AUTHOR SHOULD NEGLECT TO DO JUSTICE TO A SUBJECT, FOR FEAR THAT THE SIMPLER SORT SHOULD NOT FULLY UNDERSTAND HIM, HE MIGHT EXPECT TO BE DEEMED A TRIFLER BY THE MORE INTELLIGENT.
OUR author had a rare talent to penetrate deep
in search of truth; to take an extensive survey of a
subject, and look through it into remote consequences.
Hence many theorems, that appeared hard and barren
to others, were to him pleasant and fruitful fields,
where his mind would expand with peculiar ease,
profit and entertainment. These studies, which to some
were too fatiguing to the mind, and wearisome to the
constitution, were to him but a natural play of genius;
and which his mind without labor would freely and
spontaneously perform. This even and concise way of
reasoning upon a controversial point was easy and na-
tural to him.

THIS may serve to account for his
usual manner of treating abstruse and controverted sub-
jects, which some have thought has been too metaphy-
sical. But the truth is, that his critical method of
looking through the nature of his subject; his accuracy
and precision in concealing truth, comparing ideas,
drawing consequences, pointing out and exposing absur-
dities,—naturally led him to reduce the evidence in
favor of truth into the form of demonstration. Which
doubtless, where it can be obtained, is the most eligible,
and by far the most satisfying to great and noble minds.
And though some readers may find the labor hard, to
keep pace with the writer, in the advances he makes,
where the subject is arduous; yet in general all was
easy to him: such was his peculiar taste and discer-
ment of truth and natural propensity to search after
it. His own ideas were clear to him, where some re-
ders have thought them obscure. Thus many things
in the works of Newton and Locke, which appear
either quite unintelligible, or very obscure to the illite-
rate—were clear and bright to those illustrious authors,
and their learned readers.
THE subjects here handled are sublime and important. The end which God had in view in creating the world, was doubtless worthy of him; and consequently the most excellent and glorious possible. This therefore must be worthy to be known by all the intelligent creation, as excellent in itself and worthy of their pursuit. And as true virtue distinguishes the inhabitants of heaven and all the happy candidates for that world of glory, from all others; there cannot surely be a more interesting subject.

The notions which some men entertain concerning God's end in creating the world, and concerning true virtue, in our late author's opinion, have a natural tendency to corrupt Christianity, and to destroy the gospel of our divine redeemer. It was therefore, no doubt, in the exercise of a pious concern for the honor and glory of God, and a tender respect to the best interests of his fellow men, that this devout and learned writer undertook the following work.

May the father of lights, smile upon the pious and benevolent airs and labors of his servant and crown them with his blessing!

July 12. 1765.

The Editor.

ERRATA.

Page 16. line 24. before notice add 33. p. 12. l. 25. f. line 1. s. t. d. e. v. p. 43. l. 20. after ser. p. 45. t. f. s. t. d. e. p. 122. l. 24. t. d. d. p. 123. l. 2. t. n. t. e. p. 132. l. 27. t. b. e. t.
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Concerning the END for which GOD created the WORLD.

INTRODUCTION

Containing Explanations of Terms, and general Positions.

To avoid all confusion in our inquiries and reasonings, concerning the end for which God created the world, a distinction should be observed between the chief end for which an agent or efficient exerts any act and performs any work, and the ultimate end. These two phrases are not always precisely of the same significance: And tho' the chief end be always an ultimate end, yet every ultimate end is not always a chief end.

A chief end is opposite to an inferior end: An ultimate end, is opposite to a subordinate end. A subordinate end is something that an agent seeks and aims at in what he does; but yet don't seek it, or regard it at all upon it's own account, but wholly on the account of a further end, or in order to some other thing, which it is considered as a means of. Thus when a man that goes a journey to ob-
tain a medicine to cure him of some disease, and restore his health,—the obtaining that medicine is his subordinate end; because 'tis not an end that he seeks for itself, or values at all upon its own account; but wholly as a means of a further end, viz. his health: Separate the medicine from that further end, and it is esteemed good for nothing; nor is it at all desired.

An ultimate end is that which the agent seeks in what he does, for it's own sake: That he has respect to, as what he loves, values and takes pleasure in on it's own account, and not merely as a means of a further end: As when a man loves the taste of some particular sort of fruit, and is at pains and cost to obtain it, for the sake of the pleasure of that taste, which he values upon it's own account, as he loves his own pleasure; and not merely for the sake of any other good, which he supposes his enjoying that pleasure will be the means of.

Some ends are subordinate ends, not only as they are subordinate to an ultimate end; but also to another end that is itself but a subordinate end: Yea, there may be a succession or chain of many subordinate ends, one dependent on another,—one sought for another: The first for the next; and that for the sake of the next to that,—and so on in a long series before you come to any thing, that the agent aims at and seeks for it's own sake:—As when a man sells a garment to get money—to buy tools—to till his land—to obtain a crop—to supply him with food—to gratify the appetite. And he seeks to gratify his appetite, on it's own account, as what is grateful in itself. Here the end of his selling his garment, is to get money; but getting money is only a subordinate end: 'Tis not only subordinate to the last end, his gratifying his appetite; but to a nearer end, viz. his buying husbandry tools: And his obtaining these, is only a subordinate end, being only for the sake of tilling land: And the tillage of land, is an end not sought on it's own account, but for the sake of the crop to be produced: And the crop produced, is not an ultimate end, or an end sought for itself, but only for the sake of making bread: And the having bread, is not sought on it's own account, but for the sake of gratifying the appetite.
in the Creation of the World.

Here the gratifying the appetite, is called the ultimate end; because 'tis the last in the chain, where a man's aim and pursuit stops and rests, obtaining in that, the thing finally aimed at. So whenever a man comes to that in which his desire terminates and rests, it being something valued on it's own account, then he comes to an ultimate end, let the chain be longer or shorter; yea, if there be but one link or one step that he takes before he comes to this end. As when a man that loves honey puts it into his mouth, for the sake of the pleasure of the taste, without aiming at any thing further. So that an end, which an agent has in view, may be both his immediate and his ultimate end; his next and his last end. That end which is sought for the sake of itself, and not for the sake of a further end, is an ultimate end; it is ultimate or last, as it has no other beyond it, for whose sake it is, it being for the sake of itself: So that here, the aim of the agent stops and rests (without going further) being come to the good which he esteems a recompence of it's pursuit for it's own value.

Here it is to be noted, that a thing sought, may have the nature of an ultimate, and also of a subordinate end, as it may be sought partly on it's own account, and partly for the sake of a further end. Thus a man in what he does, may seek the love and respect of a particular person, partly on it's own account, because 'tis in itself agreeable to men to be the objects of other's esteem and love: And partly, because he hopes, through the friendship of that person to have his assistance in other affairs; and so to be put under advantage for the obtaining further ends.

A chief end or highest end, which is opposite not properly to a subordinate end, but to an inferior end, is something diverse from an ultimate end. The chief end is an end that is most valued; and therefore most sought after by the agent in what he does. 'Tis evident, that to be an end more valued than another end, is not exactly the same thing as to be an end valued ultimately, or for it's own sake. This will appear, if it be considered.

1. That two different ends may be both ultimate ends, and yet not be chief ends. They may be both valued for their
their own fake, and both sought in the same work or acts, and yet one valued more highly and sought more than another: Thus a man may go a journey to obtain two different benefits or enjoyments, both which may be agreeable to him in themselves considered, and so both may be what he values on their own account and seeks for their own fake; And yet one may be much more agreeable than the other: And so be what he sets his heart chiefly upon, and seeks most after in his going a journey. Thus a man may go a journey partly to obtain the possesion and enjoyment of a bride that is very dear to him, and partly to gratify his curiosity in looking in a telescope, or some new-invented and extraordinary optic glafs: Both may be ends he seeks in his journey, and the one not properly subordinaie or in order to another. One may not depend on another; and therefore both may be ultimate ends: But yet the obtaining his beloved bride may be his chief end, and the benefit of the optic glafs, his inferior end. The former may be what he sets his heart vastly most upon; and so be properly the chief end of his journey.

2. An ultimate end is not always the chief end, because some subordinate ends may be more valued and sought after than some ultimate ends. Thus for instance, a man may aim at these two things in his going a journey: one may be to visit his friends, and another to receive a great estate, or a large sum of money that lies ready for him, at the place to which he is going. The latter, viz. his receiving the sum of money may be but a subordinate end: He may not value the silver and gold on their own account, but only for the pleasure, gratifications and honor; that is the ultimate end, and not the money which is valued only as a means of the other. But yet the obtaining the money, may be what is more valued, and so an higher end of his journey, than the pleasure of seeing his friends; tho' the latter is what is valued on its own account, and so is an ultimate end.

But here several things may be noted:

First, That when it is said, that some subordinate ends may be more valued than some ultimate ends, 'tis not supposed that ever a subordinate end is more valued than that ultimate end or ends to which it is subordinate; because a subordinate end
end has no value, but what it derives from its ultimate end: For that reason it is called a subordinate end, because it is valued and sought, not for its own sake, or its own value, but only in subordination to a further end, or for the sake of the ultimate end, that it is in order to. But yet a subordinate end may be valued more than some other ultimate end that it is not subordinate to, but is independent of it, and don't belong to that series, or chain of ends. Thus for instance: If a man goes a journey to receive a sum of money, not at all as an ultimate end, or because he has any value for the silver and gold for their own sake, but only for the value of the pleasure and honor that the money may be a means of. In this case it is impossible that the subordinate end, viz. his having the money should be more valued by him than the pleasure and honor, for which he values it. It would be absurd to suppose that he values the means more than the end, when he has no value for the means but for the sake of the end, of which it is the means: But yet he may value the money, tho' but a subordinate end, more than some other ultimate end, to which it is not subordinate, and with which it has no connection. For instance, more than the comfort of a friendly visit; which was one end of his journey.

Secondly, Not only is a subordinate end never superior to that ultimate end, to which it is subordinate; but the ultimate end is always (not only equal but) superior to its subordinate end, and more valued by the agent; unless it be when the ultimate end entirely depends on the subordinate: So that he has no other means by which to obtain his last end, and also is looked upon as certainly connected with it;—then the subordinate end may be as much valued as the last end; because the last end, in such a case, does altogether depend upon, and is wholly and certainly conveyed by it. As for instance, if a pregnant woman has a peculiar appetite to a certain rare fruit that is to be found only in the garden of a particular friend of her's, at a distance; and she goes a journey to go to her friend's house or garden, to obtain that fruit—the ultimate end of her journey, is to gratify that strong appetite: The obtaining that fruit, is the subordinate end of it. If she looks upon it, that the appetite can be gratified by no other means than the obtaining that fruit; and that it will certainly be gratified if she obtains it,
then she will value the fruit as much as she values the gratification of her appetite. But otherwise, it will not be so: If she be doubtful whether that fruit will satisfy her craving, then she will not value it equally with the gratification of her appetite itself; or if there be some other fruit that she knows of, that will gratify her desire, at least in part; which she can obtain without such inconvenience or trouble as shall counterbalance the gratification; which is in effect, frustrating her of her last end, because her last end is the pleasure of gratifying her appetite, without any trouble that shall counterbalance, and in effect destroy it. Or if it be so, that her appetite cannot be gratified without this fruit, nor yet with it alone, without something else to be compounded with it,—then her value for her last end will be divided between these several ingredients as so many subordinate, and no one alone will be equally valued with the last end.

Hence it rarely happens among mankind, that a subordinate end is equally valued with its last end; because the obtaining of a last end rarely depends on one single, uncompounded means, and is infallibly connected with that means: Therefore, men's last ends are commonly their highest ends.

Thirdly, If any being has but one ultimate end, in all that he does, and there be a great variety of operations, his last end may justly be looked upon as his supreme end: For in such a case, every other end but that one, is an end to that end; and therefore no other end can be superior to it. Because, as was observed before, a subordinate end is never more valued, than the end to which it is subordinate.

Moreover, the subordinate effects, events or things brought to pass, which all are means of this end, all uniting to contribute their share towards the obtaining the one last end, are very various; and therefore, by what has been now observed, the ultimate end of all must be valued, more than any one of the particular means. This seems to be the case with the works of God, as may more fully appear in the sequel.

From what has been said, to explain what is intended by an ultimate end, the following things may be observed concerning ultimate ends in the sense explained.
FOURTHLY, Whatsoever any agent has in view in any thing he does, which he loves, or which is an immediate gratification of any appetite or inclination of nature; and is agreeable to him in itself, and not meerly for the sake of something else, is regarded by that agent as his last end. The same may be said, of avoiding of that which is in itself painful or disagreeable: For the avoiding of what is disagreeable is agreeable. This will be evident to any bearing in mind the meaning of the terms. By last end being meant, that which is regarded and sought by an agent, as agreeable or desirable for its own sake; a subordinate that which is sought only for the sake of something else.

FIFTHLY, From hence it will follow, that, if an agent in his works has in view more things than one that will be brought to pass by what he does, that are agreeable to him, consider'd in themselves, or what he loves and delights in on their own account,—then he must have more things than one that he regards as his last ends in what he does. But if there be but one thing that an agent seeks, as the consequence of what he does that is agreeable to him, on it's own account, then there can be but one last end which he has in all his actions and operations.

But only here a distinction must be observed of things which may be said to be agreeable to an agent, in themselves consider'd in two senses. (1.) What is in itself grateful to an agent, and valued and loved on its own account, simply and absolutely considered, and is so universally and originally, antecedent to, and independent of all conditions, or any supposition of particular cases and circumstances. And (2.) What may be said to be in itself agreeable to an agent, hypothetically and consequentially: Or, on supposition or condition of such and such circumstances or on the happening of such a particular case. Thus, for instance: A man may originally love society. An inclination to society may be implanted in his very nature: And society may be agreeable to him antecedent to all presupposed cases and circumstances: And this may cause him to seek a family. And the comfort of society may be originally his last end, in seeking a family. But after he has a family, peace, good order and mutual justice and friendship in his family, may be agreeable to him, and
and what he delights in for their own sake: and therefore these things may be his last end in many things he does in the government and regulation of his family. But they were not his original end with respect to his family. The justice and peace of a family was not properly his last end before he had a family, that induced him to seek a family, but consequentially. And the case being put of his having a family, then these things wherein the good order and beauty of a family consist, become his last end in many things he does in such circumstances. In like manner we must suppose that God before he created the world, had some good in view, as a consequence of the world's existence that was originally agreeable to him in itself considered, that inclined him to create the world, or bring the universe, with various intelligent creatures into existence in such a manner as he created it. But after the world was created, and such and such intelligent creatures actually had existence, in such and such circumstances, then a wise, just regulation of them was agreeable to God, in itself considered. And God's love of justice, and hatred of injustice, would be sufficient in such a case to induce God to deal justly with his creatures, and to prevent all injustice in him towards them. But yet there is no necessity of supposing, that God's love of doing justly to intelligent beings, and hatred of the contrary, was what originally induced God to create the world, and make intelligent beings; and so to order the occasion of doing either justly or unjustly. The justice of God's nature makes a just regulation agreeable, and the contrary disagreeable, as there is occasion, the subject being supposed, and the occasion given: But we must suppose something else that should incline him to create the subjects or order the occasion.

So that perfection of God which we call his faithfulness, or his inclination to fulfill his promises to his creatures, could not properly be what moved him to create the world; nor could such a fulfilment of his promises to his creatures, be his last end, in giving the creatures being. But yet after the world is created, after intelligent creatures are made, and God has bound himself by promise to them, then that disposition which is called his faithfulness may move him in his providential dispositions towards them: And this may be the end of many of God's works of providence, even the exercise of
of his faithfulness in fulfilling his promises. And may be in the lower sense his last end. Because faithfulness and truth must be supposed to be what is in itself amiable to God, and what he delights in for its own sake. Thus God may have ends of particular works of providence, which are ultimate ends in a lower sense, which were not ultimate ends of the creation.

So that here we have two sorts of ultimate ends; one of which may be called an original, and independent ultimate end; the other consequential and dependent. For 'tis evident, the latter sort are truly of the nature of ultimate ends: Because, tho' their being agreeable to the agent, or the agent's desire of them, be consequential on the existence, or supposition of proper subjects and occasion; yet the subject and occasion being supposed, they are agreeable and amiable in themselves. We may suppose that to a righteous Being, the doing justice between two parties, with whom he is concerned, is agreeable in itself, and is loved for it's own sake, and not merely for the sake of some other end: And yet we may suppose, that a desire of doing justice between two parties, may be consequential on the being of those parties, and the occasion given.

Therefore I make a distinction between an end that in this manner is consequential, and a subordinate end.

It may be observed, that when I speak of God's ultimate end in the creation of the world, in the following discourse, I commonly mean in that highest sense, viz. the original ultimate end.

Sixthly, It may be further observed, that the original ultimate end or ends of the creation of the world is alone, that which induces God to give the occasion for consequential ends, by the first creation of the world, and the original disposal of it. And the more original the end is, the more extensive and universal it is. That which God had primarily in view in creating, and the original ordination of the world, must be constantly kept in view, and have a governing influence in all God's works, or with respect to every thing that he does towards his creatures.
AND therefore,

SEVENTHLY, If we use the phrase ultimate end in this highest sense, then the same that is God's ultimate end in creating the world, if we suppose but one such end, must be what he makes his ultimate aim in all his works, in every thing he does either in creation or providence. But we must suppose that in the use, which God puts the creatures to that he hath made, he must evermore have a regard to the end, for which he has made them. But if we take ultimate end in the other lower sense, God may sometimes have regard to those things as ultimate ends, in particular works of providence, which could not in any proper sense be his last end in creating the world.

EIGHTHLY, On the other hand, whatever appears to be God's ultimate end in any sense, of his works of providence in general, that must be the ultimate end of the work of creation itself. For tho' it be so that God may act for an end, that is an ultimate end in a lower sense, in some of his works of providence, which is not the ultimate end of the creation of the world: Yet this doth not take place with regard to the works of providence in general. But we may justly look upon whatsoever has the nature of an ultimate end of God's works of providence in general, that the same is also an ultimate end of the creation of the world; for God's works of providence in general, are the same with the general use that he puts the world to that he has made. And we may well argue from what we see of the general use which God makes of the world, to the general end for which he designed the world. Tho' there may be some things that are ends of particular works of providence, that were not the last end of the creation, which are in themselves grateful to God in such particular emergent circumstances; and so are last ends in an inferior sense: Yet this is only in certain cases, or particular occasions. But if they are last ends of God's proceedings in the use of the world in general, this shews that his making them last ends don't depend on particular cases and circumstances, but the nature of things in general, and his general design in the being and constitution of the universe.

NINETHLY,
Ninthly, If there be but one thing that is originally, and independent on any future, supposed cases, agreeable to God, to be obtained by the creation of the world, then there can be but one last end of God's work, in this highest sense. But if there are various things, properly diverse one from another, that are, absolutely and independently on the supposition of any future given cases, agreeable to the divine being, which are actually obtained by the creation of the world, then there were several ultimate ends of the creation, in that highest sense.

CHAPTER I. Wherein is considered, what Reason teaches concerning this Affair.

SECTION I. Some Things observed in general, which Reason dictates.

Having observed these things, which are proper to be taken notice of, to prevent confusion in discourses on this subject, I now proceed to consider what may, and what may not be supposed to be God's ultimate end in the creation of the world.

And in the first place, I would observe some things which reason seems to dictate in this matter. Indeed this affair, seems properly to be an affair of divine revelation. In order to be determin'd what was aimed at, or design'd in the creating of the astonishing fabric of the universe which we behold, it becomes us to attend to and rely on what he has told us, who was the architect that built it. He best knows his own heart, and what his own ends and designs were in the wonderful works which he has wrought. Nor is it to be supposed that mankind, who, while destitute of revelation, by the utmost improvements of their own reason, and advances in science and philosophy, could come to no clear and established determination who the author of the world was, would
would ever have obtain'd any tolerable settled judgment of the end which the author of it proposed to himself in so vast, complicated and wonderful a work of his hands. And tho' it be true, that the revelation which God has given to men, which has been in the world as a light shining in a dark place, has been the occasion of great improvement of their faculties, has taught men how to use their reason; (in which regard, notwithstanding the nobleness and excellency of the faculties which God had given them, they seem'd to be in themselves almost helpless.) And tho' mankind now, thro' the long continual assistance they have had by this divine light, have come to attainments in the habitual exercise of reason, which are far beyond what otherwise they would have arrived to; yet I confess it would be relying too much on reason, to determine the affair of God's last end in the creation of the world, only by our own reason, or without being herein principally guided by divine revelation, since God has given a revelation containing instructions concerning this matter. Nevertheless, as in the disputes and wranglings which have been about this matter, those objections, which have chiefly been made use of against what I think the scriptures have truly revealed, have been from the pretended dictates of reason,—I would in the first place soberly consider in a few things, what seems rational to be supposed concerning this affair;—and then proceed to consider what light divine revelation gives us in it.

As to the first of these, viz. what seems in itself rational to be supposed concerning this matter, I think the following things appear to be the dictates of reason:

1. That no notion of God's last end in the creation of the world is agreeable to reason, which would truly imply or infer any indigence, insufficiency and mutability in God; or any dependence of the Creator on the creature, for any part of his perfection or happiness. Because it is evident, by both scripture and reason, that God is infinitely, eternally, unchangeably, and independently glorious and happy; that he stands in no need of, cannot be profited by, or receive any thing from the creature; or be truly hurt, or be the subject of any sufferings or imPAIR of his glory and felicity from any other being. I need not stand to produce the proofs of God's being
being such a one, it being so universally allowed and maintained by such as call themselves christians.—The notion of God’s creating the world in order to receive any thing properly from the creature, is not only contrary to the nature of God, but inconsistent with the notion of creation; which implies a being s receiving it’s existence, & all that belongs to it’s being, out of nothing. And this implies the most perfect, absolute and universal derivation and dependence. Now, if the creature receives it’s all from God entirely and perfectly, how is it possible that it should have any thing to add to God, to make him in any respect more than he was before, and so the Creator become dependent on the creature?

2. Whatsoever is good & valuable in itself, is worthy that God shou’d value for itself, & on it’s own account; or which is the same thing, value it with an ultimate value or respect. It is therefore worthy to be ultimately fought by God, or made the last end of his action and operation; if it be a thing of such a nature as to be properly capable of being attained in any divine operation. For it may be supposed that some things, which are valuable and excellent in themselves, are not properly capable of being attained in any divine operation; because they do not remain to be attained; but their existence in all possible respects, must be conceived of as prior to any divine operation. Thus God’s existence and infinite perfection, tho’ infinitely valuable in themselves, and in a perfectly valued by God, yet can’t be supposed to be the end of divine operation. For we can’t conceive of them as in dom respect consequent on any works of God.—But whatever creature in itself valuable, absolutely so, and that is capable of being fought and attained, is worthy to be made a last end of the divine operation.—Therefore

3. Whatever that be which is in itself most valuable, and was so originally, prior to the creation of the world, and which is attainable by the creation, if there be any thing which was superior in value to all others, that must be worthy to be God’s last end in the creation; and also worthy to be his highest end.—In consequence of this, it will follow,

4. That if God himself be in any respect properly capable of being his own end in the creation of the world, then
it is reasonable to suppose that he had respect to himself as his last and highest end in this work; because he is worthy in himself to be so, being infinitely the greatest and best of Beings. All things else, with regard to worthiness, importance and excellence, are perfectly as nothing in comparison of him. And therefore if God esteems, values, and has respect to things according to their nature and proportions, he must necessarily have the greatest respect to himself. It would be against the perfection of his nature, his wisdom, holiness, and perfect rectitude, whereby he is disposed to do every thing that is fit to be done, to suppose otherwise. At least a great part of the moral rectitude of the heart of God, whereby he is disposed to every thing that is fit, suitable and amiable in itself, consists in his having infinitely the highest regard to that which is in itself infinitely highest and best: Yea it is in this that it seems chiefly to consist.—The moral rectitude of God’s heart must consist in a proper and due respect of his heart to things that are objects of moral respect: That is, to intelligent beings capable of moral actions and relations. And therefore it must chiefly consist in giving due respect to that Being to whom most is due; yea infinitely most, and in effect all. For God is infinitely the most worthy of regard. The worthines of others is as nothing to his: So that to him belongs all possible respect. To him belongs the whole of the respect that any moral agent, either God, any intelligent Being is capable of. To him belongs all as heart—Therefore if moral rectitude of heart consists in the respect or regard of the heart which is due, or ch fitnes & suitablenes requires, fitness requires infinite-the greatest regard to be paid to God; and the denying preme regard here, would be a conduct infinitely the most unfit. Therefore a proper regard to this Being, is what the fitnes of regard does infinitely most consist in.—Hence it will follow—that the moral rectitude and fitness of the disposition, inclination or affection of God’s heart, does chiefly consist in a respect or regard to himself infinitely above his regard to all other beings: Or in other words, his holiness consists in this.

And if it be thus fit that God shou’d have a supreme regard to himself, then it is fit that this supreme regard shou’d appear, in those things by which he makes himself known, 

of
or by his word and works; i.e., in what he says, and in what he does. If it be an infinitely amiable thing in God, that he should have a supreme regard to himself, then it is an amiable thing that he should act as having a chief regard to himself; or act in such a manner, as to shew that he has such a regard; that what is highest in God's heart may be highest in his actions and conduct. And if it was God's intention, as there is great reason to think it was, that his works should exhibit an image of himself their author, that it might brightly appear by his works what manner of being he is, and afford a proper representation of his divine excellencies, and especially his moral excellence, consisting in the disposition of his heart; then 'tis reasonable to suppose that his works are so wrought as to shew this supreme respect to himself, where-in his moral excellency does primarily consist.

When we are considering with ourselves, what would be most fit and proper for God to have a chief respect to, in his proceedings in general, with regard to the universality of things, it may help us to judge of the matter with the greater ease & satisfaction to consider, what we can suppose would be judged and determined by some third being of perfect wisdom and rectitude, neither the creator nor one of the creatures, that should be perfectly indifferent and disinterested. Or if we make the supposition, that wisdom itself, or infinitely wise justice and rectitude were a distinct disinterested person, whose office it was to determine how things shall be most fitly and properly order'd in the whole system, or kingdom of existence, including king and subjects, God and his creatures; and upon a view of the whole to decide what regard should prevail and govern in all proceedings. Now such a judge in adjusting the proper measures and kinds of regard that every part of existence is to have, would weigh things in an even balance, taking care, that greater, or more existence should have a greater share than less, that a greater part of the whole should be more looked at and respected, than the lesser in proportion (other things being equal) to the measure of existence,—that the more excellent should be more regarded than the less excellent:—so that the degree of regard should always be in a proportion, compounded of the proportion of existence, and proportion of excellence, or according to the degree of greatness and goodness, consider'd conjunctly.
Such an arbiter, in considering the system of created intelligent beings by itself, would determine, that the system in general, consisting of many millions, was of greater importance, and worthy of a greater share of regard, than only one individual. For however considerable some of the individuals might be, so that they might be much greater and better, and have a greater share of the sum total of existence and excellence than another individual, yet no one exceeds others so much as to countervail all the rest of the system. And if this judge consider not only the system of created beings, but the system of being in general, comprehending the sum total of universal existence, both creator and creature; still every part must be considered according to its weight and importance, or the measure it has of existence and excellence. To determine then, what proportion of regard is to be allotted to the creator, and all his creatures taken together, both must be as it were put in the balance;—the supreme Being, with all in him, that is great, considerable, & excellent, is to be estimated and compared with all that is to be found in the whole creation: And according as the former is found to outweigh, in such proportion is he to have a greater share of regard. And in this case, as the whole system of created beings in comparison of the creator, would be found as the light dust of the balance (which is taken notice of by him that weighs) and as nothing and vanity; so the arbiter must determine accordingly with respect to the degree in which God should be regarded by all intelligent existence, and the degree in which he should be regarded in all that is done thro' the whole universal system; in all actions and proceedings, determinations and effects whatever, whether creating, preserving, using, disposing, changing, or destroying. And as the creator is infinite, and has all possible existence, perfection and excellence, so he must have all possible regard. As he is every way the first and supreme, and as his excellence is in all respects the supreme beauty and glory, the original good, and fountain of all good; so he must have in all respects the supreme regard. And as he is God over all, to whom all are properly subordinate, and on whom all depend, worthy to reign as supreme head with absolute and universal dominion; so it is fit that he should be so regarded by all & in all proceedings & effects thro' the whole system: That this universality of things in their whole compass and
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sries should look to him and respect him in such a manner as that respect to him should reign over all respect to other things and that regard to creatures should universally be subordinate and subject.

When I speak of regard to be thus adjusted in the universal system, or sum total of existence, I mean the regard of the sum total; not only the regard of individual creatures, or all creatures, but of all intelligent existence, created, and uncreated. For 'tis fit, that the regard of the creator should be proportioned to the worthiness of objects, as well as the regard of creatures. Thus we must conclude such an arbiter, as I have supposed, would determine in this business, being about to decide how matters should proceed most fitly, properly, and according to the nature of things. He would therefore determine, that the whole universe, including all creatures animate and inanimate, in all it's actions, proceedings, revolutions, and entire series of events, should proceed from a regard and with a view, to God, as the supreme and last end of all: That every wheel, both great and small, in all it's rotations, should move with a constant invariable regard to him as the ultimate end of all; as perfectly and uniformly, as if the whole system were animated and directed by one common soul: Or, as if such an arbiter as I have before supposed, one possessed of perfect wisdom and rectitude, became the common soul of the universe, and actuated and governed it in all it's motions.

Thus I have gone upon the supposition of a third person, neither creator nor creature, but a disinterested person stepping in to judge of the concerns of both, and state what is most fit and proper between them. The thing supposed is impossible; but the case is nevertheless just the same as to what is most fit and suitable in itself. For it is most certainly proper for God to act, according to the greatest fitness, in his proceedings, and he knows what the greatest fitness is, as much as if perfect rectitude were a distinct person to direct him. As therefore there is no third being beside God and the created system, nor can be, so there is no need of any, seeing God himself is possessed of that perfect discernment and rectitude which have been supposed. It belongs to him as supreme arbiter, and to his infinite wisdom and
God's last End

and rectitude, to state all rules and measures of proceedings. And seeing these attributes of God are infinite, and most absolutely perfect, they are not the less fit to order and dispose, because they are in him, who is a being concern'd, and not a third person that is disinterested.—For being interested unfit a person to be an arbiter or judge, no otherwise than as interest tends to blind & mislead his judgment, or incline him to act contrary to it. But that God should be in danger of either, is contrary to the supposition of his being possessed of discerning and justice absolutely perfect. And as there must be some supream judge of fitures and propriety in the universality of things, as otherwise there could be no order nor regularity, it therefore belongs to God whose are all things, who is perfectly fit for this office, and who alone is so to state all things according to the most perfect fitness and rectitude, as much as it perfect rectitude were a distinct person. We may therefore be sure it is and will be done.

I should think that these things might incline us to suppose, that God has not forgot himself, in the ends which he proposed in the creation of the world; but that he has so stated these ends (however he is self-sufficient, immutable, and indendent) as therein plainly to shew a supreme regard to himself. Whether this can be, or whether God has done thus, must be considered afterwards, as also what may be objected against this view of things.

5. Whatever is good, amiable and valuable in itself, absolutely and originally, which facts and events shew that God aimed at in the creation of the world, must be supposed to be regarded, or aimed at by God ultimately, or as an ultimate end of creation.—For we must suppose from the perfection of God's nature, that whatsoever is valuable and amiable in itself, simply and absolutely considered, God values simply for itself; 'tis agreeable to him absolutely on it's own account; because God's judgment and esteem are according to truth. He values and loves things accordingly, as they are worthy to be valued and loved. But if God values a thing simply, and absolutely, for itself, and on its own account, then 'tis the ultimate object of his value; he don't value it merely for the sake of a further end to be attained by it. For to suppose that he values it only for some farther end,
is in direct contradiction to the present supposition, which is, that he values it absolutely, and for itself.—Hence it most clearly follows, that if that which God values ultimately, and for itself, appears in fact and experience, to be what he seeks by any thing he does, he must regard it as an ultimate end. And therefore if he seeks it in creating the world, or any part of the world, 'tis an ultimate end of the work of creation.—Having got thus far, we may now proceed a step farther, and assert

6. whatsoever thing is actually the effect or consequence of the creation of the world, which is simply and absolutely good and valuable in itself, that thing is an ultimate end of God's creating the world.—We see that it is a good that God aimed at by the creation of the world; because he has actually attained it by that means. This is an evidence that he intended to attain, or aimed at it. For we may justly infer what God intends, by what he actually does; because he does nothing inadvertently, or without design. But whatever God intends to attain from a value for it; or in other words, whatever he aims at in his actions and works, that he values; he seeks that thing in those acts and works. Because, for an agent to intend to attain something he values by means he uses, is the same thing as to seek it by those means. And this is the same as to make that thing his end in those means. Now it being by the supposition what God values ultimately, it must therefore by the preceding position, be aimed at by God as an ultimate end of creating the world.

Sect. II.

Some farther observations concerning those things which reason leads us to suppose God aimed at in the creation of the world, shewing particularly what things that are absolutely good, are actually the consequence of the creation of the world.

From what was last observed it seems to be the most proper and just way of proceeding, as we could see what light reason will give us respecting the particular end or ends God had
had ultimately in view in the creation of the world, to consider what thing or things, are actually the effect or consequence of the creation of the world, that are simply and originally valuable in themselves. And this is what I would directly proceed to, without entering on any tedious metaphysical enquiries wherein fitness, amiableness, or valableness consists; or what that is in the nature of some things, which is properly the foundation of a worthiness of being loved and esteemed on their own account. In this I must at present refer what I say to the sense and dictates of the reader's mind on sedate and calm reflection I proceed to observe,

1. It seems a thing in itself fit, proper and desirable, that the glorious attributes of God, which consist in a sufficiency to certain acts and effects, should be exerted in the production of such effects, as might manifest the infinite power, wisdom, righteousness, goodness, &c. which are in God. If the world had not been created, these attributes never would have had any exercise. The power of God, which is a sufficiency in him to produce great effects, must for ever have been dormant and useless as to any effect. The divine wisdom and prudence would have had no exercise in any wise contrivance, any prudent proceeding or dispositions of things; for there would have been no objects of contrivance or disposition. The same might be observed of God's justice, goodness and truth.—Indeed God might have known as perfectly that he possessed these attributes, if they had never been exerted or expressed in any effect. But then if the attributes which consist in a sufficiency for correspondent effects, are in themselves excellent, the exercise of them must likewise be excellent. If it be an excellent thing that there should be a sufficiency for a certain kind of action or operation, the excellency of such a sufficiency must consist in its relation to this kind of operation or effect; but that could not be, unless the operation itself were excellent. A sufficiency for any act or work is no farther valuable, than the work or effect is valuable.* As God therefore

* As we must conceive of things, the end and perfection of these attributes, goes as it were consist in their exercise: "The end of wisdom (see Mr. G. Tennent, in his Sermon at the opening of the presbyterian church of Philadelphia) is design; the end
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fore esteems these attributes themselves valuable, and delights in them; so 'ts natural to supptole that he delights in their proper exercise and expression. For the same reason that he esteems his own sufficiency wisely to contrive and dispose effects, he also will esteem the wise contrivance and disposition itself. And for the same reason as he delights in his own disposition, to do justly, and to dispose of things according to truth and just proportion; so he must delight in such a righteous disposal itself.

2. It seems to be a thing in itself fit and desirable, that the glorious perfections of God should be known, and the operations and expressions of them seen by other beings besides himself. If it be fit, that God's power and wisdom, &c. should be exercised and expressed in some effects, and not lie eternally dormant, then it seems proper that these exercises should appear, and not be totally hidden and unknown. For if they are, it will be just the same as to the above purpose, as if they were not. God as perfectly knew himself and his perfections, had as perfect an idea of the exercises and effects they were sufficient for, antecedently to any such actual operations of them, as since. If therefore it be nevertheless a thing in itself valuable, and worthy to be desired, that these glorious perfections be actually expressed and exhibited in their correspondent effects; then it seems also, that the knowledge of these perfections, and the expressions and discoveries that are made of them, is a thing valuable in itself absolutely considered; and that 'tis desirable that this knowledge should exist. As God's perfections are things in themselves excellent, so the expression of them in their proper acts and fruits is excellent; and the knowledge of these excellent perfections, and of these glorious expressions of them, is an excellent thing, the existence of which is in itself valuable and desirable. — 'Tis a thing infinitely good in itself that God's glory should be known by a glorious society of created beings.

And
And that there should be in them an increasing knowledge of God to all eternity, is an existence, a reality infinitely worthy to be, and worthy to be valued and regarded by him, to whom it belongs to order that to be, which, of all things possible, is fittest & best. If existence is more worthy than defect and non-entity, and if any created existence is in itself worthy to be, then knowledge or understanding is a thing worthy to be; and if any knowledge, then the most excellent sort of knowledge, viz. that of God and his glory. The existence of the created universe consists as much in it as in any thing: Yea, this knowledge, is one of the highest, most real and substantial parts, of all created existence, most remote from non-entity and defect.

3. As it is a thing valuable and desirable in itself that God's glory should be seen and known, so when known, it seems equally reasonable and fit, it should be valued and esteemed, loved and delighted in, answerably to its dignity. There is no more reason to esteem it a fit and suitable thing that God's glory should be known, or that there should be an idea in the understanding corresponding unto the glorious object, than that there should be a corresponding disposition or affection in the will. If the perfection itself be excellent, the knowledge of it is excellent, and so is the esteem and love of it excellent. And as 'tis fit that God should love and esteem his own excellence, 'tis also fit that he should value and esteem the love of his excellency. For if it becomes any being greatly to value another, then it becomes him to love to have him valued and esteemed: And if it becomes a being highly to value himself, it is fit that he should love to have himself valued and esteemed. If the idea of God's perfection in the understanding be valuable, then the love of the heart seems to be more especially valuable, as moral beauty especially consists in the disposition and affection of the heart.

4. As there is an infinite fulness of all possible good in God, a fulness of every perfection, of all excellency and beauty, and of infinite happiness. And as this fulness is capable of communication or emanation ad extra; so it seems a thing amiable and valuable in itself that it should be communicated or flow forth, that this infinite fountain of good should send forth abundant streams, that this infinite fountain of light should,
should, diffusing it’s excellent fulness, pour forth light all around.—And as this is in itself excellent, so a disposition to this, in the divine being, must be looked upon as a perfection or an excellent disposition, such an emanation of good is, in some sense, a multiplication of it; so far as the communication or external stream may be looked upon as any thing besides the fountain, so far it may be looked on as an increase of good. And if the fulness of good that is in the fountain, is in itself excellent and worthy to exist, then the emanation, or that which is as it were an increase, repetition or multiplication of it, is excellent and worthy to exist. Thus it is fit, since there is an infinite fountain of light and knowledge, that this light should shine forth in beams of communicated knowledge and understanding: And as there is an infinite fountain of holiness, moral excellence and beauty, so it should flow out in communicated holiness.—And that as there is an infinite fulness of joy and happiness, so these should have an emanation, and become a fountain flowing out in abundant streams, as beams from the sun.

From this view it appears another way to be a thing in itself valuable, that there should be such things as the knowledge of God’s glory in other beings, and an high esteem of it, love to it, and delight and complacence in it: This appears I say in another way, viz. as these things are but the emanations of God’s own knowledge, holiness and joy.

Thus it appears reasonable to suppose, that it was what God had respect to as an ultimate end of his creating the world, to communicate of his own infinite fulness of good; or rather it was his last end, that there might be a glorious and abundant emanation of his infinite fulness of Good ad extra, or without himself, and the disposition to communicate himself, or diffuse his own FULNESS, * which we must conceive of

* I shall often use the phrase God’s fulness, as signifying and comprehending all the good which is in God natural and moral, either excellence or happiness: partly because I know of no better phrase to be used in this general meaning; and partly because I am led hereby by some of the inspired writers, particularly the apostle Paul, who often useth the phrase in this sense.
of as being originally in God as a perfection of his nature, was what moved him to create the world. But here as much as possible to avoid confusion, I observe, that there is some impropriety in saying that a disposition in God to communicate himself to the creature, moved him to create the world. For tho' the diffusive disposition in the nature of God, that moved him to create the world, doubtless inclines him to communicate himself to the creature, when the creature exists; yet this can't be all: Because an inclination in God to communicate himself to an object, seems to presuppose the existence of the object, at least in idea. But the diffusive disposition that excited God to give creatures existence, was rather a communicative disposition in general, or a disposition in the fulness of the divinity to flow out and diffuse itself. Thus the disposition there is in the root and stock of a tree to diffuse and send forth its sap and life, is doubtless the reason of the communication of its sap and life to its buds, leaves and fruits, after these exist. But a disposition to communicate of its life and sap to its fruits, is not so properly the cause of it's producing those fruits, as it's disposition to communicate itself, or diffuse its sap and life in general. Therefore to speak more strictly according to truth, we may suppose, that a disposition in God, as an original property of his nature, to an emanation of his own infinite fulness, was what excited him to create the world; and so that the emanation itself was aimed at by him as a last end of the creation.

Sect. III.

Herein it is considered how, on the supposition of God's making the forementioned things his last end, he manifests a supreme and ultimate regard to himself in all his works.

In the last section I observed some things, which are actually the consequence of the creation of the world, which seem absolutely valuable in themselves, and so worthy to be made God's last end in this work. I now proceed to enquire, how God's making such things as these his last end is consistent with his making himself his last end, or his manifesting an ultimate respect to himself in his acts and works. Because this
this is a thing I have observed as agreeable to the dictates of reason, that in all his proceedings he should set himself highest. — Therefore I would endeavour to shew with respect to each of the forementioned things, that God, in making them his end, makes himself his end, so as in all to shew a supreme and ultimate respect to himself; and how his infinite love to himself and delight in himself, will naturally cause him to value and delight in these things: Or rather how a value to these things is implied in his love to himself, or value of that infinite fulness of good that is in himself.

Now with regard to the first of the particulars mention'd above, viz. God's regard to the exercise and expression of those attributes of his nature, in their proper operations and effects, which consist in a sufficiency for these operations, 'tis not hard to conceive that God's regard to himself, and value for his own perfections, should cause him to value these exercises and expressions of his perfections; and that a love to them will dispose him to love their exhibition and exertment: Inasmuch as their excellency consists in their relation to use, exercise and operation; as the excellency of wisdom consists in it's relation to, and sufficiency for, wise designs and effects. God's love to himself, and his own attributes, will therefore make him delight in that, which is the use, end and operation of these attributes. If one highly esteem and delight in the virtues of a friend, as wisdom, justice, &c. that have relation to action, this will make him delight in the exercise and genuine effects of these virtues: So if God both esteem, and delight in his own perfections and virtues, he can't but value and delight in the expressions and genuine effects of them. So that in delighting in the expressions of his perfections, he manifests a delight in his own perfections themselves: Or in other words, he manifests a delight in himself; and in making these expressions of his own perfections his end, he makes himself his end.

And with respect to the second and third particulars, the matter is no less plain. For he that loves any being, and has a disposition highly to prize, and greatly to delight in his virtues and perfections, must from the same disposition be well pleased to have his excellencies known, acknowledged, esteemed and prized by others. He that loves and approves any
any being or thing, he naturally loves and approves the love and approbation of that thing, and is opposite to the disapprobation and contempt of it. Thus it is when one loves another, and highly prizes the virtues of a friend. And thus it is fit it should be, if it be fit that the other should be beloved, and his qualification priz'd. And therefore thus it will necessarily be, if a being loves himself and highly prizes his own excellencies: And thus it is fit it should be, if it be fit he should thus love himself, and prize his own valuable qualities. That is, 'tis fit that he should take delight in his own excellencies being seen, acknowledged, esteemed, and delighted in. This is implied in a love to himself and his own perfections. And in seeking this, and making this his end, he seeks himself, and makes himself his end.

**And with respect to the fourth and last particular, viz. God's being disposed to an abundant communication, and glorious emanation of that infinite fulness of good which he possesses in himself; as of his own knowledge, excellency, and happiness, in the manner which he does; if we thoroughly and properly consider the matter, it will appear, that herein also God makes himself his end, in such a sense, as plainly to manifest and testify a supreme and ultimate regard to himself.**

**Meekly in this disposition to diffuse himself, or to cause an emanation of his glory and fulness, which is prior to the existence of any other being, and is to be consider'd as the inciting cause of creation, or giving existence to other beings, God can't so properly be said to make the creature his end, as himself.**—For the creature is not as yet considered as existing. This disposition or desire in God, must be prior to the existence of the creature, even in intention and foresight. For it is a disposition that is the original ground of the existence of the creature; and even of the future intended and foreseen existence of the creature.—God's love, or benevolence, as it respects the creature, may be taken either in a larger, or stricter sense. In a larger sense it may signify nothing diverse from that good disposition in his nature to communicate of his own fulness in general; as his knowledge, his holiness, and happiness; and to give creatures existence in order to it. This may be called benevolence
lence or love, because it is the same good disposition that is exercised in love: 'Tis the very fountain from whence love originally proceeds, when taken in the most proper sense; and it has the same general tendency and effect in the creature's well-being.—But yet this can't have any particular present or future created existence for its object; because it is prior to any such object, and the very source of the futuritue of the existence of it. Nor is it really diverse from God's love to himself; as will more clearly appear afterwards.

But God's love may be taken more strictly, for this general disposition to communicate good, as directed to particular objects: Love in the most strict and proper sense, presupposes the existence of the object beloved, at least in idea and expectation, and represented to the mind as future. God did not love angels in the strictest sense, but in consequence of his intending to create them, and so having an idea of future existing angels. Therefore his love to them was not properly what excited him to intend to create them. Love or benevolence strictly taken, presupposes an existing object, as much as pity, a miserable suffering object.

This propensity in God to diffuse himself, may be consider'd as a propensity to himself diffused; or to his own glory existing in its emanation. A respect to himself, or an infinite propensity to, and delight in his own glory, is that which causes him to incline to its being abundantly diffused, and to delight in the emanation of it. Thus that nature in a tree, by which it purs forth buds, shoots out branches, and brings forth leaves and fruit, is a disposition that emanates in its own compleat self. And to the disposition in the sun to shine, or abundantly to diffuse its fulness, warmth and brightness, is only a tendency to its own most glorious and compleat state. So God looks on the communication of himself, and the emanation of the infinite glory and good that are in himself to belong to the fulness and compleatness of himself; as tho' he were not in his most compleat and glorious state without it. Thus the church of Christ (toward whom, and in whom are the emanations of his glory and communications of his fulness) is called the fulness of Christ: As tho' he were not in his compleat state without
without her; as Adam was in a defeotive state without Eve. And the church is call'd the glory of Chrifl, as the woman is the glory of the man, 1 Cor. xi. 7.—Ifai. xlvi. 13. I will place salvation in Zion, for Israel my glory.*—Indeed after the creatures are intended to be created, God may be conceived of as being moved by benevolence to these creatures, in the strictest fense, in his dealings with, and works about them. His exercising his goodnefs, and gratifying his benevolence to them in particular, may be the spring of all God's proceedings thro' the universe; as being now the determin'd way of gratifying his general inclination to diffuse himself. Here God's acting for himself, or making himself his laft end, and his acting for their fake, are not to be fet in opposition; or to be considered as the oppofite parts of a disjunction: They are rather to be considered as coinciding one with the other, and implied one in the other. But yet God is to be considered as first and original in his regard; and the creature is the object of God's regard confequenti- and by implication as being as it were comprehended in God; as shall be more particularly observe'd presently.

But how God's value for and delight in the emanations of his fulnefs in the work of creation, argues his delight in the infinite fulnefs of good there is in himself, and the supreme

* Very remarkable is that place, Joh. xii. 23, 24. "And Jefus answered them faying: the hour is come that the fon of man should be glorified. Verily I fay unto you, except a corn of wheat fall into the ground and die, it abideth alone; but if it die it bringeth forth much fruit." He had refpect herein, to the blessed fruits of Chrifl's death, in the converfion, falvation, and eternal happiness and holinefs of thofe that fhould be redeemed by him. This confequence of his death, he calls his glory; and his obtaining this fruit he calls his being glorified: As the flourishing beautiful produce of a corn of wheat fown in the ground is its glory. Without this he is alone as Adam was before Eve was created: But from him by his death proceeds a glorious offpring; in which he is communicated, that is his fulnefs and glory: As from Adam in his deep fleep proceeds the woman a beautiful companion to fill his emptinefs, and relieve his folitarinefs. By Chrifl's death, his fulnefs is abundant-ly diffufed in many streams; and expressed in the beauty and glory of a great multitude of his spiritual offpring.
preme respect and regard he has for himself; and that in making these emanations of himself his end, he does ultimately make himself his end in creation, will more clearly appear by considering more particularly the nature and circumstances of these communications of God’s fulness which are made, and which we have reason either from the nature of things, or the word of God to suppose shall be made.

One part of that divine fulness which is communicated, is the divine knowledge. That communicated knowledge which must be supposed to pertain to God’s last end in creating the world, is the creatures knowledge of him. For this is the end of all other knowledge: And even the faculty of understanding would be vain without this. And this knowledge is most properly a communication of God’s infinite knowledge which primarily consists in the knowledge of himself. God in making this his end, makes himself his end. This knowledge in the creature, is but a conformity to God. 'Tis the image of God’s own knowledge of himself. 'Tis a participation of the same: 'Tis as much the same as 'tis possible for that to be, which is infinitely less in degree: As particular beams of the sun communicated, are the light and glory of the sun in part.

Besides God’s perfections, or his glory, is the object of this knowledge, or the thing known; so that God is glorified in it, as hereby his excellency is seen. As therefore God values himself, as he delights in his own knowledge; he must delight in every thing of that nature: As he delights in his own light, he must delight in every beam of that light. And as he highly values his own excellency, he must be well pleased in having it manifested, and so glorified.

Another thing wherein the emanation of divine fulness that is, and will be made in consequence of the creation of the world, is the communication of virtue and holiness to the creature. This is a communication of God’s holiness; so that hereby the creature partakes of God’s own moral excellency; which is properly the beauty of the divine nature. And as God delights in his own beauty, he must necessarily delight in the creatures holiness; which is a conformity
conformity to, and participation of it, as truly as the brightness of a jewel, held in the sun’s beams, is a participation, or derivation of the sun’s brightness, tho’ immensely less in degree.—And then it must be considered wherein this holiness in the creature consists; viz. in love, which is the comprehension of all true virtue; and primarily in love to God, which is exercised in an high esteem of God, admiration of his perfections, complacency in them, and praise of them. All which things are nothing else but the hearts exalting, magnifying, or glorifying God; which as I shew’d before, God necessarily approves of, and is pleased with, as he loves himself, and values the glory of his own nature.

Another part of God’s fulness which he communicates, is his happiness. This happiness consists in enjoying and rejoicing in himself: And so does also the creatures happiness. ’Tis, as has been observed of the other, a participation of what is in God; and God and his glory are the objective ground of it. The happiness of the creature consists in rejoicing in God; by which also God is magnified and exalted: Joy, or the exulting of the heart in God’s glory, is one thing that belongs to praise.—So that God is all in all, with respect to each part of that communication of the divine fulness which is made to the creature. What is communicated is divine, or something of God: And each communication is of that nature, that the creature to whom it is made, is thereby conform’d to God, and united to him; and that in proportion as the communication is greater or less. And the communication itself, is no other, in the very nature of it, than that wherein the very honor, exaltation and praise of God consists.

And ’tis farther to be considered, that the thing which God aimed at in the creation of the world, as the end which he had ultimately in view, was that communication of himself, which he intended throughout all eternity. And if we attend to the nature and circumstances of this eternal emanation of divine good, it will more clearly shew how in making this his end, God testifies a supreme respect to himself, and makes himself his end. There are many reasons to think that what God has in view, in an increasing communication of himself throughout eternity, is an increasing knowledge
knowledge of God, love to him, and joy in him. And it is to be consider'd that the more those divine communications increase in the creature, the more it becomes one with God: For so much the more is it united to God in love, the heart is drawn nearer and nearer to God, and the union with him becomes more firm and close: and at the same time the creature becomes more and more conform'd to God. The image is more and more perfect, and so the good that is in the creature comes forever nearer and nearer to an identity with that which is in God. In the view therefore of God, who has a comprehensive prospect of the increasing union and conformity through eternity, it must be an infinitely strict and perfect nearness, conformity, and oneness. For it will for ever come nearer and nearer to that strictness and perfection of union which there is between the Father and the Son: So that in the eyes of God, who perfectly sees the whole of it, in its infinite progress and increase, it must come to an eminent fulfilment of Christ's request, in Joh. xvii. 21, 23.—"That they all may be one, as thou Father art in me, & I in thee, that they also may be one in us, I in them and thou in me, that they may be made perfect in one." In this view, those elect creatures which must be looked upon as the end of all the rest of the creation, considered with respect to the whole of their eternal duration, and as such made God's end, must be viewed as being, as it were, one with God. They were respected as brought home to him, united with him, centering most perfectly in him, and as it were swallowed up in him: so that his respect to them finally coincides and becomes one and the same with respect to himself— The interest of the creature, is, as it were, God's own interest, in proportion to the degree of their relation and union to God. Thus the interest of a man's family is look'd upon as the same with his own interest; because of the relation they stand in to him; his propriety in them, and their strict union with him. But consider God's elect creatures with respect to their eternal duration, so they are infinitely dearer to God, than a man's family is to him.— What has been said, shews that as all things are from God as their first cause and fountain; so all things tend to him, and in their progress come nearer & nearer to him through all eternity: which argues that he who is their first cause is their last end.

S E C T.
Some objections considered which may be made against the reasonableness of what has been said of God's making himself his last end.

Object. 1. Some may object against what has been said, as inconsistent with God's absolute independence and immutability: particularly the representation that has been made, as tho' God were inclined to a communication of his fulness and emanations of his own glory, as being his own most glorious and compleat state. It may be thought that this don't well consist with God's being self-existent from all eternity; absolutely perfect in himself, in the possession of infinite and independent good. And that in general, to suppose that God makes himself his end, in the creation of the world, seems to suppose that he aims at some interest or happiness of his own, not easily reconcileable with his being happy, perfectly & infinitely happy in himself. If it could be supposed that God needed anything; or that the goodness of his creatures could extend to him; or that they could be profitable to him; it might be fit, that God should make himself, and his own interest, his highest and laft end in creating the world: and there would be some reason and ground for the preceding discourse. But seeing that God is above all need and all capacity of being added to and advanced, made better or happier in any respect; to what purpose should God make himself his end; or seek to advance himself in any respect by any of his works? How absurd is it to suppose that God should do such great things with a view to obtain, what he is already most perfectly possessed of, and was so from all eternity; and therefore can't now possibly need, nor with any colour of reason be supposed to seek?

Answer 1. Many have wrong notions of God's happiness, as resulting from his absolute self-sufficiency, independence, and immutability. Tho' it be true, that God's glory and happiness are in and of himself, are infinite and can't be added to, unchangeable for the whole and every part of which he is perfectly independent of the creature; yet
yet it don't hence follow, nor is it true, that God has no real and proper delight, pleasure or happiness, in any of his acts or communications relative to the creature; or effects he produces in them; or in any thing he sees in the creatures qualifications, dispositions, actions and state. God may have a real and proper pleasure or happiness in seeing the happy state of the creature: yet this may not be different from his delight in himself; being a delight in his own infinite goodness; or the exercise of that glorious propensity of his nature to diffuse and communicate himself, and so gratifying this inclination of his own heart. — This delight which God has in his creature's happiness, can't properly be said to be what God receives from the creature. For 'tis only the effect of his own work in, and communications to the creature; in making it, and admitting it to a participation of his fulness. As the sun receives nothing from the jewel that receives its light, and shines only by a participation of its brightness.

With respect also to the creature's holiness; God may have a proper delight and joy in imparting this to the creature, as gratifying hereby his inclination, to communicate of his own excellent fulness. God may delight with true and great pleasure in beholding that beauty which is an image and communication of his own beauty, an expression and manifestation of his own loveliness. And this is so far from being an instance of his happiness not being in and from himself, that 'tis an evidence that he is happy in himself, or delights and has pleasure in his own beauty. If he did not take pleasure in the expression of his own beauty, it would rather be an evidence that he don't delight in his own beauty; that he hath not his happiness and enjoyment in his own beauty and perfection. — So that if we suppose God has real pleasure and happiness in the holy love and praise of his saints, as the image and communication of his own holiness, it is not properly any pleasure distinct from the pleasure he has in himself; but is truly an instance of it.

And with respect to God's being glorified in this respect, that those perfections wherein his glory consists, are exercised and expressed in their proper and corresponding effects;
as his wisdom in wise designs and well-contrived works,—his power in great effects—his justice in acts of righteousness—his goodness in communicating happiness; and so his shewing forth the glory of his own nature, in its being exercised, exhibited, communicated, known, and esteemed; his having delight herein does not argue that his pleasure or happiness is not in himself, and his own glory; but the contrary. This is the necessary consequence of his delighting in the glory of his nature, that he delights in the emanation and effulgence of it.

Nor do any of these things argue any dependence in God on the creature for happiness. Though he has real pleasure in the creature's holiness and happiness; yet this is not properly any pleasure which he receives from the creature. For these things are what he gives the creature. They are wholly and entirely from him. Therefore they are nothing that they give to God by which they add to him. His rejoicing therein is rather a rejoicing in his own acts, and his own glory expressed in those acts, than a joy derived from the creature. God's joy is dependent on nothing besides his own act, which he exerts with an absolute and independent power. And yet, in some sense it can be truly said that God has the more delight and pleasure for the holiness and happiness of his creatures. Because God would be less happy, if he was less good; or if he had not that perfection of nature which consists in a propensity of nature to diffuse of his own fulness. And he would be less happy, if it were possible for him to be hindered in the exercise of his goodness, and his other perfections in their proper effects. But he has compleat happiness, because he has these perfections, and can't be hindered in exercising and displaying them in their proper effects. And this surely is not thus, because he is dependent; but because he is independent on any other that should hinder him.

From this view it appears, that nothing that has been said is in the least inconsistent with those expressions in the Scripture that signify that man can't be profitable to God; that he receives nothing of us by any of our wisdom and righteousness. For these expressions plainly mean no more than
than that God is absolutely independent of us; that we have nothing of our own, no stock from whence we can give to God; and that no part of his happiness originates from man.

From what has been said it appears, that the pleasure that God hath in those things which have been mentioned, is rather a pleasure in diffusing and communicating to the creature, than in receiving from the creature. Surely, 'tis no argument of indigence in God, that he is inclined to communicate of his infinite fulness. 'Tis no argument of the eminence or deficiency of a fountain, that it is inclined to overflow. — Another thing signified by these expressions of Scripture is, that nothing that is from the creature, adds to or alters God's happiness, as tho' it were changeable either by encrease or diminution. Nor does any thing that has been advanced in the least suppose or infer that it does, or is it in the least inconsistent with the eternity, and most absolute immutability of God's pleasure and happiness. — For tho' these communications of God, these exercises, operations, effects and expressions of his glorious perfections, which God rejoices in, are in time; yet his joy in them is without beginning or change. They were always equally present in the divine mind. He beheld them with equal clearness certainty and fulness in every respect, as he doth now. They were always equally present; as with him there is no variability or succession. He ever beheld and enjoyed them perfectly in his own independent and immutable power and will. And his view of, and joy in them is eternally, absolutely perfect unchangeable and independent. It can't be added to or diminished by the power or will of any creature: nor is in the least dependent on any thing mutable or contingent.

2. If any are not satisfied with the preceding answer, but still insist on the objection: let them consider whether they can devise any other scheme of God's last end in creating the world, but what will be equally obnoxious to this objection in its full force, if there be any force in it. For if God had any last end in creating the world, then there was something, in some respect future, that he aimed at, and designd to bring to pass by creat-
ing the world: something that was agreeable to his inclination or will: let that be his own glory, or the happiness of his creatures, or what it will. Now if there be something that God seeks as agreeable, or grateful to him, then in the accomplishment of it he is gratified. If the last end which he seeks in the creation of the world, be truly a thing grateful to him, (as certainly it is if it be truly his end and truly the object of his will) then it is what he takes a real delight and pleasure in. But then according to the argument of the objection, how he can have any thing future to desire or seek, who is already perfectly, eternally and immutably satisfied in himself? What can remain for him to take any delight in or to be further gratified by, whose eternal and unchangeable delight is in himself as his own compleat object of enjoyment. Thus the objector will be pressed with his own objection; let him embrace what notion he will of God's end in the creation. And I think he has no way left to answer but that which has been taken above.

It may therefore be proper here to observe, that let what will be God's last end, that, he must have a real and proper pleasure in: Whatever be the proper object of his will, he is gratified in. And the thing is either grateful to him in itself; or for something else for which he wills it: And so is his further end. But whatever is God's last end, that he wills for its own sake; as grateful to him in itself: or which is the same thing; it is that which he truly delights in; or in which he has some degree of true and proper pleasure. Otherwise we must deny any such thing as will in God with respect to any thing brought to pass in time; and so must deny his work of creation, or any work of his providence to be truly voluntary. But we have as much reason to suppose that God's works in creating and governing the world, are properly the fruits of his will, as of his understanding. And if there be any such thing at all, as what we mean by acts of will in God; then he is not indifferent whether his will be fulfilled or not. And if he is not indifferent, then he is truly gratified and pleased in the fulfilment of his will: or which is the same thing, he has a pleasure in it. And if he has a real pleasure in attaining his end, then the attainment of it belongs to his happiness.
happiness. That in which God's delight or pleasure in any measure consists is his happiness in some measure consists. To suppose that God has pleasure in things, that are brought to pass in time, only figuratively and metaphorically; is to suppose that he exercises will about these things, and makes them his end only metaphorically.

3. The doctrine that makes God's creatures and not himself, to be his last end, is a doctrine the farthest from having a favourable aspect on God's absolute self-sufficiency and independence. It far less agrees therewith than the doctrine against which this is objected. For we must conceive of the efficient as depending on his ultimate end. He depends on this end, in his desires, aims, actions and pursuits; so that he fails in all his desires actions and pursuits, if he fails of his end. — Now if God himself be his last end, then in his dependence on his end, he depends on nothing but himself. If all things be of him, and to him, and he the first and the last, this shews him to be all in all: He is all to himself. He goes not out of himself in what he seeks; but his desires and pursuits as they originate from, so they terminate in himself; and he is dependent on none but himself in the beginning or end of any of his exercises or operations. But if not himself, but the creature, be his last end, then as he depends on his last end, he is in some sort dependent on the creature.

Object. 2. Some may object, that to suppose that God makes himself his highest and last end, is dishonourable to him; as it in effect supposes, that God does every thing from a selfish spirit. Selfishness is looked upon as mean and forcid in the creature! unbecoming and even hateful in such a worm of the dust as man. We should look upon a man as of a base and contemptible character, that should in every thing he did, be governed by selfish principles; shou'd make his private interest his governing aim in all his conduct in life. How far then should we be from attributing any such thing to the supream Being, the blessed and only potentate! Does it not become us to ascribe to him, the most noble and generous dispositions; and those qualities that are the most remote from every thing that is private, narrow and forcid?
Sect. IV.

Anf. 1. Such an objection must arise from a very ignorant or inconsiderate notion of the vice of selfishness, and the virtue of generosity. It by selfishness be meant, a disposition in any being to regard himself; this is no otherwise vicious or unbecoming, than as one is less than a multitude; and so the public weal is of greater value than his particular interest. Among created beings one single person must be looked upon as inconsiderable in comparison of the generality; and so his interest as of little importance compared with the interest of the whole system: Therefore in them, a disposition to prefer self, as if it were more than all is exceeding vicious. But it is vicious on no other account, than as it is a disposition that don't agree with the nature of things; and that which is indeed the greatest good. And a disposition in any one to forego his own interest for the sake of others, is no further excellent, no further worthy the name of generosity than it is a treating things according to their true value; a prosecuting something most worthy to be prosecuted; an expression of a disposition to prefer something to self-interest, that is indeed preferable in it felt. But if God be indeed so great, and so excellent, that all other beings are as nothing to him, and all other excellency be as nothing and less than nothing, and vanity in comparison of his; and God be omniscient and infallible and perfectly knows that he is infinitely the most valuable being; then it is fit that his heart should be agreeable to this, which is indeed the true nature and proportion of things and agreeable to this infallible and all-comprehending understanding which he has of them, and that perfectly clear light in which he views them; and so 'tis fit and suitable that he should value himself infinitely more than his creatures.

2. In created beings, a regard to self-interest may properly be set in opposition to the public welfare; because the private interest of one person may be inconsistent with the public good: at least it may be so in the apprehension of that person. That, which this person looks upon as his interest may interfere with, or oppose the general good—Hence his private interest may be regarded and pursued in opposition to the public—But this can't be with respect to the suprem Being, the author & head of the whole system;
on whom all absolutely depend; who is the fountain of being and good to the whole. It is more absurd to suppose that his interest should be opposite to the interest of the universal system, than that the welfare of the head, heart and vitals of the natural body, should be opposite to the welfare of the body. And it is impossible that God, who is omnipotent shall apprehend the matter thus; viz. his interest, as being inconsistent with the good and interest of the whole.

3. GOD's seeking himself in the creation of the world, in the manner which has been supposed, is so far from being inconsistent with the good of his creatures, or any possibility of being so; that it is a kind of regard to himself, that inclines him to seek the good of his creature. It is a regard to himself that disposes him to diffuse and communicate himself. It is such a delight in his own internal fulness and glory, that disposes him to an abundant effusion and emanation of that glory. The same disposition, that inclines him to delight in his glory, causes him to delight in the exhibitions, expressions and communications of it. This is a natural conclusion—If there were any person of such a taste and disposition of mind, that the brightness and light of the sun seem'd unlovely to him, he would be willing that the sun's brightness and light should be retained within itself: But they, that delight in it, to whom it appears lovely and glorious, will esteem it an amiable and glorious thing to have it diffused and communicated through the world.

Here by the way it may be properly considered, whether some writers are not chargeable with inconsistence in this respect, viz. that whereas they speak against the doctrine of God's making himself his own highest and last end, as tho' this were an ignoble selfishness in God: when indeed he only is fit to be made the highest end, by himself and all other beings; in as much as he is the highest Being, and infinitely greater and more worthy than all others,—Yet with regard to creatures, who are infinitely less worthy of supreme and ultimate regard, they (in effect at least) suppose that they necessarily at all times seek their own happiness, and make it their ultimate end in all, even their most
most virtuous actions: And that this principle, regulated by wisdom and prudence, as leading to that which is their true and highest happiness is the foundation of all virtue and every thing that is morally good and excellent in them.

Object. 3. To what has been has been supposed, that God makes himself his end in this way, viz. in seeking that his glory & excellent perfection should be known, esteemed, loved and delighted in by his creatures, it may be objected, that this seems unworthy of God. It is considered as below a truly great man, to be much influenced in his conduct, by a desire of popular applause. The notice and admiration of a gazing multitude, would be esteemed but a low end, to be aimed at by a prince or philosopher, in any great and noble enterprize. How much more is it unworthy the great God, to perform his magnificent works, e. g. the creation of the vast universe, out of regard to the notice and admiration of worms of the dust: That the displays of his magnificence may be gazed at, and applauded by those who are infinitely more beneath him, than the meanest rabble are beneath the greatest prince or philosopher.

This objection is specious. It hath a shew of argument; but it will appear to be nothing but a shew, if we consider,

1. Whether or no it be not worthy of God, to regard and value what is excellent and valuable in itself; and so to take pleasure in its existence.

It seems not liable to any doubt, that there could be nothing future, or no future existence worthy to be desired or sought by God, and so worthy to be made his end, if no future existence was valuable and worthy to be brought to effect. If when the world was not, there was any possible future thing fit and valuable in itself, I think the knowledge of God's glory, and the esteem and love of it must be so. Understanding and will are the highest kind of created existence. And if they be valuable, it must be in their exercise. But the highest and most excellent kind of their exercise, is in some actual knowledge and exercise of will. And certainly the most excellent actual knowledge and will,
will, that can be in the creature, is the knowledge and the love of God. And the most true excellent knowledge of God is the knowledge of his glory or moral excellence: and the most excellent exercise of the will consists in esteem and love and a delight in his glory.—If any created existence is in itself worthy to be, or any thing that ever was future is worthy of existence, such a communication of divine fulness, such an emanation and expression of the divine glory is worthy of existence. But if nothing that ever was future was worthy to exist, then no future thing was worthy to be aimed at by God in creating the world. And if nothing was worthy to be aimed at in creation, then nothing was worthy to be God's end in creation.

If God's own excellency and glory is worthy to be high-ly valued and delighted in by him, then the value and esteem hereof by others, is worthy to be regarded by him: for this is a necessary consequence. To make this plain, let it be considered how it is with regard to the excellent qualities of another. If we highly value the virtues and excellencies of a friend, in proportion as we do so, we shall approve of and like others esteem of them; and shall disapprove and dislike the contempt of them. If these virtues are truly valuable, they are worthy that we should thus approve others esteem, and disapprove their contempt of them.—And the case is the same with respect to any Being's own qualities or attributes. If he highly esteem them, and greatly delights in them, he will naturally and necessarily love to see esteem of them in others, & dislike their disesteem. And if the attributes are worthy to be highly esteem'd by the Being who hath them, so is the esteem of them in others worthy to be proportionably approved, and regarded. —I desire it may be considered, whether it be unfit that God should be displeas'd with contempt of himself? If not, but on the contrary it be fit and suitable that he should be displeased with this, there is the same reason that he should be pleased with the proper love esteem and honor of himself.

The matter may be also cleared, by considering what it would become us to approve of and value with respect to any public society we belong to, e. g. our nation or country.
It becomes us to love our country; and therefore it becomes us to value the just honor of our country. But the same that it becomes us to value and desire for a friend, and the same that it becomes us to desire and seek for the community, the same does it become God to value and seek for himself; that is on supposition it becomes God to love himself as well as it does men to love a friend or the public; which I think has been before proved.

Here are two things that ought particularly to be advaunted to—1. That in God the love of himself, and the love of the public are not to be distinguished, as in man. Because God's Being as it were comprehends all. His existence, being infinite, must be equivalent to universal existence. And for the same reason that public affection in the creature is fit and beautiful, God's regard to himself must be to likewise. 2. In God, the love of what is fit and decent, or the love of virtue, can't be a distinct thing from the love of himself. Because the love of God is that wherein all virtue and holiness does primarily and chiefly consist, and God's own holiness must primarily consist in the love of himself; as was before observed. And if God's holiness consists in love to himself, then it will imply an approbation of and pleasedness with the esteem and loveliness of him in others. For a Being that loves himself, necessarily loves Love to himself. If holiness in God consist chiefly in love to himself, holiness in the creature must chiefly consist in love to him. And if God loves holiness in himself, he must love it in the creature.

Virtue by such of the late philosophers as seem to be in chief repute, is placed in public affection or general benevolence. And if the essence of virtue lies primarily in this, then the love of virtue itself is virtuous, no otherwise, than as it is implied in or arises from this public affection, or extensive benevolence of mind. Because if a man truly loves the public, he necessarily loves Love to the public.

Now therefore, for the same reason, if universal benevolence in the highest sense, be the same thing with benevolence to the divine Being, who is in effect universal Being, it will follow, that love to virtue itself is no otherwise virtuous, than as it is implied in or arises from love to the divine
divine Being. Consequently God's own love to virtue is implied in love to himself: and is virtuous no otherwise than as it arises from love to himself. So that God's virtuous disposition, appearing in love to holiness in the creature, is to be resolved into the same thing with love to himself. And consequentially wherever he makes virtue his end he makes himself his end. — In fine, God being as it were an all-comprehending being, all his moral perfections, as his holiness, justice, grace and benevolence are some way or other to be resolved into a suprem and infinite regard to himself: and if so it will be easy to suppose that it becomes him to make himself his suprem and last end in his works.

I would here observe by the way, that if any insist that it becomes God to love and take delight in the virtue of his creatures for its own sake, in such a manner as not to love it from regard to himself; and that it supposeth too much selfishness to suppose that all God's delight in virtue is to be resolved into delight in himself: This will contradict a former objection against God's taking pleasure in communications of himself; viz. that inasmuch as God is perfectly independent and self-sufficient therefore all his happiness and pleasure consists in the enjoyment of himself. For in the present objection it is insisted that it becomes God to have some pleasure, love or delight in virtue distinct from his delight in himself. So that if the same persons make both objections they must be inconsistent with themselves.

2. In answer to the objection we are upon; as to God's creatures whose esteem and love he seeks, being infinitely inferior to God as nothing and vanity. — I would observe that it is not unworthy of God to take pleasure in that which in itself is fit and amiable, even in those that are infinitely below him. If there be infinite grace and condescension in it, yet these are not unworthy of God; but infinitely to his honour and glory.

They who insist that God's own glory was not an ultimate end of his creation of the world; but that all that he had any ultimate regard to was the happiness
of his creatures; and suppose that he made his creatures, and not himself his last end; do it under a colour of exalting and magnifying God's benevolence and love to his creatures.—But if his love to them be so great, and he so highly values them as to look upon them worthy to be his end in all his great works as they suppose; they are not consistent with themselves, in supposing that God has so little value for their love and esteem. For as the nature of love, especially great love causes him that loves to value the esteem of the person beloved: so that God should take pleasure in the creatures just love and esteem will follow both from God's love to himself and his love to his creatures. If he esteem and love himself, he must approve of esteem and love to himself; and disapprove the contrary. And if he loves and values the creature, he must value and take delight in their mutual love and esteem: because he loves not because he needs them.

3. As to what is alleged of its being unworthy of great men to be governed in their conduct and achievements by a regard to the applause of the populace: I would observe, what makes their applause to be worthy of so little regard, is their ignorance, giddiness and injustice. The applause of the multitude very frequently is not founded on any just view and understanding of things, but on humour, mistake, folly and unreasonable affections. Such applause is truly worthy to be disregarded—But 'tis not beneath a man of the greatest dignity and wisdom, to value the wife and just esteem of others, however inferior to him. The contrary, instead of being an expression of greatness of mind, would shew an haughty and mean spirit. 'Tis such an esteem in his creatures only, that God hath any regard to: for 'tis such an esteem only that is fit and amiable in itself.

Object. 4. To suppose that God makes himself his ultimate end in the creation of the world derogates from the treasurers of his goodness, in his beneficence to his creatures: and from their obligations to gratitude for the good communicated. For if God, in communicating his fulness, makes himself, and not the creatures, his end; then what good he does, he does for himself, and not for them; for his own sake, and not theirs.
Anf. God and the creature in this affair of the emanation of the divine fulness, are not properly set in opposition; or made the opposite parts of a disjunction. Nor ought God's glory and the creatures good, to be spoken of as if they were properly and entirely distinct, as they are in the objection. This supposeth, that God's having respect to his glory and the communication of good to his creatures, are things altogether different: that God's communicating his fulness for himself, and his doing it for them, are things standing in a proper disjunction and opposition. — Whereas if we were capable of having more full and perfect views of God and divine things, which are so much above us, 'tis probable it would appear very clear to us, that the matter is quite otherwise: and that these things, instead of appearing entirely distinct, are implied one in the other. That God in seeking his glory, therein seeks the good of his creatures. Because the emanation of his glory (which he seeks and delights in, as he delights in himself & his own eternal glory) implies the communicated excellency and happiness of his creature. And that in communicating his fulness for them, he does it for himself. Because their good, which he seeks, is so much in union and communion with himself. God is their good. Their excellency and happiness is nothing, but the emanation and expression of God's glory: God in seeking their glory and happiness, seeks himself: and in seeking himself, i.e. himself diffused and expressed, (which he delights in, as he delights in his own beauty and fulness) he seeks their glory and happiness.

This will the better appear, if we consider the degree and manner, in which he aimed at the creatures excellency and happiness in his creating the world; viz. the degree and manner of the creatures glory and happiness during the whole of the design'd eternal duration of the world, he was about to create: which is in greater and greater nearness and strictness of union with himself, and greater and greater communion and participation with him in his own glory and happiness, in constant progression, throughout all eternity. As the creature's good was viewed in this manner when God made the world for it, viz. with respect to the whole of the eternal duration of it, and the eternally progressive union and communion with him; so the creature must
must be viewed as in infinite strict union with himself. In this view it appears that God's respect to the creature, in the whole, unites with his respect to himself. Both regards are like two lines which seem at the beginning to be separate, but aim finally to meet in one, both being directed to the same center.—And as to the good of the creature itself, if viewed in its whole duration, and infinite progression, it must be viewed as infinite; and so not only being some communication of God's glory, but as coming nearer and nearer to the same thing in its infinite fullness. The nearer any thing comes to infinite, the nearer it comes to an identity with God. And if any good, as viewed by God, is beheld as infinite, it can't be viewed as a distinct thing from God's own infinite glory.

The apostle's discourse of the great love of Christ to men, Eph. 5. 25. to the end, leads us thus to think of the love of Christ to his church; as coinciding with his love to himself, by virtue of the strict union of the church with him. Thus "husbands love your wives, as Christ also loved the church, and gave himself for it—that he might present it to himself a glorious church. So ought men to love their wives, as their own bodies. He that loveth his wife loveth himself—even as the Lord the church; for we are members of his body, of his flesh, and of his bones."

Now I apprehend that there is nothing in this manner of God's seeking the good of the creatures, or in his disposition to communicate of his own fulness to them, that at all derogates from the excellence of it, or the creature's obligation.

God's disposition to communicate good, or to cause his own infinite fulness to flow forth, is not the less properly called God's goodness, because the good that he communicates, is something of himself; a communication of his own glory, and what he delights in as he delights in his own glory. The creature has no less benefit by it; neither has such a disposition less of a direct tendency to the creature's benefit; or the less of a tendency to love to the creature, when the creature comes to exist. Nor is this disposition in God to communicate of and diffuse his own good, the less excellent
excellent, because it is implied in his love and regard to himself. For his love to himself don't imply it any otherwise, but as it implies a love to whatever is worthy and excellent. The emanation of God's glory, is in itself worthy and excellent, and so God delights in it: and his delight in this excellent thing, is implied in his love to himself, or his own fulness; because that is the fountain, and so the sum and comprehension of every thing that is excellent. And the matter standing thus, 'tis evident, that these things cannot derogate from the excellency of this disposition in God, to an emanation of his own fulness, or communication of good to the creature.

Nor does God's inclination to communicate good in this manner, i.e. from regard to himself, or delight in his own glory, at all diminish the freeness of his beneficence in this communication. This will appear, if we consider particularly, in what ways, doing good to others from self-love, may be inconsistent with the freeness of beneficence. And I conceive there are only these two ways,

1. When any does good to another from confined self-love, that is opposite to a general benevolence. This kind of self-love is properly call'd selfishness. In some sense, the most benevolent generous person in the world, seeks his own happiness in doing good to others; because he places his happiness in their good. His mind is so enlarged as to take them, as it were, into himself. Thus when they are happy he feels it, he partakes with them, and is happy in their happiness. This is so far from being inconsistent with the freeness of beneficence, that on the contrary, free benevolence and kindness consists in it. The most free beneficence that can be in men, is doing good, not from a confined selfishness, but from a disposition to general benevolence, or love to beings in general.

But now, with respect to the divine being, there is no such thing as such confined selfishness in him, or a love to himself, opposite to general benevolence. It is impossible, because he comprehends all entity, and all excellence in his own essence. The first Being, the eternal and infinite Being, is in effect, Being in general; and comprehends universal
universal existence, as was observed before. God in his benevolence to his creatures, can't have his heart enlarged in such a manner as to take in beings that he finds, who are originally out of himself, distinct and independent. This can't be in an infinite being, who exists alone from eternity. But he, from his goodness, as it were enlarges himself in a more excellent and divine manner. This is by communicating and diffusing himself; and so instead of finding, making objects of his benevolence: not by taking into himself what he finds distinct from himself, and so partaking of their good, and being happy in them; but by flowing forth, and expressing himself in them, and making them to partake of him, and rejoicing in himself expressed in them, and communicated to them.

2. Another thing, in doing good to others from self-love, that derogates from the freeness of the goodness; is doing good to others from dependence on them for the good we need, or desire: which dependence obliges. So that in our beneficence we are not self-moved, but as it were, constrained by something without ourselves. But it has been particularly shewn already, that God's making himself his end, in the manner that has been spoken of, argues no dependence; but is consistent with absolute independence and self-sufficiency.

And I would here observe, that there is something in that disposition in God to communicate goodness, which shews him to be independent and self-moved in it, in a manner that is peculiar, and above what is in the beneficence of creatures. Creatures, even the most gracious of them, are not so independent and self-moved in their goodness; but that in all the exercises of it, they are excited by some object that they find: something appearing good, or in some respect worthy of regard, presents itself, and moves their kindness. But God being all and alone is absolutely self-moved. The exercises of his communicative disposition are absolutely from within himself, not finding any thing, or any object to excite them or draw them forth: but all that is good and worthy in the object, and the very being of the object, proceeding from the over flowing of his fulness.
These things shew that the supposition of God's making himself his last end, in the manner spoken of, don't at all diminish the creature's obligation to gratitude, for communications of good it receives. For if it lessen it's obligation, it must be on one of the following accounts. Either, that the creature has not so much benefit by it; or, that the disposition it flows from is not proper goodness, not having so direct a tendency to the creatures benefit; or that the disposition is not so virtuous and excellent in it's kind; or that the beneficence is not so free. But it has been observed, that none of these things take place, with regard to that disposition, which has been supposed to have excited God to create the world.

I confess there is a degree of indistinctness and obscurity in the close consideration of such subjects, and a great imperfection in the expressions we use concerning them; arising unavoidably from the infinite sublimity of the subject, and the incomprehensibleness of those things that are divine. Hence revelation is the surest guide in these matters; and what that teaches shall in the next place be considered. Nevertheless, the endeavours used to discover what the voice of reason is, so far as it can go, may serve to prepare the way, by obviating cavils insisted on by many; and to satisfy us, that what the word of God says of the matter, is not unreasonable; and thus prepare our minds for a more full acquiescence in the instructions it gives, according to the more natural and genuine sense of words and expressions, we find often used there concerning this subject.
C H A P. II.
Wherein it is enquired, what is to be learned from holy scriptures, concerning God's last end in the creation of the world.

S E C T. I.
The scriptures represent God as making himself his own last end in the creation of the world.

It is manifest, that the scriptures speak, on all occasions, as tho' God made himself his end in all his works: and as tho' the same being, who is the first cause of all things, were the supream and last end of all things. Thus in Isai. 44. 6. "Thus saith the Lord, the king of Israel, and his redeemer the Lord of hosts, I am the first, I also am the last, and besides me there is no God". Cap. 48. 12. "I am the first, and I am the last". Rev. 1. 8. I am alpha and omega, the beginning and the ending, faith the Lord, which is, and was, and which is to come, the almighty. ver. 11. I am alpha and omega, the first and the last. ver. 17. I am the first and the last". Cap. 21. 6. "And he said unto me, it is done, I am alpha and omega, the beginning and the end". Cap. 22. 13. "I am alpha and omega, the beginning and the end, the first and the last".

And when God is so often spoken of as the last as well as the first, and the end as well as the beginning, what is meant (or at least implied) is, that as he is the first efficient cause and fountain from whence all things originate; so he is the last final cause for which they are made; the final term to which they all tend in their ultimate issue. This seems to be the most natural import of these expressions; and is confirmed by other parallel passages; as Rom. 11. 36. "For of him and thro' and to him are all things". Col. 1. 16. "For by him were all things created, that are
in heaven, and that are in earth, visible and invisible, whether they be thrones or dominions, principalities and powers, all things were created by him, and for him". Heb. 2. 10. "For it became him, by whom are all things, and for whom are all things". In Prov. 16. 4. "tis said expressly, "The Lord hath made all things for himself".

And the manner is observable, in which God is said to be the last, to whom, and for whom are all things. 'Tis evidently spoken of as a meet and suitable thing, a branch of his glory; a meet prerogative of the great, infinite and eternal being; a thing becoming the dignity of him who is infinitely above all other beings; from whom all things are, and by whom they consist, and in comparison with whom, all other things are as nothing.

Sect. II.

Wherein some positions are advanced concerning a just method of arguing in this affair, from what we find in holy scriptures.

We have seen that the scriptures speak of the creation of the world as being for God, as its end. What remains therefore to be enquired into, is, which way do the scriptures represent God as making himself his end?

It is evident that God don't make his existence or being the end of the creation; nor can he be supposed to do so without great absurdity. His being and existence can't be conceived of but as prior to any of God's acts or designs: they must be presupposed as the ground of them. Therefore it can't be in this way that God makes himself the end of his creating the world. He can't create the world to the end that he may have existence; or may have such attributes and perfections, and such an essence. Nor do the scriptures give the least intimation of any such thing. Therefore, what divine effect, or what is it in relation to God, that is the thing which the scripture teacheth us to be the end he aimed at in his works of creation, in designing of which, he makes himself his end?
In order to a right understanding of the scripture doctrine, and drawing just inferences from what we find said in the word of God relative to this matter; so to open the way to a true and definitive answer to the above enquiry, I would lay down the following positions,

Position, 1. THAT which appears to be spoken of as God's ultimate end in his works of providence in general, we may justly suppose to be his last end in the work of creation—This appears from what was observed before (under the fifth particular of the introduction) which I need not now repeat.

Pos. 2. WHEN any thing appears by the scripture to be the last end of some of the works of God, which thing appears in fact, to be the result, not only of this work, but of God's works in general. And altho' it be not mentioned as the end of those works, but only of some of them, yet being actually the result of other works as well as that, & nothing appears peculiar, in the nature of the case, that renders it a fit, and beautiful and valuable result of those particular works, more than of the rest; but it appears with equal reason desirable and valuable in the case of all works, of which it is spoken of in the word of God as (and seen in fact to be) the effect; we may justly infer, that thing to be the last end of those other works also. For we must suppose it to be on account of the valuableness of the effect, that it is made the end of those works of which it is expressly spoken of as the end: and this effect, by the supposition, being equally, and in like manner the result of the work, and of the same value, 'tis but reasonable to suppose, that it is the end of the work, of which it is naturally the consequence, in one case as well as in another.

Pos. 3. The ultimate end of God's creating the world, being also (as was before observed) the last end of all God's works of providence, and that in the highest sense, and being above all other things important, we may well presume that this end will be chiefly insisted on in the word of God, in the account it gives of God's designs and ends in his works of providence—and therefore, if there be any particular thing, that we find more frequently mentioned in scripture
scripture as God's ultimate aim in his works of providence, than any thing else, this is a presumption that this is the supreme and ultimate end of God's works in general, and so the end of the work of creation.

Pos. 4. That which appears from the word of God to be his last end with respect to the moral world, or God's last end in the creation and disposal of the intelligent part of the system, and in the moral government of the world, that is God's last end in the work of creation in general. Because it is evident, from the constitution of the world itself, as well as from the word of God, that the moral part is the end of all the rest of the creation. The inanimate unintelligent part is made for the rational as much as a house is prepared for the inhabitant. And it is evident also from reason and the word of God, that it is with regard to what is moral in them, or for the sake of some moral good in them, that moral agents are made & the world made for them. But it is further evident that whatsoever is the last end of that part of creation that is the end of all the rest, and for which all the rest of the world was made, must be the last end of the whole. If all the other parts of a watch are made for the hand of the watch, to move that aright, and for a due and proper regulation of that, then it will follow, that the last end of the hand, is the last end of the whole machine.

Pos. 5. That, which appears from the scripture to be God's last end in the chief work or works of his providence, we may well determine is God's last end in creating the world. For as was observed, we may justly infer the end of a thing from the use of it. We may justly infer the end of a clock, a chariot, a ship, or water-engine from the main use to which it is applied. But God's providence is his use of the world he has made. And if there be any work or works of providence that are evidently God's main work or works, herein appears and consists the main use that God makes of the creation. From these two last positions we may infer the next, viz.
Pof. 6. Whatever appears by the scriptures to be
God's last end in his main work or works of providence
towards the moral world, that we justly infer to be the last
end of the creation of the world. Because as was just
now observed, the moral world is the chief part of the cre-
ation and the end of the rest; and God's last end in cre-
ating that part of the world, must be his last end in the cre-
ation of the whole. And it appears by the last posi-
tion, that the end of God's main work or works of provi-
dence towards them, or the main use he puts them to,
shews the last end for which he has made them; and
consequently the main end for which he has made the whole world.

Pof. 7. That which divine revelation shews to be
God's last end with respect to that part of the moral world
which are good, or which are according to his mind, or
such as he would have them be; I say that which is
God's last end with respect to these (i.e. his last end in
their being, and in their being good) this we must sup-
pose to be the last end of God's creating the world.
For it has been already shewn that God's last end in the
moral part of creation must be the end of the whole.
But his end in that part of the moral world that are good,
must be the last end for which he has made the moral
world in general. For therein consists the goodness of a
thing, viz. in its fitness to answer its end: or at least this
must be goodness in the eyes of the author of that thing.
For goodness in his eyes is its agreeableness to his mind,
But an agreeableness to his mind in what he makes for
some end or use, must be an agreeableness or fitness to
that end. For his end in this case is his mind. That
which he chiefly aims at in that thing, is chiefly his mind
with respect to that thing. And therefore they are good
moral agents, who are fitted for the end for which God
has made moral agents: as they are good machines, in-
struments and utensils that are fitted for the end they are
designed for. And consequently that which is the chief
end to which in being good they are fitted that is the
chief end of utensils. So that which is the chief end to
which good created moral agents in being good are fitted,
this is the chief end of moral agents, or the moral part
of the creation; and consequently of the creation in general.

Pos. 8. That, which the word of God requires the intelligent and moral part of the world to seek as their main end, or to have respect to in that they do, and regulate all their conduct by, as their ultimate & highest end, that we have reason to suppose is the last end for which God has made them; and consequently by position fourth, the last end for which he has made the whole world. A main difference between the intelligent and moral parts, and the rest of the world, lies in this, that the former are capable of knowing their creator, and the end for which he made them, and capable of actively complying with his design in their creation and promoting it; while other creatures can't promote the design of their creation, only passively and eventually. And seeing they are capable of knowing the end for which their author has made them, 'tis doubtless their duty to fall in with it. Their wills ought to comply with the will of the creator in this respect, in mainly seeking the same as their last end which God mainly seeks as their last end. This must be the law of nature and reason with respect to them. And we must suppose that God's reveal'd law, and the law of nature agree; and that his will, as a lawgiver, must agree with his will as a creator. Therefore we justly infer, that the same thing which God's revealed law requires intelligent creatures to seek as their last and greatest end, that God their creator has made their last end, and so the end of the creation of the world.

Pos. 9: We may well suppose that what seems in holy scripture from time to time to be spoken of as the main end of the goodness of the good part of the moral world, so that the respect and relation their virtue or goodness has to that end, is what chiefly makes it valuable and desirable; I say, we may well suppose that to be the thing which is God's last end in the creation of the moral world; and so by position fourth, of the whole world. For the end of the goodness of a thing, is the end of the thing. Herein, it was observed before, must consist the goodness or valubleness of any thing in the eyes of him that made it for his use,
use. viz. its being good for that use, or good with respect to the end for which he made it.

Pos. 10. THAT which persons who are described in scripture as approved saints, and set forth as examples of piety, sought as their last and highest end in the things which they did, and which are mentioned as parts of their holy conversation, or instances of their good and approved behaviour; that we must suppose, was what they ought to seek as their last end; and consequently by the preceding position, was the same with God's last end in the creation of the world.

Pos. 11. THAT which appears by the word of God to be that end or event, in the desire of which, the souls of the good parts of the moral world, especially of the best, and in their best frames, do most naturally and directly exercise their goodness in, and in expressing of their desire of this event or end, they do most properly and directly express their respect to God; we may, I say, well suppose, that event or end to be the chief and ultimate end of a spirit of piety and goodness, and God's chief end in making the moral world, and so the whole world. For doubtless the most direct and natural desire and tendency of a spirit of true goodness in the good and best part of the moral world is to the chief end of goodness, and so the chief end of the creation of the moral world. And in what else can the spirit of true respect and friendship to God be expressed by way of desire, than desires of the same end, which God himself chiefly and ultimately desires and seeks in making them and all other things.

Pos. 12. SINCE the holy scriptures teach us that Jesus Christ is the head of the moral world, and especially of all the good part of it; the chief of God's servants, appointed to be the head of his saints and angels, and set forth as the chief and most perfect pattern and example of goodness; we may well suppose by the foregoing positions, that what he sought as his last end, was God's last end in the creation of the world.
Particular texts of scripture, that shew that God's glory is an ultimate end of the creation.

What God says in Isai. 48. 11. naturally leads us to suppose, that the way in which God makes himself his end in his work or works which he does for his own sake, is in making his glory his end. "For my own sake, even for my own sake will I do it. For how should my name be polluted: and I will not give my glory to another". Which is as much as to say, I will obtain my end, I will not forego my glory: another shall not take this prize from me. 'Tis pretty evident here, that God's name and his glory, which seems to intend the same thing (as shall be observed more particularly afterwards) are spoken of as his last end in the great work mentioned, not as an inferior subordinate end, subservient to the interest of others. The words are emphatical. The emphasis and repetition constrain us to understand that what God does, is ultimately for his own sake: "For my own sake, even for my own sake will I do it."

So the words of the apostle, in Rom. 11. 36. naturally lead us to suppose that the way in which all things are to God, is in being for his glory. "For of him, and through him, and to him are all things, to whom be glory forever and ever. Amen". In the preceding context the apostle observes the marvellous dispositions of divine wisdom, for causing all things to be to him in their final issue and result, as they are from him at first, & governed by him. His discourse shews how God contrived and brought this to pass in his disposition of things, viz. by setting up the kingdom of Christ in the world; leaving the jews, and calling the gentiles; and in what he would hereafter do in bringing in the jews with the fulness of the gentiles; with the circumstances of these wonderful works, so as greatly to shew his justice and his goodness, magnify his grace, and manifest the sovereignty and freeness of it, and the absolute dependence of all on him—And then in the four last verses, breaks out into a most pathetic rapturous exclamation, expressing his great admiration of the depth of divine wisdom in the
steps he takes for the attaining his end, and causing all things
to be to him: and finally, he expresses a joyful consent to
God’s excellent design in all to glorify himself, in saying,
“to him be glory forever”; as much as to say, as all
things are so wonderfully ordered for his glory, so let
him have the glory of all, forevermore.

2. The glory of God is spoken of in holy scripture as the
last end for which that part of the moral world that are good
were made. Thus in Isai. 43. 6, 7. “I will say to the
north give up, and to the south keep not back, bring my
sons from far, and my daughters from the ends of the
earth, even every one that is called by my name; for I
have created him for my glory, I have formed him, yea I
have made him”. Isai. 60. 21. “Thy people also shall be all
righteous. They shall inherit the land forever, the branch
of my planting, the work of my hand, that I may be glorified”.
chap. 61. 3. “That they may be called trees of
righteousness, the planting of the Lord, that be might be
glorified”.

In these places we see that the glory of God is spoken of
as the end of God’s saints, the end for which he makes
them, i. e. either gives them being, or gives them a being;
as saints, or both. It is said that God has made and form-
ed them to be his sons and daughters, for his own glory:
That they are trees of his planting, the work of his hands,
as trees of righteousness, that he might be glorified.—And
if we consider the words, especially as taken with the con-
text in each of the places, it will appear quite unnatural,
to suppose that God’s glory is here spoken of only as an
end inferior and subordinate to the happiness of God’s
people; or as a prediction that God would create, form
and plant them that he might be glorified, that so God’s
people might be happy. On the contrary, if we take the
places with the context, they will appear rather as pro-
mises of making God’s people happy, that God therein
might be glorified. So is that in the 43d chap. as we
shall see plainly, if we take the whole that is said from the
beginning of the chapter. ‘Tis wholly a promise of a
future, great and wonderful work of God’s power and
grace, delivering his people from all misery, and making
them
them exceeding happy; and then the end of all, or the sum of God's design in all, is declared to be God's own glory. "I have redeemed thee, I have called thee by thy name, thou art mine.— I will be with thee.—When thou walkest thro' the fire, thou shalt not be burnt, nor the flame kindle upon thee,— thou art precious and honorable in my sight. I will give men for thee, and people for thy life. Fear not, I am with thee.—I will bring my sons from far, and my daughters from the ends of the earth; every one that is called by my name: for I have created him for my glory."

So it plainly is chap. 60. ver. 21. the whole chapter is made up of nothing but promises of future, exceeding happiness to God's church. But for brevity's sake, let us take only the two preceeding verses. "The sun shall be no more thy light by day, neither for brightness shall the moon give light unto thee: but the Lord shall be unto thee an everlasting light, and thy God thy glory. Thy sun shall no more go down, neither shall thy moon withdraw itself: for the Lord shall be thine everlasting light, and the days of thy mourning shall be ended. Thy people also shall be all righteous; they shall inherit the land forever, the branch of my planting, the work of my hands," and then the end of all is added, "that I might be glorified." All the preceeding promises are plainly mentioned as so many parts or constituents of the great and exceeding happiness of God's people; and God's glory is mentioned rather as God's end, or the sum of his design in this happiness, than this happiness as the end of this glory. Just in like manner is the promise in the third verse of the next chapter. To appoint to them that mourn in Zion, to give to them beauty for ashes, the oil of joy for mourning, the garment of praise for the spirit of heavines, that they might be called trees of righteousness, the planting of the Lord, that be might be glorified". The work of God promised to be effected, is plainly an accomplishment of the joy, gladness and happiness of God's people, instead of their mourning and sorrow; and the end in which the work issues, or that in which God's design in this work is obtained and summed up, is his glory. This proves by the seventh position, that God's glory is the end of the creation.
The same thing may be argued from Jer. 13. 11. "For as a girdle cleaveth to the loins of a man, so have I caused to cleave unto me the whole house of Israel, and the whole house of Judah, faith the Lord: that they might be unto me for a people, and for a name, and for a praise, and for a glory: but they would not hear". That is, God fought to make them to be his own holy people; or, as the apostle expresses it, his peculiar people, zealous of good works; that so they might be a glory to him, as girdles were used in those days for ornament and beauty, and as badges of dignity and honor.* Which is agreeable to the places observed before, that speak of the church as the glory of Christ.

Now when God speaks of himself, as seeking a peculiar and holy people for himself, to be for his glory and honor, as a man that seeks an ornament and badge of honor for his glory, 'tis not natural to understand it meerly of a subordinate end, as tho' God had no respect to himself in it; but only the good of others. If so, the comparison would not be natural; for men are commonly wont to seek their own glory and honor in adorning themselves, and dignifying themselves with badges of honor, out of respect to themselves.

The same doctrine seems to be taught, Eph. 44: 23, "Having predestinated us to the adoption of children, by Jesus Christ, unto himself, according to the good pleasure of his will, to the praise of the glory of his grace".

The same may be argued from Isai. 44. 23. "For the Lord hath redeemed Jacob, he hath glorified himself in Israel". And chap. 49. 3. "Thou art my servant Jacob, in whom I will be glorified". Joh. 17. 10. "And all mine are thine, and thine are mine, and I am glorified in them". 2 Thes. 1. 10. "When he shall come to be glorified in his saints". ver. 11. 12. "Wherefore also we pray always for you, that our God would count you worthy.

* See ver. 9, and also Isai. 3. 24. and 22. 21, and 23. 10. 2 Sam. 18. 11. Exod. 28. 8.
thy of his calling, and fulfill all the good pleasure of his goodnes, and the work of faith with power: that the name of our Lord Jesus may be glorified in you, and ye in him, according to the grace of God and our Lord Jesus Christ".

3. The scripture speaks from time to time, of God's glory, as tho' it were his ultimate end of the goodnes of the moral part of the creation; and that end, in a respect and relation to which chiefly it is, that the value or worth of their virtue consists. As in Phil. i. 10. II. "That ye may approve things that are excellent, that ye may be sincere, and without offence till the day of Christ: being filled with the fruits of righteousness, which are by Jesus Christ, unto the glory and praise of God." Here the apostle shews how the fruits of righteousness in them are valuable and how they answer their end. viz. in being "by Jesus Christ to the praise and glory of God." Joh. 15. 8. "Herein is my Father glorified, that ye bear much fruit." Signifying that by this means it is, that the great end of religion is to be answered. And in 1 Pet. 4. II. the apostle directs the christians to regulate all their religious performances, with reference to that one end. "If any man speak, let him speak as the oracles of God: if any man minister, let him do it as of the ability which God giveth, that God in all things may be glorified; to whom be praise and dominion forever and ever, amen." And, from time to time, embracing and practising true religion, and repenting of sin, and turning to holiness, is expressed by glorifying God, as tho' that were the sum and end of the whole matter. Rev. 11. 13. "And in the earthquake were slain of men seven thousand; and the remnant were affrighted, and gave glory to the God of heaven." So, Rev. 14. 6, 7. "And I saw another angel fly in the midst of heaven, having the everlasting gospel to preach to them that dwell on the earth;—saying with a loud voice, Fear God, and give glory to him." As tho' this were the sum and end of that virtue and religion, which was the grand design of preaching the gospel every where thro' the world. Rev. 16. 9. —"And repented not, to give him glory." Which is as much as to say, they did not forfake their sins and turn to true religion, that God might receive that which is the great end he seeks, in the religion

And as the exercise of true religion and virtue in christians is summanily expressed by their glorifying God; so when the good influence of this on others, as bringing them by the example to turn to the ways and practice of true goodness, is spoken of, it is expressed in the same manner. Matt. 5. 16. "Let your light so shine before men, that others seeing your good works, may glorify your father which is in heaven." 1 Pet. 2. 12. "Having your conversation honest among the gentiles, that whereas they speak evil against you as evil-doers, they may by your good works which they behold, glorify God in the day of visitation."

That the ultimate end of moral goodness, or righteousness is answer'd in God's glory being attain'd, is supposed in the objection which the apostle makes, or supposes some will make, in Rom. 3. 7. "For if the truth of God hath more abounded thro' my lie unto his glory, why am I judged as a sinner?" i. e. seeing the great end of righteousness is answer'd by my sin, in God's being glorified, why is my sin condemned and punished: and why is not my vice equivalent to virtue?

And the glory of God is spoken of as that wherein consists the value and end of particular graces. As of faith, Rom. 4. 20. "He staggered not at the promise of God thro' unbelief; but was strong in faith, giving glory to God." Phil. 2. 11. "That every tongue should confess that Jesus is the Lord, to the glory of God the father." Of repentance. Joel. 6. 19 "Give glory to the Lord God of Israel, and make confession unto him." Of charity. 2 Cor. 8. 19. -"With this grace, which is administered by us, to the glory of the same Lord, and declaration of your ready mind." Thanksgiving and praise. Luk. 7. 18. "There are not found that returned to give glory to God, save this stranger." Psal. 50. 23. "Who so offereth praise glorifieth me, and to him that ordereth his conversation aright, will I shew the salvation of God." Concerning which a place may be observ'd; — God here seems
seems to say this to such as abounded in their sacrifices and outward ceremonies of religion, as taking it for granted, and as what they knew already, and supposed in their religious performances, that the end of all religion was to glorify God. They supposed they did this in the best manner, in offering a multitude of sacrifices (see the preceding part of the psalm.) But here God corrects this mistake, and informs that this grand end of religion is not attained this way, but in offering the more spiritual sacrifices of praise and a holy conversation.

In fine, the words of the apostle in 1 Cor. 6. 20. are worthy of particular notice. "Ye are not your own; for ye are bought with a price: therefore glorify God in your body and in your spirit, which are his." Here not only is glorifying God spoken of, as what summarily comprehends the end of that religion and service of God, which is the end of Christ's redeeming us: but here I would further remark this. — That the apostle in this place urges, that inasmuch as we are not our own, but bought for God, that we might be his; therefore we ought not to act as if we were our own, but as God's; and should not use the members of our bodies, or faculties of our souls for ourselves, as making ourselves our end, but for God, as making him our end. And he expresses the way in which we are to make God our end, viz. in making his glory our end. "Therefore glorify God in your body and in your spirit, which are his." Here it can't be pretended, that though Christians are indeed required to make God's glory their end; yet it is but as a subordinate end, as subservient to their own happiness, as a higher end; for then in acting chiefly and ultimately for their own selves, they would use themselves more as their own, than as God's; which is directly contrary to the design of the apostle's exhortation, and the argument he is upon; which is, that we should give ourselves, as it were, away from ourselves to God, and use ourselves as his, and not our own, acting for his sake, and not our own sakes. Thus it is evident by prov. 9. that the glory of God is the last end for which he created the world.
4. There are some things in the word of God, that lead us to suppose that it requires of men, that they should desire and seek God's glory, as their highest and last end in what they do. As particularly the passage last mentioned. This appears from what has been just now observ'd upon it. The same may be argued from 1 Cor. 10. 30. "Whether therefore ye eat or drink, or whatsoever ye do, do all to the glory of God." And 1 Pet. 4. 11.—"That God in all things may be glorified." Which was mentioned before. And it may be argued that Christ requires his followers should desire and seek God's glory in the first place, and above all things else, from that prayer which he gave his disciples, as the pattern and rule for the direction of his followers in their prayers. The first petition of which is, "Hallowed be thy name." Which in scripture language is the same with, glorified be thy name; as is manifest from Lev. 10. 3, Ezek 28. 22, and many other places. Now our last and highest end is doubtless what should be first in our desires, and consequently first in our prayers: and therefore we may argue, that since Christ directed that God's glory should be first in our prayers, that therefore this is our last end. This is further confirmed by the conclusion of the Lord's prayer, "For thine is the kingdom, the power and glory." Which, as it stands in connection with the rest of the prayer, implies that we desire and ask all these things, which are mentioned in each petition, with a subordination, and in subservience to the dominion and glory of God; in which all our desires ultimately terminate, as their last end. God's glory and dominion are the two first things mentioned in the prayer, and are the subject of the first half of the prayer; and they are the two last things mentioned in the same prayer, in it's conclusion: and God's glory is the alpha and omega in the prayer. From these things we may argue, according to pof. 8. that God's glory is the last end of the creation.

5. The glory of God appears, by the account given in the word of God, to be that end or event, in the earnest desires of which, and in their delight in which, the best part of the moral world, and when in their best frames, do most naturally express the direct tendency of the spirit of true goodness, and give vent to the virtuous and pious affections
affections of their heart, and do most properly and directly testify their supream respect to their creator. This is the way in which the holy apostles, from time to time, gave vent to the ardent exercises of their piety, and expressed and breathed forth their regard to the supream being. Rom. 11. 36. "To whom be glory forever and ever, amen". Chap. 16. 27. "To God only wise, be glory, thro' Jesus Christ, forever, amen". Gal. 1. 4, 5. "Who gave himself for our sins, that he might deliver us from this present evil world, according to the will of God and our father, to whom be glory forever and ever, amen". 2 Tim. 4. 18. "And the Lord shall deliver me from every evil work, and will preserve me to his heavenly kingdom: to whom be glory forever and ever, amen". Eph. 3. 21. "Unto him be glory in the church, by Christ Jesus throughout all ages, world without end". Heb. 13. 21. "Through Jesus Christ, to whom be glory forever and ever, amen". Phil. 4. 20. "Now unto God and our father, be glory forever and ever, amen". 2 Pet. 3. 18. "To him be glory both now and forever, amen". Jude 25. "To the only wise God our saviour, be glory and majesty, dominion and power, both now and ever, amen". Rev. 1. 5, 6. "Unto him that loved us &c—to him be glory and dominion forever and ever, amen". It was in this way that holy David, the sweet psalmist of Israel, vented the ardent tendencies and desires of his pious heart. 1 Chron. 16. 28, 29. "Give unto the Lord ye kindreds of the people, give unto the Lord glory and strength: give unto the Lord the glory due unto his name". We have much the same expressions again, Psal. 29. 1, 2. and 69. 7, 8. See also, Psal. 57. 5; 72. 18, 19. 115. 1. So the whole church of God, thro' all parts of the earth. Isai. 42. 10, 11, 12. In like manner the faints and angels in heaven express the piety of their hearts. Rev. 4. 9, 11. and 5. 11, 12, 13, 14. and 7. 12. This is the event that the hearts of the seraphim especially exult in, as appears by Isai. 6. 2, 3. "Above it stood the seraphim.—And one cried unto another and said, Holy, holy, holy is the Lord of hosts, the whole earth is full of his glory". So at the birth of Christ, Luk. 2. 14. "Glory to God in the highest, &c".
It is manifest that these holy persons in earth and heaven, in thus expressing their desires of the glory of God, have respect to it, not meerly as a subordinate end, or meerly for the sake of something else; but as that which they look upon in itself valuable, and in the highest degree so. It would be abfurd to say, that in these ardent exclamations, they are only giving vent to their vehement benevolence to their fellow-creatures, and expressing their earnest desires that God might be glorified, that so his subjects may be made happy by the means. It is evident 'tis not so much love, either to themselves, or fellow-creatures, which they exprefs, as their exalted and suprême regard to the most high and infinitely glorious Being. When the church says, "Not unto us, not unto us, O Jehovah, but to thy name give glory", it would be abfurd to say, that the only desires that God may have glory, as a necessary or convenient means of their own advancement and felicity. From these things it appears, by the eleventh position, that God's glory is the end of the creation.

6. The scripture leads us to suppose, that Christ sought God's glory, as his highest and last end. Joh. 7. 18. "He that speaketh of himself, seeketh his own glory: but he that seeketh his glory that sent him, the same is true, and no unrighteousness is in him". When Christ says, he did not seek his own glory, we cannot reasonably understand him, that he had no regard to his own glory, even the glory of the human nature; for the glory of that nature was part of the reward promised him, and of the joy set before him. But we must understand him, that this was not his ultimate aim; it was not the end that chiefly governed his conduct: and therefore when, in opposition to this, in the latter part of the sentence, he says, "But he that seeketh his glory that sent him, the same is true, &c." 'tis natural from the antithesis to understand him, that this was his ultimate aim, his suprême governing end. Joh. 12. 27, 28. "Now is my soul troubled, and what shall I say? Father, save me from this hour: But for this cause came I unto this hour. Father, glorify thy name". Christ was now going to Jerusalem, and expected in a few days there to be crucified: and the prospect
prospect of his last sufferings, in this near approach, was very terrible to him. Under this distress of mind, in so terrible a view, he supports himself with a prospect of what would be the consequence of his sufferings, viz. God's glory. Now, 'tis the end that supports the agent in any difficult work that he undertakes, and above all others, his ultimate and suprem end. For this is above all others valuable in his eyes; and so sufficient to counteract the difficulty of the means. That is the end, which is in itself agreeable and sweet to him, which ultimately terminates his desires, is the center of rest and support; and so must be the fountain and sum of all the delight and comfort he has in his prospects, with respect to his work. Now Christ has his soul strained and distressed with a view of that which was infinitely the most difficult part of his work, which was just at hand. Now certainly if his mind seeks support in the conflict from a view of his end: it must most naturally repair to the highest end, which is the proper fountain of all support in this case. We may well suppose, that when his soul conflicts with the appearance of the most extreme difficulties, it would resort for support to the idea of his supreme and ultimate end, the fountain of all the support and comfort he has in the means, or the work. The same thing, viz. Christ's seeking the glory of God as his ultimate end, is manifest by what Christ says, when he comes yet nearer to the hour of his last sufferings, in that remarkable prayer, the last he ever made with his disciples, on the evening before his crucifixion; wherein he expresses the sum of his aims and desires. His first words are, "Father, the hour is come, glorify thy son, that thy son also may glorify thee". As this is his first request, we may suppose it to be his supreme request and desire, and what he ultimately aimed at in all. If we consider what follows to the end, all the rest that is said in the prayer, seems to be but an amplification of this great request.

On the whole, I think it is pretty manifest, that Jesus Christ sought the glory of God as his highest and last end; and that therefore, by position twelfth, this was God's last end in the creation of the world.
7. 'Tis manifest from scripture, that God's glory is the last end of that great work of providence, the work of redemption by Jesus Christ. This is manifest from what is just now observed, of its being the end ultimately sought by Jesus Christ the redeemer. And if we further consider the texts mentioned in the proof of that, and take notice of the context, it will be very evident, that it was what Christ sought as his last end, in that great work which he came into the world upon, viz. to procure redemption for his people. It is manifest that Christ professes in Joh. 7. 18. that he did not seek his own glory in what he did, but the glory of him that sent him. He means that he did not seek his own glory, but the glory of him that sent him, in the work of his ministry; the work he performed, and which he came into the world to perform, and which his father sent him to work out, which is the work of redemption. And with respect to that text, Joh. 12. 27, 28. it has been already observed, that Christ comforted himself in the view of the extreme difficulty of his work, which was the work of redemption, in the prospect of that which he had respect to, and rejoiced in, as the highest, ultimate, and most valuable excellent end of that work, which he set his heart most upon, and delighted most in. And in the answer that the father made him from heaven at that time, in the latter part of the same verse, "I have both glorified it, and will glorify it again", the meaning plainly is, that God had glorified his name in what Christ had done, in the work he sent him upon, and would glorify it again, and to a greater degree, in what he should further do, and in the success thereof. Christ shews that he understood it thus, in what he says upon it, when the people took notice of it, wondering at the voice; some saying, that it thundered, others, that an angel spake to him. Christ says, "This voice came not because of me, but for your sakes". And then he says (exulting in the prospect of this glorious end and success) "Now is the judgment of this world; now is the prince of this world cast out, & I, if I be lift up from the earth, will draw all men unto me". In the success of the same work of redemption, he places his own glory, as was observed before, in these words in the 23, and 24, verses of the same chapter. "The hour is come, that the Son of man should be glorified. Verily, verily I say unto you,
you, except a corn of wheat fall into the ground, it abideth alone; but if it die, it bringeth forth much fruit’.

So it is manifest that when he seeks his own and his father’s glory, in that prayer, Joh. 17. (which, it has been observed, he then seeks as his last end) he seeks it as the end of that great work he came into the world upon, which he is now about to finish in his death. What follows thro’ the whole prayer, plainly shews this: and particularly the 4th. and 5th. verses. “I have glorified thee on earth: I have finished the work which thou gavest me to do. And now, O father, glorify thou me with thine own self”. Here ’tis pretty plain that declaring to his father, that he had glorified him on earth, and finished the work God gave him to do, meant that he had finished the work which God gave him to do for this end, viz. that he might be glorified. He had now finished that foundation that he came into the world to lay for his glory. He had laid a foundation for his father’s obtaining his will, and the utmost that he designed. By which it is manifest, that God’s glory was the utmost of his design, or his ultimate end in this great work.

And ’tis manifest by Joh. 13. 31, 32. that the glory of the father, and his own glory, are what Christ exulted in, in the prospect of his approaching sufferings, when Judas was gone out to betray him, as the end his heart was mainly set upon, and supremely delighted in. “Therefore when he was gone out, Jesus said, Now is the son of man glorified, and God is glorified in him. If God be glorified in him, God shall also glorify him in himself, and shall straightway glorify him”.

That the glory of God is the highest and last end of the work of redemption, is confirmed by the song of the angels at Christ’s birth. Luk. 2. 14. “Glory to God in the highest, and on earth peace and good-will towards men”. It must be supposed that they knew what was God’s last end in sending Christ into the world: and that in their rejoicing on the occasion of his incarnation, their minds would be most taken up with, and would most rejoice in that which was most valuable and glorious in it; which must
The glory of the father and the son is spoken of as the end of the work of redemption, in Phil. 2. 6,—11. very much in the same manner as in Joh. 12. 23, 28. and 13. 31, 32. and 17. 1, 4, 5. "Who being in the form of God,—made himself of no reputation, and took upon him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men: and being found in fashion as a man, he humbled himself, and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross: wherefore God also hath highly exalted him, and given him a name, &c.—that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow,—and every tongue confess, that Jesus is the Lord, TO THE GLORY OF GOD THE FATHER". So God's glory, or the praise of his glory, is spoken of as the end of the work of redemption, in Eph. 1. 3, &c. "Blessed be the God and father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who hath blessed us with all spiritual blessings in heavenly places in Christ: according as he hath chosen us in him.—Having predestinated us to the adoption of children,—TO THE PRAISE OF THE GLORY OF HIS GRACE". And in the continuance of the same discourse concerning the redemption of Christ, in follows in what the same chapter, God's glory is once and again mentioned as the great end of all. Several things belonging to that great redemption are mentioned in the following verses: such as God's great wisdom in it, ver 8. The clearness of light granted thro' Christ, ver. 9. God's gathering together in one, all things in heaven and earth in Christ, ver. 10. God's giving the christians that were first converted to the christian faith from among the jews, an interest in this great redemption, ver. 11. Then the great end is added, ver. 12. "That we should be TO THE PRAISE OF HIS GLORY, who first trusted in Christ". And then is mentioned the bestowing of the same great salvation on the gentiles, in its beginning or first fruits in the world, and in the compleating
it in another world, in the two next verses. And then the same great end is added again. "In whom ye also trusted, after that ye heard the word of truth, the gospel of your salvation: In whom also, after that ye believed, ye were sealed with the holy spirit of promise, which is the earnest of our inheritance, until the redemption of the purchased possession, unto the praise of his glory". The same thing is express'd much in the same manner, in 2 Cor. 4. 14, 15.—"He which raised up the Lord Jesus, shall raise up us also by Jesus, and shall present us with you. For all things are for your sakes, that the abundance of grace might thro' the thanksgiving of many, redound to the glory of God".

The same is spoken of as the end of the work of redemption in the old-testament. Psal. 79. 9. "Help us, O God of our salvation, for the glory of thy name; deliver us and purge away our sins, for thy name's sake". So in the prophecies of the redemption of Jesus Christ. Isai. 44. 23. "Sing, O ye heavens; for the Lord hath done it: shout, ye lower parts of the earth: break forth into singing, ye mountains, O forest, and every tree therein: for the Lord hath redeemed Jacob, and glorified himself in Israel." Thus the works of creation are called upon to rejoice at the attaining of the same end, by the redemption of God's people, that the angels rejoiced at, when Christ was born. See also chap. 48. 10, 11. and 49. 3.

Thus 'tis evident that the glory of God is the ultimate end of the work of redemption.—Which is the chief work of providence towards the moral world, as is abundantly manifest from scripture: the whole universe being put in subjection to Jesus Christ; all heaven and earth, angels and men being subject to him, as executing this office: and put under him to that end, that all things may be order'd by him, in subservience to the great designs of his redemption: all power, as he says, being given to him, in heaven and in earth, that he may give eternal life to as many as the father has given him: and he being exalted far above all principality and power, and might and dominion, and made head over all things to the church. The angels being put in subjection to him, that he may employ them
them all as ministering spirits, for the good of them that shall be the heirs of his salvation: and all things being so govern'd by their redeemer for them, that all things are theirs, whether things present or things to come: and all God’s works of providence in the moral government of the world, which we have an account of in scripture history, or that are foretold in scripture prophecy, being evidently sub-ordinate to the great purposes and ends of this great work. And besides, the work of redemption is that work, by which good men are, as it were, created, or brought into being, as good men, or as restored to holiness and happiness. The work of redemption is a new creation, according to scripture representation, whereby men are brought into a new existence, or are made new creatures.

From these things it follows, according to the 5th, 6th, and 7th positions, that the glory of God is the last end of the creation of the world.

8. The scripture leads us to suppose, that God’s glory is his last end in his moral government of the world in general. This has been already shewn concerning several things that belong to God’s moral government of the world. As particularly, in the work of redemption, the chief of all his dispensations, in his moral government of the world. And I have also observed it, with respect to the duty which God requires of the subjects of his moral government, in requiring them to seek his glory as their last end. And this is actually the last end of the moral goodness required of them; the end which gives their moral goodness its chief value. And also, that it is what that person which God has set at the head of the moral world, as its chief governor, even Jesus Christ, seeks as his chief end. And it has been shewn, that it is the chief end for which that part of the moral world which are good, are made, or have their existence as good. I now further observe, that this is the end of the establishment of the public worship and ordinances of God among mankind. Hag. 1. 8. “Go up to the mountain, and bring wood, and build the house; and I will take pleasure in it, and I will be glorified, faith the Lord.” This is spoken of as the end of God’s promises of rewards, and of their fulfilment.
fulfilment. 2 Cor. 1. 20. "For all the promises of God in him are yea, and in him amen, TO THE GLORY OF GOD by us." And this is spoken of as the end of the execution of God's threatenings, in the punishment of fin. Num. 14. 20, 21, 22, 23. "And the LORD said, I have pardoned according to thy word. But as truly as I live, all the earth shall be filled with THE GLORY OF JEHOVAH. Because all these men, &c. -Surely they shall not see the land." The glory of Jehovah is evidently here spoken of, as that which he had regard to, as his highest and ultimate end; which therefore he could not fail of; but must take place every where, and in every case, through all parts of his dominion, whatever became of men. And whatever abatements might be made, as to judgments deserved; and whatever changes might be made in the course of God's proceedings, from compassion to sinners; yet the attaining of God's glory was an end, which being ultimate and supreme, must in no case whatsoever give place. This is spoken of as the end of God's executing judgments on his enemies in this world. Exod. 14. 17, 18. "And I will get me honour (Ihabbedha, I will be glorified) upon Pharaoh, and upon all his host, &c." Ezek. 28. 22 "Thus faith the Lord God, Behold I am against thee O Zion, and I will be glorified in the midst of thee: And they shall know that I am the Lord, when I shall have executed judgments in her, and shall be sanctified in her." So Ezek. 39. 13. "Yea, all the people of the land (shall bury them; and it shall be to them a renown, the day that I shall be glorified, faith the Lord God." And this is spoken of as the end, both of the executions of wrath, and in the glorious exercises of mercy, in the misery and happiness of another world. Rom. 9. 22, 23. "What if God willing to shew his wrath, and make his power known, endured with much long suffering, the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction: and that he might make known the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy, which he had afore prepared unto glory". And this is spoken of as the end of the day of judgment, which is the time appointed for the highest exercises of God's authority as moral governor of the world; and is as it were, the day of the consummation of God's moral government, with respect to all his subjects in heaven, earth and hell. 2 Thes. 1. 9, 10. "Who shall
shall be punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord, and from the glory of his power; when he shall come to be glorified in his saints, and to be admired in all them that believe." Then his glory shall be obtained, with respect both to saints and sinners.

From these things it is manifest by the fourth position, that God's glory is the ultimate end of the creation of the world.

9. It appears from what has been already observed, that the glory of God is spoken of in scripture as the last end of many of God's works: and it is plain that this thing is in fact the issue and result of the works of God's common providence, and of the creation of the world. Let us take God's glory in what sense so ever, consistent with its being something brought to pass, or a good attained by any work of God, certainly it is the consequence of these works: and besides it is expressively spoken of in scripture. This is implied in the 1st. ver. of the 8th. psalm, wherein are celebrated the works of creation; the heavens being the work of God's fingers; the moon and the stars being ordained by God; and God's making man a little lower than the angels, &c. The first verse is, "O Lord, our Lord, how excellent is thy name in all the earth! who hast set thy glory above the heavens", or upon the heavens. By name and glory, very much the same thing is intended here, as in many other places, as shall be particularly shewn afterwards. So the psalm concludes as it began. "O Lord our Lord, how excellent is thy name in all the earth!" So in the 148th. psalm, after a particular mention of most of the works of creation, enumerating them in order, the psalmist says, ver. 13. "Let them praise the name of the Lord, for his name alone is excellent, his glory is above the earth and the heaven". And in in the 104th psalm, after a very particular, orderly and magnificent representation of God's works of creation and common providence, 'tis said in the 31st ver. "The glory of the Lord shall endure forever: the Lord shall rejoice in his works". Here God's glory is spoken of, as the grand result, and blessed consequence of all these works, which God values, and on account of which he rejoices in these works. And this is one thing doubtless
The glory of God, in being the result and consequence of those works of providence that have been mention'd, is in fact the consequence of the creation. The good attained in the use of a thing, made for use, is the result of the making of that thing, as the signifying the time of day, when actually attained by the use of a watch, is the consequence of the making of the watch. So that it's apparent that the glory of God is a thing that is actually the result and consequence of the creation of the world. And from what has been already observed, it appears, that it is what God seeks as good, valuable and excellent in itself. And I presume, none will pretend, that there is any thing peculiar in the nature of the case, rendering it a thing valuable in some of the instances wherein it takes place, and not in others: or that the glory of God, tho' indeed an effect of all God's works, is an exceeding desirable effect of some of them; but of others, a worthless and insignificant effect. God's glory therefore, must be a desirable, valuable consequence of the work of creation. Yea 'tis expressly spoken of in Psal. 104. 3, (as was observed) as an effect, on account of which, God rejoices and takes pleasure in the works of creation.

Therefore it is manifest by position third, that the glory of God is an ultimate end in the creation of the world.

S E C T. IV.

Places of scripture that lead us to suppose, that God created the world for his Name, to make his Perfections known; and that he made it for his Praise.

Here I shall first take notice of some passages of scripture, that speak of God's name as being made God's end, or the object of his regard, and the regard of his virtuous
and holy intelligent creatures, much in the same manner as has been observed of God's glory.

As particularly, God's name is in like manner spoken of, as the end of his acts of goodness towards the good part of the moral world, and of his works of mercy and salvation towards his people. As 1 Sam. 12. 22. "The Lord will not forfake his people, for his great name's sake." Psal. 23. 3. "He restoreth my soul, he leadeth me in the paths of righteousness, for his name's sake." Psal. 31. 3. "For thy name's sake lead me, and guide me." Psal. 109. 21. "But do thou for me,—for thy name's sake." The forgiveness of sin in particular, is often spoken of as being for God's name's sake. 1 John. 2. 12. "I write unto you, little children, because your sins are forgiven you for his name's sake." Psal. 25. 11. "For thy name's sake, O Lord, pardon mine iniquity, for it is great." Psal. 79. 9. "Help us, O God of our salvation, for the glory of thy name, and deliver us, and purge away our sins, for thy name's sake." Jer. 14. 7. "O Lord, though our iniquities testify against us, do thou it for thy name's sake."

These things seem to shew, that the salvation of Christ is for God's name's sake. Leading and guiding in the way of safety and happiness, restoring the soul, the forgiveness of sin, and that help, deliverance and salvation, that is consequent thereon, is for God's name. And here 'tis observable, that those two great temporal salinations of God's people, the redemption from Egypt, and that from Babylon, that are often represented as figures and similitudes of the redemption of Christ, are frequently spoken of as being wrought for God's name's sake. So is that great work of God, in delivering his people from Egypt, carrying them through the wilderness to their rest in Canaan. 2 Sam. 7. 23. "And what one nation in the earth is like thy people, even like Israel, whom God went to redeem for a people to himself, and to make him a name." Psal. 106. 8. "Nevertheless he saved them for his name's sake." Psal. 63. 12. "That led them by the right hand of Moses, with his glorious arm, dividing the waters before them, to make himself an everlasting name." In the 20th chap. of Ezek. God rehearsing the various parts of this wonderful work, adds from
from time to time, "I wrought for my name's sake, that it should not be polluted before the heathen," as in ver. 9, 14, 22. See also Josh. 7, 8, 9. Dan. 9, 15. So is the redemption from the Babylonish captivity. 11ai. 48, 9, 10. "For my name's sake will I defer mine anger. — For mine own sake, even for mine own sake will I do it, for how should my name be polluted?" In Ezek. 36, 21, 22, 23. The reason is given for God's mercy in restoring Israel. "But I had pity for my holy name. — Thus faith the Lord, I do not this for your sakes, O house of Israel, but for my holy name's sake; — And I will sanctify my great name, which was profan'd among the heathen." And chap. 39, 25. "Therefore thus faith the Lord God, now will I bring again the captivity of Jacob, and have mercy upon the whole house of Israel, and will be jealous for my holy name." Daniel prays that God would forgive his people, and shew them mercy for his own sake. Dan. 9, 19.

When God from time to time speaks of shewing mercy, and exercising goodness, and promoting his people's happiness for his name's sake, we can't understand it as of a merely subordinate end. How absurd would it be to say, that he promotes their happiness for his name's sake, in subordination to their good; and that his name may be exalted only for their sakes, as a means of promoting their happiness! especially when such expressions as these are used, "For mine own sake, even for mine own sake will I do it, for how should my name be polluted?" and "Not for your sakes do I this, but for my holy name's sake".

Again, 'tis represented as tho' God's people had their existence, at least as God's people, for God's name's sake. God's redeeming or purchasing them, that they might be his people, for his name, implies this. As in that passage mentioned before, 2 Sam. 7, 23. — "Thy people Israel, whom God went to redeem for a people to himself, and to make him a name". So God's making them a people for his name, is implied in Jer. 13, 11. "For as the girdle cleaveth to the loins of a man, so have I caused to cleave unto me the whole house of Israel &c. — that they may be unto me for a people, and for a name." Az. 15.
15. 14. "Simeon hath declared how God at the first did visit the gentiles, to take out of them a people for his name."

This also is spoken of as the end of the virtue and religion, and holy behaviour of the saints. Rom. 1. 5. "By whom we have received grace and apostleship, for obedience to the faith among all nations for his name." Matt. 19. 29. "Every one that forsaith houses or brethren &c. — for my name’s sake, shall receive an hundred fold, and shall inherit everlasting life." 3 Joh. 7. "Because that for his name’s sake they went forth, taking nothing of the gentiles." Rev. 2. 3. "And hast born, and hast patience, and for my name’s sake hast laboured, and hast not fainted."

And we find that holy persons express their desire of this, and their joy in it, in the same manner as in the glory of God. 2 Sam. 7. 26. "Let thy name be magnified forever." Psal. 76. 1. "In Judah is God known, his name is great in Israel." Psal. 148. 13. "Let them praise the name of the Lord; for his name alone is excellent, his glory is above the earth, and heaven." Psal. 135. 13. "Thy name O Lord, endureth forever, and thy memorial throughout all generations." Isai. 12. 4. "Declare his doings among the people, make mention that his name is exalted."

The judgments God executes on the wicked, are spoken of as being for the sake of his name, in like manner as for his glory. Exod. 9. 16. "And in very deed for this cause have I raised thee up, for to shew in thee my power, and that my name may be declared throughout all the earth". Neh. 9. 10. "And shewedst signs and wonders upon Pharaoh, &c on all his servants, and on all the people of his land; for thou knewest that they dealt proudly against them: so didst thou get thee a name as at this day".

And this is spoken of as a consequence of the works of creation, in like manner as God’s glory. Psal. 8. 1. "O Lord, how excellent is thy name in all the earth! who hast set thy glory above the heavens". And then at the conclusion
clusion of the observations on the works of creation, the psalm ends thus (ver. 9.) "O Lord, our Lord, how excellent is thy name in all the earth". So Psal. 148. 13. after a particular mention of the various works of creation, "Let them praise the name of the Lord, for his name alone is excellent in all the earth, his glory is above the earth and the heaven".

So we find manifestation, or making known God's perfections, his greatness and excellency, is spoken of very much in the same manner as God's glory.

There are several scriptures which would lead us to suppose this to be the great thing that God sought of the moral world, and the end aimed at in the moral agents, which he had created, wherein they are to be active in answering their end. This seems implied in that argument God's people sometimes made use of, in depreciating a state of death and destruction: that in such a state, they can't know or make known the glorious excellency of God. Psal. 88. 18, 19. "Shall thy loving kindness be declared in the grave, or thy faithfulness in destruction? Shall thy wonders be known in the dark, and thy righteousness in the land of forgetfulness"? So Psal. 30. 9. Isai. 38. 18, 19. The argument seems to be this: Why should we perish? and how shall thine end, for which thou hast made us, be obtained in a state of destruction, in which thy glory cannot be known or declared?

This is spoken of as the end of the good part of the moral world, or the end of God's people in the same manner as the glory of God. Isai. 43. 21. "This people have I formed for myself, they shall shew forth my praise". 1 Pet. 2. 9. "But ye are a chosen generation, a royal priesthood, an holy nation, a peculiar people, that ye should shew forth the praises of him, who hath called you out of darkness into marvellous light".

And this seems to be represented as the thing wherein the value and proper fruit and end of their virtue appears. Isai. 60. 6. Speaking of the conversion of the gentile nations
ions to true religion—"They shall come and shew forth the praises of the Lord." Isai. 66. 19. "I will send unto the nations—and to the isles afar off, that have not heard my name, neither have seen my glory; and they shall declare my glory among the gentiles.

And this seems by scripture representations to be the end, in the designs of which, and delight in which appears the proper tendency and rest of true virtue, and holy dispositions; much in the same manner as the glory of God. 1 Chron. 16. 8. "Make known his deeds among the people". Ver. 23, 24. "Shew forth from day to day thy salvation. Declare his glory among the heathen". See also, Psal. 9. 1, 11, 14. and 19. 1. and 26. 7. and 71. 18. and 75. 9. and 76. 1. and 79. 13. and 96. 2. 3. and 101. 1. and 107. 22. and 118. 17. and 145. 6, 11, 12. Isai. 42. 12. and 64. 1, 2. Jer. 50. 10.

This seems to be spoken of as a great end of the acts of God's moral government. Particularly, the great judgments he executes for sin. Exod. 9. 16. "And in very deed for this cause have I raised thee up, to shew in thee my power, and that my name might be declared throughout all the earth". Dan. 4. 17. "This matter is by the decree of the watchers, &c.—To the intent that the living may know that the most high ruleth in the kingdom of men, and giveth it to whomsoever he will; and setteth up over it the basest of men". But places to this purpose are too numerous to be particularly recited. See them in the margin.*

This is also spoken of as a great end of God's works of favor and mercy to his people. 2 King. 19. 19. "Now therefore, O Lord our God, I beseech thee, save thou us out of his hand, that all the kingdoms of the earth may know that thou art the Lord God, even thou only". 1 King. 8. 59, 60. "That he maintain the cause of his servant, & the cause of his people Israel at all times as the matter shall require, that all the people of the earth may know that the Lord is God, and that there is none else". See other passages to the same purpose refer'd to in the margin.

This is spoken of as the end of the eternal damnation of the wicked, and also the eternal happiness of the righteous. Rom. 9. 22, 23. "What if God, willing to shew his wrath, and make his power known, endured with much long suffering, the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction: and that he might make known the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy, which he hath afore prepared unto glory"?

This is spoken of from time to time, as a great end of the miracles which God wrought. See Exod. 7. 17. and 8. 10. and 19. 2. Deut. 29. 5, 6. Ezek. 24. 27.

This is spoken of as a great end of ordinances. Exod. 29. 44, 45, 46. "And I will sanctify the tabernacle of the congregation; I will sanctify also both Aaron and his sons, to minister to me in the priests office. And I will dwell among the children of Israel, and will be their God. And they shall know that I am the Lord their God, &c." Chap. 31. 13. "Verily my sabbaths shall ye keep; for it is a sign between me and you, throughout your generations; that ye may know that I am the Lord that doth sanctify you". We have again almost the same words, Ezek. 20. 12, and ver. 20.

† Exod. 6. 7. and 8. 22. and 16. 12. 1 King. 8. 43. and 20. 28. Psal. 102. 21. Ezek. 23. 49. and 24. 24. and 25. 5. and 35. 9. and 39. 21, 22,
This is spoken of as a great end of the work of redemption of Jesus Christ: both of the purchase of redemption by Christ, and the application of redemption. Rom. 3, 25, 26. “Whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood, to declare his righteousness. — To declare I say, at this time his righteousness: that he might be just, and the justifier of him that believeth in Jesus.” Eph. 2, 4—7. “But God who is rich in mercy &c. — That he might shew the exceeding riches of his grace, in his kindness towards us through Jesus Christ.” chap. 3, 8, 9, 10. “To preach among the gentiles the unfathomable riches of Christ, and to make all men see, what is the fellowship of that mystery which, from the beginning of the world hath been hid in God, who created all things by Jesus Christ: To the intent that now unto the principalities and powers in heavenly places, might be known by the church the manifold wisdom of God.” Plal. 22, 21, 22. “Save me from the lion’s mouth. I will declare thy name unto my brethren: in the midst of the congregation will I praise thee,” compared with Heb. 2, 12, and Joh. 17, 26. Isai. 64, 4. “O that thou wouldest rend the heavens— to make thy name known to thine adversaries.”
Creation of the World.

And it is spoken of as the end of that great actual salvation, which should follow Christ's purchase of salvation, both among Jews and gentiles. Isai. 49. 22, 23. "I will lift up my hand to the gentiles, and they shall bring thy sons in their arms, and kings shall be thy nursing fathers, and thou shalt know that I am the Lord."*

This is spoken of as the end of God's common providence. Job 37. 6, 7. "For he faith to the snow, Be thou on the earth. Likewise to the small rain, and to the great rain of his strength. He sealeth up the hand of every man, that all men may know his work".

It is spoken of as the end of the day of judgment, that grand consummation of God's moral government of the world, and the day for the bringing all things to their designed ultimate issue. It is called "The day of the revelation of the righteous judgment of God", Rom. 2. 5.

And the declaration, or openly manifesting God's excellency is spoken of as the actual, happy consequence and effect of the work of creation. Psal. 19. at the beginning. "The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament sheweth his handy work. Day unto day uttereth speech, night unto night sheweth forth knowledge. — In them hath he placed a tabernacle for the sun, which is as a bridegroom coming out of his chamber, and rejoiceth as a strong man to run his race, &c."

In like manner, there are many scriptures that speak of God's praise, in many of the forementioned respects, just in the same manner as of his name and glory.

This is spoken of as the end of the being of God's people, in the same manner. Jer. 13. 11. "For as the girdle cleaveth to the loins of a man, so have I caused to cleave unto me the whole house of Israel, and the whole

* See also, Ezek. 16. 62. and 29. 21. and 34. 27. and 36. 38. and 39. 28, 29. Joel 3. 17.
whole house of Judah, faith the Lord; that they might be unto me for a name, and for a praise, and for a glory."

It is spoken of as the end of the moral world. Matt. 21. 16. "Out of the mouth of babes and sucklings haft thou perfected praise." That is, lo haft thou in thy sovereignty and wisdom ordered it, that thou shouldst obtain the great end for which intelligent creatures are made, more especially from some of them that are in themselves weak, or inferior and more insufficient. Compare Psal. 8. 1, 2.

And the same thing that was observed before concerning the making known God's excellency, may also be observed concerning God's praise. That it is made use of as an argument in depreciating a state of destruction, that in such a state this end can't be answered; in such a manner as seems to imply its being an ultimate end, that God had made man for. Psal. 88. 10. "Shall the dead arise and praise thee? shall thy lovingkindness be declared in the grave?—shall thy wonders be known in the dark?" Psal. 30. 9. "What profit is there in my blood when I go down to the pit, shall the dust praise thee? shall it declare thy truth?" Psal. 115. 17, 18. "The dead praise not the Lord, neither any that go down into silence: but we will bless the Lord, from this time forth and for evermore. Praise ye the Lord." Isai. 38 18, 19. "For the grave cannot praise thee, death cannot celebrate thee; they that go down into the pit cannot hope for thy truth. The living, the living, he shall praise thee."

It is spoken of as the end of the virtue of God's people, in like manner as is God's glory. Phil. 1. 11. "Being filled with the fruits of righteousness, which are by Jesus Christ to the praise and glory of God."

It is spoken of as the end of the work of redemption. In the first chap. of Eph. where that work in the various parts of it is particularly insisted on, and set forth in its exceeding glory, this is mentioned from time to time as the great end of all, that it should be "to the praise of his glory." (As in ver. 6, 12, 14.) By which we may doubtless
doubtles understand much the same thing, with that which in Phil. i. ii. is expressed, "his praise and glory." Agreeable to this, Jacob's fourth son, from whom the Messiah the great Redeemer was to proceed, by the spirit of prophecy, or the special direction of God's providence, was called PRAISE, with reference to this happy consequence, and glorious end of that great redemption, this Messiah, one of his posterity, was to work out.

This in the old testament is spoken of as the end of the forgiveness of the sin of God's people, and their salvation, in the same manner as is God's name and glory. Isai. 48. 9, 10, 11. "For my name's sake will I defer mine anger, and for my praise will I refrain for thee, that I cut thee not off. Behold I have refined thee — for mine own sake, even for mine own sake will I do it; for how should my name be polluted? and my glory will I not give to another." Jer. 33. 8, 9. "And I will cleanse them from all their iniquity, — and I will pardon all their iniquities. And it shall be to me a name of joy, a praise, and an honor."

And that the holy part of the moral world, do express desires of this, and delight in it, as the end which holy principles in them tend to, reach after, and rest in, in their highest exercises, just in the same manner as the glory of God, is abundantly manifest. It would be endless to enumerate particular places wherein this appears; wherein the saints declare this, by expressing their earnest desires of God's praise; calling on all nations, and all beings in heaven and earth to praise him; in a rapturous manner calling on one another, crying Hallelujah, praise ye the Lord, praise him forever. Expressing their resolutions to praise him as long as they live through all generations, and ever; declaring how good, how pleasant and comely the praise of God is, &c.

And 'tis manifest that God's praise is the desirable and glorious consequence and effect of all the works of creation, by such places as these. Psal. 145. 5,—10. and 148. throughout, and 103. 19,—22.
PLACES of scripture from whence it may be argued, that communication of good to the creature, was one thing which God had in view, as an ultimate end of the creation of the world.

I. According to the scripture, communicating good to the creatures, is what is in itself pleasing to God: and that this is not merely subordinately agreeable, and esteemed valuable on account of its relation to a further end, as it is in executing justice in punishing the sins of men; which God is inclined to as fit and necessary in certain cases, and on the account of good ends attained by it: but what God is inclined to on its own account, and what he delights in simply and ultimately. For tho' God is sometimes in scripture spoken of as taking pleasure in punishing men's sins, Deut. 28. 63. "The Lord will rejoice over you, to destroy you". Ezek. 5. 13. "Then shall mine anger be accomplished, and I will cause my fury to rest upon them, and I will be comforted". Yet God is often spoken of as exercising goodness and shewing mercy, with delight, in a manner quite different, and opposite to that of his executing wrath. For the latter is spoken of as what God proceeds to with backwardness and reluctance; the misery of the creature being not agreeable to him on its own account. Neh. 9. 17. "That thou art a God ready to pardon, gracious and merciful, slow to anger, and of great loving kindness". Psal. 103. 8. "The Lord is merciful & gracious, slow to anger, and plenteous in mercy". Psal. 145. 8. "The Lord is gracious and full of compassion, slow to anger, and of great mercy". We have again almost the same words, Jonah 4. 2. Mic. 7. 10. "Who is a God like thee, that pardoneth iniquity, &c.—He retaineth not his anger forever, because he delighteth in mercy". Ezek. 18. 32. "I have no pleasure in the death of him that dieth, faith the Lord God; wherefore turn yourselves, and live ye". Lam. 3. 33. "He doth not afflict willingly, nor grieve the children of men". Ezek. 33. 11. "As I live, faith the Lord God, I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live: turn
turn ye, turn ye from your evil ways; for why will ye die, O house of Israel”. 2 Pet. 3. 9. “Not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance”.

2. The work of redemption wrought out by Jesus Christ, is spoken of in such a manner as being from the grace and love of God to men, that does not well con\set\ as his seeking a communication of good to them, only subordinate\y, i.e. not at all from any inclination to their good di\rectly, or delight in giving happiness to them, simply and ultimately consider’d; but only indirectly, and wholly from a regard to something entirely diverse, which it is a means of. Such expressions as that in Joh. 3. 16, carry another idea. “God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten son, that whosoever believeth in him, should not perish, but have everlasting life”. And 1 Joh. 4. 9, 10. “In this was manifested the love of God towards us, because that God sent his only begotten son into the world, that we might live through him. Herein is love; not that we loved God but that he loved us, and sent his son to be a propitiation for our sins”. So Eph. 2. 4. “But God, who is rich in mercy, for his great love wherewith he loved us, &c”. But if indeed this was only from love to something else, and a regard to a further end, entirely diverse from our good; then all the love is truly terminated in that, its ultimate object! and God’s love consists in regard towards that: and therein is God’s love, and therein is his love manifested, strictly and properly speaking, and not in that he loved us, or exercised such high regard towards us. For if our good be not at all regarded ultimately, but only subordinate\, then our good or interest is in itself consider’d, nothing in God’s regard or love: God’s respect is all terminated upon, and swallowed up in something diverse, which is the end, and not in the means.

So the scripture everywhere represents concerning Christ, as tho’ the great things that he did and suffered, were in the most direct and proper sense, from exceeding love to us; and not as one may shew kindness to a person, to whole interest, simply and in itself consider’d, he is entirely indifferent, only as it may be a means of promoting the inter\est
terest of another (that is indeed directly regarded) which is connected with it. Thus the apostle Paul represents the matter, Gal. 2. 20. "Who loved me, and gave himself for me". Eph. 5. 25. "Husbands love your wives, even as Christ loved the church, and gave himself for it". And Christ himself, Joh. 17. 19, "For their sakes I sanctify myself". And the scripture represents Christ as resting in the salvation and glory of his people, when obtained, as in what he ultimately sought, as having therein reached the goal at the end of his race; obtained the prize he aimed at; enjoying the travail of his soul, in which he is satisfied, as the recompence of his labours and extreme agonies. Isai. 53. 10, 11. "When thou shalt make his soul an offering for sin, he shall see his seed, he shall prolong his days, and the pleasure of the Lord shall prosper in his hand. He shall see of the travail of his soul, and shall be satisfied: by his knowledge shall my righteous servant justify many, for he shall bear their iniquities". He sees the travail of his soul, in seeing his seed, the children brought forth in the issue of his travail. This implies that Christ has his delight, most truly and properly, in obtaining the salvation of his church, not merely as a means conducing to the thing which terminates his delight and joy; but as what he rejoices and is satisfied in, most directly and properly: as do those scriptures, which represent him as rejoicing in his obtaining this fruit of his labour and purchase, as the bridegroom, when he obtains his bride. Isai. 62. 5. "As the bridegroom rejoices over the bride, so shall thy God rejoice over thee". And how emphatical and strong to the purpose, are the expressions in Zeph. 3. 17. "The Lord thy God in the midst of thee is mighty; he will save, he will rejoice over thee with joy: he will rest in his love, he will rejoice over thee with singing". The same thing may be argued from Prov. 8. 30, 31. "Then was I by him, as one brought up with him: and I was daily his delight, rejoicing always before him: rejoicing in the habitable part of his earth, and my delights were with the sons of men". And from those places that speak of the saints as God's portion, his jewels and peculiar treasure. These things are abundantly confirmed by what is related, Joh. 12. 23.—32. But the particular consideration of what
may be observed to the present purpose, in that passage of scripture, may be refer'd to the next section.

3. The communications of divine goodnes, particularly forgivenes of sin, and salvation, are spoken of from time to time, as being for God's goodnes sake, and for his mercies sake, just in the same manner as they are spoken of, as being for God's name's sake, in places observed before. Psal. 25. 7. “Remember not the sins of my youth, nor my transigressions: according to thy mercy remember thou me, for thy goodnes sake, O Lord”. In the 11th. ver. the psalmist says, “For thy name's sake, O Lord pardon mine iniquity”. Neh. 9. 31. “Nevertheless for thy great mercies sake, thou hast not utterly consumed them, nor for - taken them; for thou art a gracious and a merciful God”. Psal. 6. 4. “Return O Lord, deliver my soul: O save me for thy mercies sake”. Psal. 31. 16. “Make thy face to shine upon thy servant: save me for thy mercies sake.” Psal. 44. 26. “Arise for our help; redeem us for thy mercies sake.” And here it may be observed, after what a remarkable manner God speaks of his love to the children of Israel in the wilder nes, as that his love was for love's sake, and his goodnes were its own end and motive. Deut. 7. 7, 8. “The Lord did not set his love upon you, nor choose you, because ye were more in number than any people, for ye were the fewest of all people; but because the Lord loved you.”

4. That the government of the world in all parts of it, for the good of such as are to be the eternal subjects of God's goodnes, is implied in what the scripture teaches us of Christ's being set at God's right hand, made king of angels and men; set at the head of the universe, having all power given him in heaven and earth, to that end that he may promote their happiness; being made head over all things to the church; and having the government of the whole creation for their good.* Christ mentions it (Mar. 28. 29.) as the reason why the son of man is made Lord of the

sabbath, that “the sabbath was made for man”. And if so, we may in like manner argue, that all things were made for man, that the son of man is made Lord of all things.

5. That God uses the whole creation, in his whole government of it, for the good of his people, is most elegantly represented in Deut. 33. 26. “There is none like the God of Jeshurun, who rideth on the heavens in thine help, and in his excellency on the sky”. The whole universe is a machine, which God hath made for his own use, to be his chariot for him to ride in; as is represented in Ezekiel's vision. In this chariot God's seat, or throne is heaven, where he sits, who uses and governs and rides in this chariot (Ezek. 1. 22, 26, 27, 28.) The inferior part of the creation, this visible universe, subject to such continual changes and revolutions, are the wheels of the chariot, under the place of the seat of him who rides in this chariot. God's providence in the constant revolutions and alterations and successive events, is represented by the motion of the wheels of the chariot, by the spirit of him who sits in his throne on the heavens, or above the firmament. Moses tells us for whose sake it is that God moves the wheels of this chariot, or rides in it sitting in his heavenly seat; and to what end he is making his progress, or goes his appointed journey in it, viz. the salvation of his people.

6. God's judgments on the wicked in this world, and also their eternal damnation in the world to come, are spoken of as being for the happiness of God's people. So are his judgments on them in this world. Itai. 43. 3, 4. “For I am the Lord thy God, the holy one of Israel, thy savour. I gave Egypt for thy ransom, Ethiopia and Seba for thee. Since thou hast been precious in my sight, thou hast been honorable, and I have loved thee; therefore will I give men for thee, and people for thy life”. So the works of God's vindictive justice and wrath, are spoken of as works of mercy to his people, Psal. 136. 10, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20. And so is their eternal damnation in another world. Rom. 9. 22, 23. “What if God, willing to shew his wrath and make his power known, endured with much longsuffering,
the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction: and that he might make known the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy, which he had afore prepared unto glory". Here it is evident the last verse comes in, in connection with the foregoing, as giving another reason of the destruction of the wicked, viz. the shewing the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy; in higher degrees of their glory and happiness, in an advancement of their relish of their own enjoyments; and greater sense of their value, and of God's free grace in the bestowment.

7. It seems to argue that God's goodness to them who are to be the eternal subjects of his goodness, is the end of the creation, that the whole creation, in all parts of it, and all God's dispositions of it, is spoken of as their's. 1 Cor. 3. 22, 23. "All things are yours. Whether Paul, or Apollos, or Cephas, or the world, or life, or death, or things present, or things to come, all are yours". The terms are very universal; and both works of creation and providence are mentioned; and 'tis manifestly the design of the apostle to be understood of every work of God whatsoever. Now, how can we understand this any otherwise, than that all things are for their benefit; and that God made and uses all for their good?

8. All God's works, both his works of creation and providence, are represented as works of goodness or mercy to his people in the 136th. psalm. His wonderful works in general, ver. 4. "To him who alone doth great wonders; for his mercy endureth forever". The works of creation in all parts of it. Ver. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9. "To him that by wisdom made the heavens; for his mercy endureth forever. To him that stretched out the earth above the waters; for his mercy endureth forever. To him that made great lights; for his mercy endureth forever. The sun to rule by day; for his mercy endureth forever. The moon and stars to rule by night; for his mercy endureth forever". And God's works of providence, in the following part of the psalm.
That expression in the blessed sentence pronounced on the righteous at the day of judgment, "Inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world", seems to hold forth as much, as that the eternal expressions and fruits of God's goodness to them, was God's end in creating the world, and in his providential dispositions ever since the creation: that God in all his works, in laying the foundation of the world, and ever since the foundation of it, had been preparing this kingdom and glory for them.

Agreatable to this, the good of men is spoken of as an ultimate end of the virtue of the moral world. Rom. 13. 8, 9, 10. "He that loveth another hath fulfilled the law. For this, Thou shalt not commit adultery, Thou shalt not kill, &c — And if there be any other commandment, it is briefly comprehended in this saying, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. Love worketh no ill to his neighbour; therefore love is the fulfilling of the law". Gal. 5. 14. "All the law is fulfilled in one word, even in this, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself". Jam. 2. 8: "If ye fulfill the royal law, according to the scripture, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself, thou shalt do well".

If the good of the creature be one end of God in all things he does; and to be one end of all things that he requires moral agents to do; and an end they should have respect to in all that they do, and which they should regulate all parts of their conduct by; these things may be easily explained: but otherwise it seems difficult to be accounted for, that the Holy Ghost should thus express himself from time to time. The scripture represents it to be the spirit of all true saints, to perfect the welfare of God's people to their chief joy. And this was the spirit of Moses and the prophets of old: and the good of God's church was an end they regulated all their conduct by. And so it was with the apostles. 2 Cor. 4. 15. "For all things are for your sakes." 2 Tim. 2. 10. "I endure all things for the elect's sake, that they may also obtain the salvation which is in Christ Jesus, with eternal glory." And the scriptures represent as though every christian should
should in all things he does be employed for the good of God's church, as each particular member of the body, is in all things employed, for the good of the body. Rom. 12. 4, 5, &c. Eph. 4. 15, 16. 1 Cor. 12. 12, 25, to the end; together with the whole of the next chapter. To this end the scripture teaches us the angels are continually employed. Heb. 1. 74.

S E C T. VI.

WHEREIN is considered what is meant by the GLORY of God, and the NAME of God in scripture, when spoken of as God's end in his works.

HAVING thus considered what things are spoken of in the holy scriptures, as the ends of God's works; and in such a manner as justly to lead us to suppose, they were the ends which God had ultimately in view, in the creation of the world: I now proceed particularly to enquire concerning some of these things, what they are, and how the terms are to be understood.

I BEGIN first, with the GLORY of God.

And here I might observe, that the phrase, the glory of God, is sometimes manifestly used to signify the second person in the Trinity. But it is not necessary at this time to consider that matter, or stand to prove it from particular passages of scripture. Omitting this therefore, I proceed to observe concerning the hebrew word Cabhodh, which is the word most commonly used in the old testament where we have the word glory in the English bible. The root which it comes from is either the verb Cabhadh, which signifies to be heavy, or make heavy, or from the adjective Cabhad, which signifies heavy or weighty. These, as seems pretty manifest, are the primary significations of these words, though they have also other meanings, which seem to be derivative. The noun Cabhad signifies gravity, heaviness, greatness and abundance. Of very many places it will be sufficient to name a few. Prov. 27. 3. 2 Sam. 14. 26. 1 King. 12. x1. Psal. 38. 4. Isai. 30. 27. And
27. And as the weight of bodies arises from two things, viz. solidity or denseness, or specific gravity, as it is called, and their magnitude; so we find the word Cabbebd used to signify dense, as in Exod. 19. 16. Gnanath Cabbed a dense cloud. And it is very often used for great. Isai. 32. 2. Gen. 5. 9. 1 King. 10. 2. 2 King. 6. 14. and 18. 17. Isai. 36. 2. and other places.

The word Cabbed, which is commonly translated glory, is used in such a manner as might be expected from this signification of the words from whence it comes. Sometimes it is used to signify what is internal, what is within the being or person inherent, in the subject, or what is in the possession of the person: and sometimes for emanation, exhibition or communication of this internal glory: and sometimes for the knowledge or sense, or effect of these, in those who behold it, to whom the exhibition or communication is made; or an expression of this knowledge or sense or effect. And here I would note, that agreeable to the use of the word Cabbed in the old testament, is that of the word Dnxa in the new. For as the word Cabbed is generally translated by Dnxa in the septuagint; so 'tis apparent, that this word is designed to be used to signify the same thing in the new testament, with Cabbed in the old. This might be abundantly proved by comparing particular places of the old testament; but probably it will not be denied.

I therefore proceed particularly to consider these words, with regard to their use in scripture, in each of the forementioned ways.

1. As to internal glory. When the word is used to signify what is within, inherent or in the possession of the subject, it very commonly signifies excellency, or great valubleness, dignity, or worthinesse or regard. This according to the hebrew idem, is as it were the weight of a thing, as that by which it is heavy; as to be light, is to be worthless, without value, contemptible. Num. 21. 5. "This light bread." 1 Sam. 18. 23, "Seemeth it a light thing." Judg. 9. 4. "Light persons," i.e. worthless, vain, vile persons. So Zeph. 3. 4. To set light is to despise, 2 Sam. 19. 43.
19. 43. Belshazzar's vileness in the sight of God, is represented by his being **Tekel**, weighed in the balances and found light, Dan. 5. 27. And as the weight of a thing arises from these two things, its magnitude, and its specific gravity conjunctly, so the word **glory** is very commonly used to signify the excellency of a person or thing, as consisting either in greatness, or in beauty, or as it were preciousness, or in both conjunctly; as will abundantly appear by considering the places referred to in the margin. *

**Sometimes** that internal great and excellent good, which is called glory, is rather in possession than inherent. Any one may be called **heavy**, that possesses an abundance; and he that is empty and destitute, may be called **light**. Thus we find riches is sometimes called **glory**. Gen. 31. 1. "And of that which was our fathers, hath he gotten all this glory." Esth. 5. 11. "Haman, told them of the glory of his riches." Psal. 49. 16, 17. "Be not afraid when one is made rich, when the glory of his house is increased. For when he dieth, he shall carry nothing away, his glory shall not descend after him." Nah. 2. 9. "Take ye the spoil of silver, take the spoil of gold; for there is none end of the store and glory out of the pleasant furniture.

And it is often put for a great height of happiness and prosperity and fulness of good in general. Gen. 45. 13. "You shall tell my father of all my glory in Egypt."

Job. 19. 9. "He hath stript me of my glory."  
Isai. 10. 3. "Where will you leave your glory."  
Ver 10. "Therefore shall the Lord of hosts send among his fat ones leanness, and under his glory shall he kindle a burning, like the burning of a fire."  
Isai. 17. 3, 4. "The kingdom shall cease from Damascus, and the remnant of Syria; they shall be as the glory of the children of Israel. And in that day it shall come to pass, that the glory of Jacob shall be made thin, and the name of his seed shall be made lean."  
Isai. 21. 16. "And all the glory of Kedar shall fail."  
Isai. 61. 6. "Ye shall eat the riches of the gentiles, and in their glory shall ye boast yourselves."  
Chap. 66. 11, 12. "That ye may milk out and be delighted with the abundance of her glory. — I will extend peace to her, like a river, and the glory of the gentiles like a flowing stream."  
Hos. 9. 11. "As for Ephraim, their glory shall fly away as a bird."  
Matt. 4. 8. — "Sheweth him all the kingdoms of the world, and the glory of them."  
Luk. 24. 26. "Ought not Christ to have suffered these things, and to enter into his glory?"  
Joh. 17. 27. "And the glory which thou gavest me, have I given them."  
Rem. 5. 2. "And rejoice in hope of the glory of God."  
Chap. 8. 18. "The sufferings of this present time, are not worthy to be compared with the glory which shall be revealed in us."  
See also chap. 2. 7. 10. and 3. 23 and 9, 23.  
1Cor. 2. 7. "The hidden wisdom which God ordained before the world, unto our glory."  
2 Cor. 4. 17. — "Worketh cut for us a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory."  
Eph. 1. 18. "And what the riches of the glory of his inheritance in the saints."  
1 Pet. 4. 13. "But rejoice, inasmuch as ye are made partakers of Christ's sufferings; that when his glory shall be revealed, ye may be glad also with exceeding joy."  
Chap. 1. 8. "Ye rejoice with joy unspeakable and full of glory."  

See also, Colos. 1. 27. and 3. 4. 1 Thess. 2. 12.  
2 Thess. 2. 14. 1 Tim. 3. 16. 2 Tim. 2. 10. Heb. 2. 10. 1 Pet. 1. 11, 21. and 5. 1, 10. 2 Pet. 1. 3.  
Rev. 2. 24, 26. Psal. 73. 24. and 149. 5.  
Hab. 11. 10.
2 The word glory, is used in scripture often to express the exhibition, emanation or communication of the internal glory. Hence it often signifies a visible exhibition of glory; as in an effulgence or shining brightness, by an emanation of beams of light. Thus the brightness of the sun and moon and stars is called their glory in 1 Cor. 15. 41. But in particular, the word is very often thus used, when applied to God and Christ. As in Ezek. 1. 28. "As the appearance of the bow that is in the cloud in the day of rain, so was the appearance of the brightness round about. This was the appearance of the likeness of the glory of the Lord." And chap. 10. 4. "Then the glory of the Lord went up from the cherub, and stood over the threshold of the house, and the house was filled with the cloud, and the court was full of the brightness of the Lord's glory." Isai. 6. 1, 2, 3. "I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne high and lifted up, and his train filled the temple. Above it stood the seraphim.—And one cried to another and said, Holy, holy, holy is the Lord of hosts, the whole earth is full of his glory." Compared with Joh. 12. 4. "These things said Esaias, when he saw his glory and spake of him." Ezek. 43. 2. "And behold the glory of the God of Israel came from the way of the east. And the earth shined with his glory." Isai. 24. 23. "Then the moon shall be confounded and the sun ashamed, when the Lord of hosts shall reign in Mount Zion, and in Jerusalem, and before his ancients gloriously." Isai. 60. 1, 2. "Arise, shine, for thy light is come, and the glory of the Lord is risen upon thee. For behold the darkness shall cover the earth, and gross darkness the people; but the Lord shall arise upon thee, and his glory shall be seen upon thee." Together with ver. 19. "The sun shall be no more thy light by day, neither for brightness shall the moon give light unto thee: but the Lord shall be unto thee an everlasting light, and thy God thy glory." Luk. 2. 9. "The glory of the Lord shone round about them." Act. 22. 11. "And when I could not see, for the glory of that light." In 2 Cor. 3. 7. The shining of Moses's face is called the glory of his countenance. And to this Christ's glory is compared ver. 18. "But we all with open face, beholding as in a glass the glory of the Lord, are changed into the same image, from glory to glory." And to chap. 4. 4. "Left the
the light of the glorious gospel of Christ, who is the image of God, should shine unto them." Ver. 6. "For God, who commanded the light to shine out of darkness, hath shined in our hearts, to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ." 

Heb. 1 3. "Who is the brightness of his glory." The apostle Peter, speaking of that emanation of exceeding brightness, from the bright cloud that over shadowed the disciples in the mount of transfiguration, and of the shining of Christ's face at that time, says, 2 Pet. 1. 17. "For he received from God the father honor and glory, when there came such a voice to him from the excellent glory, This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased." Rev. 18. 1. "Another angel came down from heaven, having great power, and the earth was lightened with his glory." Rev. 21. 11. "Having the glory of God, and her light was like unto a store most precious, like a jasper stone, clear as crystal." Ver. 23. "And the city had no need of the sun, nor of the moon to shine in it ; for the glory of God did lighten it." So the word for a visible effulgence or emanation of light in the places to be seen in the margin.

The word glory, as applied to God or Christ, sometimes evidently signifies the communications of God's fulness and means much the same thing, with God's abundant and exceeding goodness and grace. So Eph. 2. 16. "That he would grant you, according to the riches of his glory, to be strengthened with might, by his spirit in the inner man". The expression, "According to the riches of his glory", is apparently equivalent to that in the same epistle, chap. 1. 7. "According to the riches of his grace". And chap. 2. 7. "The exceeding riches of his grace in his kindness towards us, thro' Christ Jesus". In like manner is the word glory used in Phil. 4. 19. "But my God shall supply

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* Exod. 16. 12. and 24. 15, 17, 23. and 40. 34, 35; Lev. 9. 6, 23. Num. 14. 10. and 16. 19. 1 King. 8. 11. 2 Chron. 5. 14. and 7. 1, 2, 3. 11ai. 58. 2. Ezek. 3. 23. and 8. 4. and 9. 3. and 10. 18, 19. and 11. 22, 23. and 43. 4, 5. and 44. 4. Act. 7. 55. Rev. 15. 8.
supply all your need, according to his riches in glory, by Christ Jesus". And Rom. 9. 23. "And that he might make known the riches of his glory, on the vessels of mercy". In this, and the foregoing verse, the apostle speaks of God's making known two things, his great wrath, and his rich grace. The former, on the vessels of wrath, ver. 22. The latter, which he calls the riches of his glory, on the vessels of mercy, ver. 23. So when Moises says, "I beseech thee shew me thy glory;" God granting his request, makes answer, "I will make all my goodness to pass before thee." Exod. 33. 18, 19. 

What we find in Joh. 12. 23, —— 32. is worthy of particular notice in this place. The words and behaviour of Christ, which we have an account of here, argue two things.

1. That the happiness and salvation of men, was an end that Christ ultimately aimed at in the labours and sufferings he went through, for our redemption (and consequently, by what has been before observed, an ultimate end of the work of creation.) The very same things which were observed before in this passage (chap. second, sect. third) concerning God's glory, are equally, and in the same manner observable, concerning the salvation of men. As it was there observed, that Christ in the great 

† Dr. Goodwin observes (vol. I. of his works, part 2d, page 166.) that riches of grace are called riches of glory in scripture. "The scripture," says he, "speaks of riches of glory in Eph. 3. 16. That he would grant you according to the riches of his glory; yet eminently mercy is there intended; for it is that which God be”ows, and which the apostle there prayeth for. And he calls his mercy there his glory, as elsewhere he doth, as being the most eminent excellency in God —— That in Rom. 9. 22, 23. compared, is observable. In the 22d ver. where the apostle speaks of God's making known the power of his wrath, faith he, God willing to shew his wrath, and make his power known. But in ver. 23d when he comes to speak of mercy, he faith, That he might make known the riches of his glory, on the vessels of mercy."
conflict of his soul, in the view of the near approach of the most extreme difficulties which attended his undertaking, comforts himself in a certain prospect of obtaining the end he had chiefly in view. It was observed that the glory of God is therefore mention’d and dwelt upon by him, as what his soul supported itself and rested in, as this great end. And at the same time, and exactly in the same manner, is the salvation of men mentioned and insisted on, as the end of these great labors and sufferings, which satisfied his soul, in the prospect of undergoing them. Compare the 23d and 24th verses; and also the 28th and 29th verses; ver. 31. and 32. And,

2. The glory of God, and the emanations and fruits of his grace in man's salvation, are so spoken of by Christ on this occasion in just the same manner, that it would be quite unnatural, to understand him as speaking of two distinct things. Such is the connection, that what he says of the latter, must most naturally be understood as exegetical of the former. He first speaks of his own glory and the glory of his father, as the great end that should be obtained by what he is about to suffer; and then explains and amplifies what he says on this, in what he expresses of the salvation of men that shall be obtained by it. Thus in the 23. ver. he says, "The hour is come that the son of man should be glorified." And in what next follows, he evidently shews how he was to be glorified, or wherein his glory consisted: "Verily, verily I say unto you, except a corn of wheat fall into the ground, and die, it abideth alone; but if it die, it bringeth forth much fruit.” As much fruit is the glory of the seed, so is the multitude of redeemed ones, which should spring from his death, his glory. * So concerning the glory of his father, in the 27th, and following verses. “Now is my soul troubled, and what shall I say? Father, save me from this hour? But for this cause came I unto this hour. Father, glorify thy name. Then came there a voice from heaven,

* Here may be remembered what was before observed of the church's being so often spoken of as the glory and fullness of Christ.
heaven, saying, I have both glorified it, and will glorify it again.” In an assurance of this, which this voice declared, Christ was greatly comforted, and his soul even exulted under the view of his approaching sufferings. And what this glory was, in which Christ’s soul was so comforted on this occasion, his own words which he then spake, plainly shew. When the people said it thundered; and others said, an angel spake to him; then Christ explains the matter to them, and tells them what this voice meant. Ver. 30, 31, 32. “Jesus answered and said, This voice came not because of me, but for your sakes. Now is the judgment of this world; now shall the prince of this world be cast out. And I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all men unto me.” By this behaviour, and these speeches of our redeemer, it appears that the expressions of divine grace, in the sanctification and happiness of the redeemed, are especially that glory of his, and his father, which was the joy that was set before him, for which he endured the cross, and despised the shame: and that this glory especially, was the end of the travail of his soul, in obtaining which end he was satisfied, agreeable to Isai. 53. 10, 11.

This is agreeable to what has been just observed, of God’s glory being so often represented by an effulgence, or emanation, or communication of light, from a luminary or fountain of light. What can be thought of, that so naturally and aptly represents the emanation of the internal glory of God; or the flowing forth, and abundant communication of that infinite fulness of good that is in God? Light is very often in scripture put for comfort, joy, happiness and for good in general.†

† Isai. 6. 3. — “Holy, holy, holy is the Lord of hosts, the whole earth is full of his glory.” In the original, His glory is the fulness of the whole earth: which signifies much more than the words of the translation. God’s glory, consisting especially in his holiness, is that, in the sight or communications of which man’s fulness, i. e. his holiness and happiness, consists. By God’s glory here, there seems to be respect to that
Again, the word glory, as applied to God in scripture, implies the view or knowledge of God's excellency. The exhibition of glory is to the view of beholders. The manifestation of glory, the emanation or effulgence of brightness, has relation to the eye. Light or brightness is a quality that has relation to the sense of seeing; we see the luminary by its light. And knowledge is often expressed in scripture by light. The word glory very often in scripture signifies or implies honor, as any one may soon see by casting his eye on a concordance. But honor implies the knowledge of the dignity and excellency of him who hath the honor. And this is often more especially signified by the word glory, when applied to God. Num. 14. 21. “But as truly as I live, all the earth shall be filled with the glory of the Lord.” i.e. All the earth shall see the manifestations I will make of my perfect holiness and hatred of sin, and so of my infinite excellency. This appears by the context. So Ezek. 39. 21, 22, 23. “And I will set my glory among the heathen, and all the heathen shall see my judgment that I have executed, and my hand that I have laid upon them. So the house of Israel shall know that I am the Lord their God. And the heathen shall know, that the house of Israel went into captivity for their iniquity.” And ’tis manifest in many places, where we read of God's glorifying himself, or of his being glorified; that one thing directly intended, is a manifesting or making known his divine greatness and excellency.

Again, glory, as the word is used in scripture, often signifies or implies praise. This appears from what was observed before, that glory very often signifies honor, which is much the same thing with praise, viz. high esteem and respect of heart, and the expression and testimony of it in words and actions. And ’tis manifest that the words glory and praise, are often used as equivalent expressions in scripture.

that train, or those effulgent beams that filled the temple: these beams signifying God's glory shining forth, and communicated. This effulgence or communication is the fulness of all intelligent creatures, who have no fulness of their own.

* See particularly Heb. 3. 3.
It is manifest the praise of God, as the phrase is used in scripture, implies the high esteem and love of the heart, exalting thoughts of God, and complacency in his excellence and perfection. This is so manifest to every one acquainted with the scripture, that there seems to be but little or no need to refer to particular places. However, if any need satisfaction, they may, among enumerable other places which might be mentioned, turn to those in the margin.

It also implies joy in God, or rejoicing in his perfections, as is manifest by Psal. 33. 2. "Rejoice in the Lord, O ye righteous, for praise is comely for the upright". Other passages to the same purpose, see in the margin. § How often do

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§ Psal. 9. 1, 2, 14. and 28. 7. and 35. 27, 28. and 42. 4. and 63. 5. and 67. 3. 4, 5. and 71. 22, 23. and 104. 33, 34. and 106. 47. and 135. 3. and 147. 1. and 149. 1, 2, 5, 6. Acts. 2. 46, 47. and 3. 8. Rev. 19. 6, 7.
do we read of singing praise? But singing is commonly an expression of joy. It is called, making a joyful noise. And as it is often used, it implies gratitude or love to God for his benefits to us.*

Having thus considered what is implied in the phrase, THE GLORY OF GOD, as we find it used in scripture; I proceed to enquire what is meant by the name of God.

And I observe that 'tis manifest that God's name and his glory, at least very often, signify the same thing in scripture. As it has been observed concerning the glory of God, that it sometimes signifies the second person in the Trinity; the same might be shewn of the name of God, if it were needful in this place. But that the name and glory of God are often equipollent expressions, is manifest by Exod. 33. 18, 19. When Moses says, "I beseech thee, shew me thy glory"; and God grants his request, he says, "I will proclaim the name of the Lord before thee". Psal. 8. 1. "O Lord, how excellent is thy name in all the earth! Who hast set thy glory above the heavens". Psal. 79. 9. "Help us O God of our salvation, for the glory of thy name; and deliver us, and purge away our sins, for thy name's sake". Psal. 102. 15. "So the heathen shall fear the name of the Lord; and all the kings of the earth, thy glory". Psal. 148. 13. "His name alone is excellent, and his glory is above the earth and heaven". Isai. 48. 9. "For my name's sake will I defer mine anger; and for my praise will I refrain for thee". Ver. 11. "For mine own sake, even for mine own sake will I do it: for how should my name be polluted? And I will not give my glory unto another". Isai. 49. 19. "They shall fear the name of the Lord from the west, and his glory from the rising of the sun". Jer. 13. 11. "That they might be unto me for a name;
name, and for a praise, and for a glory. As glory often implies the manifestation, publication and knowledge of excellency, and the honor that any one has in the world; so it is evident does name. Gen. 11. 4. "Let us make us a name". Deut. 26. 19. "And to make thee high above all nations, in praise, in name, and in honor".]

So 'tis evident that by name is sometimes meant much the same thing as praise, by several places which have been just mentioned, as Isa. 48. 9. Jer. 13. 11. Deut. 26. 19. And also by Jer. 33. 9. "And it shall be unto me for a name, a praise and an honor, before all the nations of the earth, which shall hear of all the good I do unto them". Zeph. 3. 40. "I will make you a name and a praise among all people of the earth".

And it seems that the expression or exhibition of God's goodness is especially called his name, in Exod. 33. 19. "I will make all my goodness pass before thee, and I will proclaim the name of the Lord before thee." And chap. 34. 5, 6, 7. "And the Lord descended in the cloud, & stood with him there, and proclaimed the name of the Lord. And the Lord passed by before him, and proclaimed, the Lord, the Lord God, gracious and merciful, longsuffering and abundant in goodness and truth; keeping mercy for thousands", &c.

And the same illustrious brightness and effulgence in the pillar of cloud, that appeared in the wilderness, and dwelt above the mercy seat in the tabernacle and temple (or rather the spiritual divine brightness and effulgence represented by it) which is so often called the glory of the Lord, is also often called the name of the Lord. Because God's glory was to dwell in the tabernacle, therefore he promises, Exod. 29. 43. "There will I meet with the children of Israel, and the tabernacle shall be sanctified by my glory." And the temple was called the house of God's glory, Isa. 60. 7. In like manner,

See also, 2 Sam. 7. 9. and 8. 13. and 23. 18. Neh. 9. 10. Job 30. 8. Prov. 22. 1. Many other places import the same thing.
manner, the name of God is said to dwell in the sanctuary. Thus we often read of the place that God chose, to put his name there: or (as it is in the hebrew) to cause his name to inhabit there. So it is sometimes rendered by our translators. As Deut. 12. 11. "Then there shall be a place which the Lord your God shall choose to cause his name to dwell there". And the temple is often spoken of as built for God's name. And in Psal. 74. 7. the temple is called the dwelling place of God's name. The mercy seat in the temple was called the throne of God's name or glory, Jer. 14. 21. "Do not abhor us, for thy name's sake, do not disgrace the throne of thy glory". Here God's name and his glory, seem to be spoken of as the same.

S E C T. VII.

S H E W I N G that the ultimate end of the creation of the world, is but one, and what that one end is.

From what has been observed in the last section, it appears, that however the last end of the creation is spoken of in scripture under various denominations; yet if the whole of what is said relating to this affair, be duly weighed, and one part compared with another, we shall have reason to think, that the design of the Spirit of God don't seem to be to represent God's ultimate end as manifold, but as one. For tho' it be signified by various names, yet they appear not to be names of different things, but various names involving each other in their meaning; either different names of the same thing, or names of several parts of one whole, or of the same whole viewed in various lights, or in its different respects and relations. For it appears that all that is ever spoken of in the scripture as an ultimate end of God's works, is included in that one phrase, the glory of God; which is the name by which the last end of God's works is most commonly called in scripture; and seems to be the name which most aptly signifies the thing.
The thing signified by that name, the glory of God, when spoken of as the supremam and ultimate end of the work of creation, and of all God's works, is the emanation and true external expression of God's internal glory and fulness; meaning by his fulness, what has already been explained. Or in other words, God's internal glory extant, in a true and just exhibition, or external existence of it. It is confessed that there is a degree of obscurity in these definitions: but perhaps an obscurity which is unavoidable, thro' the imperfection of language, and words being less fitted to express things of so sublime a nature. And therefore the thing may possibly be better understood, by using many words and a variety of expressions, by a particular consideration of it, as it were by parts, than by any short definition.

There is included in this, the exercise of God's perfections to produce a proper effect, in opposition to their lying eternally dormant and ineffectual: as his power being eternally without any act or fruit of that power; his wisdom eternally ineffectual in any wise production, or prudent disposal of any thing, &c. The manifestation of his internal glory to created understandings. The communication of the infinite fulness of God to the creature. The creature's high esteem of God, love to God, and complacence and joy in God; and the proper exercises and expressions of these.

These at first view may appear to be entirely distinct things: but if we more closely consider the matter, they will all appear to be one thing, in a variety of views and relations. They are all but the emanation of God's glory; or the excellent brightness and fulness of the divinity diffused, overflowing, and as it were enlarged; or in one word, existing ad extra. God's exercising his perfection to produce a proper effect, is not distinct from the emanation or communication of his fulnesses: for this is the effect, viz. his fulness communicated, and the producing this effect is the communication of his fulnesss; and there is nothing in this effectual exerting of God's perfection, but the emanation of God's internal glory. The emanation or communication, of the internal glory or fulness of God, as it is. Now God's internal glory, as it is in God, is either in his understand-
ing, or will. The glory or fulness of his understanding, is his knowledge. The internal glory and fulness of God, which we must conceive of as having its special seat in his will, is his holiness and happiness. The whole of God's internal good or glory, is in these three things, viz. his infinite knowledge; his infinite virtue or holiness, and his infinite joy and happiness. Indeed there are a great many attributes in God, according to our way of conceiving or talking of them: but all may be reduced to these; or to the degree, circumstances and relations of these. We have no conception of God's power, different from the degree of these things, with a certain relation of them to effects. God's infinity is not so properly a distinct kind of good in God, but only expresses the degree of the good there is in him. So God's eternity is not a distinct good; but is the duration of good. His immutability is still the same good, with a negation of change. So that, as I said, the fulness of the God-head is the fulness of his understanding, consisting in his knowledge, and the fulness of his will, consisting in his virtue and happiness. And therefore the external glory of God consists in the communication of these. The communication of his knowledge is chiefly in giving the knowledge of himself: for this is the knowledge in which the fulness of God's understanding chiefly consists. And thus we see how the manifestation of God's glory to created understandings, and their seeing and knowing it, is not distinct from an emanation or communication of God's fulness, but clearly implied in it. Again, the communication of God's virtue or holiness, is principally in communicating the love of himself (which appears by what has before been observed.) And thus we see how, not only the creature's seeing and knowing God's excellency, but also supremely esteeming and loving him, belongs to the communication of God's fulness. And the communication of God's joy & happiness, consists chiefly in communicating to the creature, that happiness and joy, which consists in rejoicing in God, and in his glorious excellency; for in such joy God's own happiness does principally consist. And in these things, viz. in knowing God's excellency, loving God for it, and rejoicing in it; and in the exercise and expression of of these, consists God's honor and praise: so that these are clearly implied in that glory of God, which consists
consists in the emanation of his internal glory. And tho' we suppose all these things, which seem to be so various, are signified by that glory, which the scripture speaks of as the last end of all God's works; yet it is manifest there is no greater, and no other variety in it, than in the internal and essential glory of God itself. God's internal glory is partly in his understanding, and partly in his will. And this internal glory, as seated in the will of God, implies both his holiness and his happiness: both are evidently God's glory, according to the use of the phrase. So that as God's external glory is only the emanation of his internal glory, this variety necessarily follows. And again, it hence appears that here is no other variety or distinction, but what necessarily arises from the distinct faculties of the creature, to which the communication is made, as created in the image of God; even as having these two faculties of understanding and will. God communicates himself to the understanding of the creature, in giving him the knowledge of his glory; and to the will of the creature, in giving him holiness, consisting primarily in the love of God: and in giving the creature happiness, chiefly consisting in joy in God. These are the sum of that emanation of divine fulness called in scripture, the glory of God. The first part of this glory, is called truth, the latter, grace. Joh. 1. 14.

"We beheld his glory, the glory of the only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth."

Thus we see that the great and last end of God's works which is so variously expressed in scripture, is indeed but one; and this one end is most properly and comprehensively called, the glory of God; by which name it is most commonly called in scripture. And is fitly compared to an effulgence or emanation of light from a luminary, by which this glory of God is abundantly represented in scripture. Light is the external expression, exhibition and manifestation of the excellency of the luminary, of the sun for instance: It is the abundant, extensive emanation and communication of the fulness of the sun to innumerable beings that partake of it. 'Tis by this that the sun itself is seen, and his glory beheld, and all other things are discovered: 'tis by a participation of this communication from the sun, that surrounding objects receive all their lustre, beauty and brightness,
What has been said may be sufficient to shew how these things, which are spoken of in scripture as ultimate ends of God's works, tho' they may seem at first view to be distinct, are all plainly to be reduced to this one thing, viz. God's internal glory or fulness extant externally, or existing in its emanation. And tho' God in seeking this end, seeks the creature's good; yet therein appears his supreme regard to himself.

The emanation or communication of the divine fulness, consisting in the knowledge of God, love to God, and joy in God, has relation indeed both to God, and the creature: but it has relation to God as its fountain, as it is an emanation from God; and as the communication itself, or thing communicated, is something divine, something of God, something of his internal fulness; as the water in the stream is something of the fountain; and as the beams of the sun, are something of the sun. And again, they have relation to God, as they have respect to him as their object:

*Tis used to signify knowledge, or that manifestation and evidence by which knowledge is received. Phil. 19. 8. and 11. 105. 112. 1st. Tim. 6. 27. Mal 8. 20. and 9. 2. and 29. 18. Dan. 5. 11. Eph. 1. 13. "But all things that are required, are made manifest by the light: for whatsoever doth make manifest is light." And in other places of the new testament innumerable.

*Tis used to signify virtue or moral good. Job. 23. 5. Eccl. 8. 1. Ral. 5. 20. and 24. 23. and 82. 1. Ezek. 28. 7. 17. Dan. 2. 31. 1 Jo. 1. 5. And many other places.

And is abundantly used to signify comfort, joy and happiness. 1st. Tim. 4. 14. 2 Thess. 18. 19. and 12. 25. and 13. 1. Phil. 4. 1. and 3. 11. and 116. 27. and 112. 4. 1st. Ral. 1. 19. and 72. 10. and 103. 7. Jer. 10. 16. Lam 1. 2. Ezk. 7. 1. Anc. 5. 24. 13. 11. 44. and other places.
object: for the knowledge communicated is the knowledge of God; and so God is the object of the knowledge: and the love communicated, is the love of God: so God is the object of that love: and the happiness communicated, is joy in God; and so he is the object of the joy communicated. In the creature's knowing, venerating, loving, rejecting, and praising God, the glory of God is both acknowledged and acknowledged; his fulness is received and returned. Here is both an emanation, and a emanation. The refugence shines upon and into the creature, and is reflected back to the luminary. The beams of glory come from God, and are something of God, and are refunded back again to their original. So that the whole is of God, and in God: and is God; and God is the beginning, middle and end in this affair.

And tho' it be true that God has respect to the creature in these things; yet his respect to himself, and to the creature in this matter, are not properly to be looked upon, as a double and divided respect of God's heart. What has been left in chap. i. (viz. 3, 4), may be sufficient to know this. Nevertheless, it may not be amiss here briefly to say a few things; tho' they are mostly implied in what has been said already.

When God was about to create the world, he had respect to that emanation of his glory, which is actually the consequence of the creation, just as it is with regard to all that belongs to it, both with regard to its relation to himself, and the creature. He had regard to it, as an emanation from himself, and a communication of himself, and as the thing communicated, in its nature returned to himself, as its final term. And he had regard to it also, as the emanation was to the creature, and as the thing communicated was in the creature, as its subject. And God had regard to it in this manner, as he had a supreme regard to himself, and value for his own infinite internal glory. It was this value for himself that caused him to value and seek that his internal glory should flow forth from himself. It was from his value for his glorious perfections of wisdom and righteousness, &c. — that he valued the proper exercise and effect of these perfections. In wise and righteous acts and effects. It was from his infinite value for his
internal glory and fulness, that he valued the thing itself, which is communicated, which is something of the same, extant in the creature. Thus, because he infinitely values his own glory, consisting in the knowledge of himself, love to himself, and complacence and joy in himself; he therefore valued the image, communication or participation of these, in the creature. And 'tis because he values himself, that he delights in the knowledge and love and joy of the creature; as being himself the object of this knowledge, love and complacence. For it is the necessary consequence of the true esteem and love of any person or being (suppose a son or friend) that we should approve and value others esteem of the same object, and disapprove and dislike the contrary. For the same reason is it the consequence of a being's esteem and love of himself, that he should approve of others esteem and love of himself.

Thus 'tis easy to conceive, how God should seek the good of the creature, consisting in the creature's knowledge and holiness, and even his happiness, from a supreme regard to himself; as his happiness arises from that which is an image and participation of God's own beauty; and consists in the creature's exercising a supreme regard to God and complacence in him; in beholding God's glory, in esteeming and loving it, and rejoicing in it, and in his exercising and testifying love and supreme respect to God: which is the same thing with the creature's exalting God as his chief good, and making him his supreme end.

And though the emanation of God's fulness which God intended in the creation, and which actually is the consequence of it, is to the creature as it's object, and the creature is the subject of the fulness communicated, and is the creature's good; and was also regarded as such, when God fought it as the end of his works: yet it don't necessarily follow, that even in so doing, he did not make himself his end. It comes to the same thing. God's respect to the creature's good, and his respect to himself, is not a divided respect; but both are united in one, as the happiness of the creature aimed at, is happiness in union with himself. The creature is no further happy with this happiness which God makes his ultimate end, than he becomes
one with God. The more happiness the greater union: when the happiness is perfect, the union is perfect. And as the happiness will be increasing to eternity, the union will become more and more strict and perfect; nearer & more like to that between God the Father, and the Son; who are so united, that their interest is perfectly one. If the happiness of the creature be considered as it will be, in the whole of the creature's eternal duration, with all the infinity of its progress, and infinite increase of nearness and union to God; in this view, the creature must be looked upon as united to God in an infinite strictness.

If God has respect to something in the creature, which he views as of everlasting duration, and as rising higher and higher thro' that infinite duration, and that not with constantly diminishing (but perhaps an increasing) celerity: then he has respect to it, as, in the whole, of infinite height; though there never will be any particular time when it can be said already to have come to such an height.

Let the most perfect union with God, be represented by something at an infinite height above us; and the eternally increasing union of the saints with God, by something that is ascending constantly towards that infinite height, moving upwards with a given velocity; and that is to continue thus to move to all eternity. God who views the whole of this eternally increasing height, views it as an infinite height. And if he has respect to it, and makes it his end, as in the whole of it, he has respect to it as an infinite height, tho' the time will never come when it can be said it has already arrived at this infinite height.

God aims at that which the motion or progression which he causes, aims at, or tends to. If there be many things supposed to be so made and appointed, that by a constant and eternal motion, they all tend to a certain center; then it appears that he who made them and is the cause of their motion, aimed at that center, that term of their motion, to which they eternally tend, and are eternally, as it were, striving after. And if God be this center; then God aimed at himself. And herein it appears, that as he is the first author of their being and motion, so he is the
last end, the final term, to which is their ultimate tendency and aim.

We may judge of the end that the creator aimed at, in the being, nature and tendency he gives the creature, by the mark or term which they constantly aim at in their tendency and eternal progress; though the time will never come, when it can be said it is attained to, in the most absolutely perfect manner.

But if strictness of union to God be viewed as thus infinitely exalted; then the creature must be regarded as infinitely, nearly and closely united to God. And viewed thus, their interest must be viewed as one with God's interest; and so is not regarded properly with a disjunct and separate, but an undivided respect. And as to any difficulty of reconciling God's not making the creature his ultimate end, with a respect properly distinct from a respect to himself; with his benevolence and free grace, and the creatures obligation to gratitude, the reader must be refer'd to chap. I. sect. 4. obj. 4, where this objection has been consider'd and answer'd at large.

If by reason of the strictness of the union of a man and his family, their interest may be looked upon as one, how much more one is the interest of Christ and his church, (whose first union in heaven is unspeakably more perfect and exalted, than that of an earthly father and his family,) if they be consider'd with regard to their eternal and increasing union? Doubtless it may justly be esteemed as so much one, that it may be supposed to be aimed at and sought, not with a distinct and separate, but an undivided respect.

'Tis certain that what God aimed at in the creation of the world, was the good that would be the consequence of the creation, in the whole continuance of the thing created.

'Tis no solid objection against God's aiming at an infinitely perfect union of the creature with himself, that the particular time will never come when it can be said, the union
union is now infinitely perfect. God aims at satisfying justice in the eternal damnation of sinners; which will be satisfied by their damnation, considered no otherwise than with regard to its eternal duration. But yet there never will come that particular moment, when it can be said, that now justice is satisfied. But if this don't satisfy our modern free-thinkers, who don't like the talk about satisfying justice with an infinite punishment; I suppose it will not be denied by any, that God, in glorifying the saints in heaven with eternal felicity, aims to satisfy his infinite grace or benevolence, by the bestowment of a good infinitely valuable, because eternal: and yet there never will come the moment, when it can be said, that now this infinitely valuable good has been actually bestowed.
The Nature of true Virtue.

CHAP. I.

Shewing wherein the essence of true virtue consists.

Whatever controversies and variety of opinions there are about the nature of virtue, yet all (excepting some sceptics, who deny any real difference between virtue and vice) mean by it something beautiful, or rather some kind of beauty, or excellency. 'Tis not all beauty, that is called virtue; for instance, not the beauty of a building, of a flower, or of the rainbow: but some beauty belonging to Beings that have perception and will. 'Tis not all beauty of mankind, that is called virtue; for instance, not the external beauty of the countenance, or shape, gracefulness of motion, or harmony of voice: but it is a beauty that has its original seat in the mind. But yet perhaps not every thing that may be called a beauty of mind, is properly called virtue. There is a beauty of understanding and speculation. There is something in the ideas and conceptions of great philosophers and statesmen, that may be called beautiful; which is a different thing from what is most commonly meant by virtue. But virtue is the beauty of those qualities and acts of the mind, that are of a moral nature, i.e. such as are attended with desert or worthiness of praise, or blame. Things of this sort, it is generally agreed, so far as I know, are not any thing belonging merely to speculation; but to the disposition and will, or (to use a general word, I suppose commonly well understood) to the heart. Therefore I suppose, I shall not depart from the common opinion, when I say, that virtue is the beauty
ty of the qualities and exercises of the heart, or those actions which proceed from them. So that when it is enquired, what is the nature of true virtue? This is the same as to enquire, what that is which renders any habit, disposition, or exercise of the heart truly beautiful?—Use the phrase true virtue, and speak of things truly beautiful, because I suppose it will generally be allowed, that there is a distinction to be made between some things which are truly virtuous, and others which only seem to be virtuous, thro' a partial and imperfect view of things: that some actions and dispositions appear beautiful, if considered partially and superficially, or with regard to some things belonging to them, and in some of their circumstances and tendencies, which would appear otherwise in a more extensive & comprehensive view, wherein they are seen clearly in their whole nature and the extent of their connections in the universality of things.——There is a general and a particular beauty. By a particular beauty, I mean that by which a thing appears beautiful when considered only with regard to its connection with, & tendency to some particular things within a limited, and as it were, a private sphere. And a general beauty is that by which a thing appears beautiful when viewed most perfectly, comprehensively and universally, with regard to all its tendencies, and its connections with every thing it stands related to.——The former may be without and against the latter. As, a few notes in a tune, taken only by themselves, and in their relation to one another, may be harmonious; which, when considered with respect to all the notes in the tune, or the entire series of sound, they are connected with, may be very discordant and disagreeable. (Of which more afterwards)——That only therefore, is what I mean by true virtue, which is that, belonging to the heart of an intelligent Being, that is beautiful by a general beauty, or beautiful in a comprehensive view as it is in itself, and as related to every thing that it stands in connection with. And therefore when we are inquiring concerning the nature of true virtue, viz. where-in this true and general beauty of the heart does most essentially consist,——this is my answer to the inquiry——

**True virtue** most essentially consists in benevolence to Being in general. Or perhaps to speak more accurately, it
it is that consent, propensity and union of heart to Being in general, that is immediately exercised in a general good-will.

The things which were before observed of the nature of true virtue, naturally lead us to such a notion of it. If it has its seat in the heart, and is the general goodness and beauty of the disposition and exercise of that, in the most comprehensive view, considered with regard to its universal tendency, and as related to every thing that it stands in connection with; what can it consist in, but a consent and good-will to Being in general?—Beauty does not consist in discord and dissent, but in consent and agreement. And if every intelligent Being is some way related to Being in general, and is a part of the universal system of existence; and so stands in connection with the whole; what can its general and true beauty be, but its union and consent with the great whole.

If any such thing can be supposed as an union of heart to some particular Being, or number of Beings, disposing it to benevolence to a private circle or system of Beings, which are but a small part of the whole; not implying a tendency to an union with the great system, and not at all inconsistent with enmity towards Being in general; this I suppose not to be of the nature of true virtue: altho' it may in some respects be good, and may appear beautiful in a confined and contracted view of things.—But of this more afterwards.

It is abundantly plain by the holy scriptures, and generally allowed, not only by Christian divines, but by the more considerable deists, that virtue most essentially consists in love. And I suppose is owned by the most considerable writers, to consist in general love of benevolence, or kind affection: tho', it seems to me, the meaning of some in this affair is not sufficiently explained; which perhaps occasions some error or confusion in discourses on this subject.

When I say, true virtue consists in love to Being in general, I shall not be likely to be understood, that no one act
act of the mind or exercise of love is of the nature of true virtue, but what has Being in general, or the great system of universal existence, for its direct and immediate object: so that no exercise of love or kind affection to any one particular Being, that is but a small part of this whole, has any thing of the nature of true virtue.—But, that the nature of true virtue consists in a disposition to benevolence towards Being in general. Tho', from such a disposition may arise exercises of love to particular Beings, as objects are presented and occasions arise. No wonder, that he who is of a generally benevolent disposition, should be more disposed than another to have his heart moved with benevolent affection to particular Persons, whom he is acquainted and conversant with, and from whom arise the greatest and most frequent occasions for exciting his benevolent temper.—But my meaning is, that no affections towards particular persons, or Beings, are of the nature of true virtue, but such as arise from a generally benevolent temper, or from that habit or frame of mind, wherein consists a disposition to love Being in general.

And perhaps it is needless for me to give notice to my readers, that when I speak of an intelligent Being's having a heart united and benevolently disposed to Being in general, I thereby mean intelligent Being in general. Not inanimate things, or Beings that have no perception or will; which are not properly capable objects of benevolence.

Love is commonly distinguished into love of benevolence and love of complacence.—Love of benevolence is that affection or propensity of the heart to any Being, which causes it to incline to its well-being, or disposes it to desire and take pleasure in its happiness. And if I mistake not, this agreeable to the common opinion, that beauty in the object is not always the ground of this propensity; but that there may be such a thing as benevolence, or a disposition to the welfare of those that are not considered as beautiful; unless mere existence be accounted a beauty. And benevolence or goodnes in the divine Being is generally supposed, not only to be prior to the beauty of many of its objects, but to their existence: so as to be the ground both of their existence and their beauty, rather than they the foundation
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foundation of God's benevolence; as 'tis supposed that it is God's goodness which moved him to give them both Being and beauty. So that if all virtue primarily consists in that affection of heart to Being, which is, exercised in benevolence, or an inclination to its good, then God's virtue is so extended as to include a property not only to Being actually existing, & actually beautiful, but to possible Being, so as to incline him to give Being, beauty and happiness. But not now to insist particularly on this—

What I would have observed at present, is, that it must be allowed, benevolence doth not necessarily presuppose beauty in its object.

What is commonly called love of complacence, presupposes beauty. For it is no other than delight in beauty; or complacence in the person or Being beloved for his beauty.

If virtue be the beauty of an intelligent Being, and virtue consists in love, then it is a plain inconsistency, to suppose that virtue primarily consists in any love to its object for its beauty; either in a love of complacence, which is delight in a Being for his beauty, or in a love of benevolence, that has the beauty of its object for its foundation. For that would be to suppose, that the beauty of intelligent Beings primarily consists in love to beauty; or, that their virtue first of all consists in their love to virtue. Which is an inconsistency, and going in a circle. Because it makes virtue, or beauty of mind, the foundation or first motive of that love wherein virtue originally consists, or wherein the very first virtue consists; or, it supposes the first virtue to be the consequence and effect of virtue. So that virtue is originally the foundation and exciting cause of the very beginning or first Being of virtue. Which makes the first virtue, both the ground, and the consequence, both cause and effect of itself. Doubtless virtue primarily consists in something else besides any effect or consequence of virtue. If virtue consists primarily in love to virtue, then virtue, the thing loved, is the love of virtue; so that virtue must consist in the love of the love of virtue. And if it be inquired, what that virtue is; which virtue consists in the love of
the love of, it must be answered, 'tis the love of virtue. So that there must be the love of the love of the love of virtue, and so on in infinitum. For there is no end of going back in a circle. We never come to any beginning, or foundation. For 'tis without beginning and hangs on nothing.

Therefore, if the essence of virtue or beauty of mind lies in love, or a disposition to love, it must primarily consist in something different both from complacence, which is a delight in beauty, and also from any benevolence that has the beauty of its object or its foundation. Because 'tis absurd, to say that virtue is primarily and first of all the consequence of itself. For this makes virtue primarily prior to itself.

Nor can virtue primarily consist in gratitude; or one Being's benevolence to another for his benevolence to him. Because this implies the same inconsistency. For it supposes a benevolence prior to gratitude, that is the cause of gratitude. Therefore the first benevolence, or that benevolence which has none prior to it, can't be gratitude.

Therefore there is room left for no other conclusion than that the primary object of virtuous love is Being, simply considered; or, that true virtue primarily consists, not in love to any particular Beings, because of their virtue or beauty, nor in gratitude, because they love us; but in a propensity and union of heart to Being simply considered; exciting absolute Benevolence (if I may so call it) to Being in general. — 'tis, true virtue primarily consists in this. For I am far from asserting, that there is no true virtue in any other love than this absolute benevolence. But I would express what appears to me to be the truth, on this subject, in the following particulars.

The first object of a virtuous benevolence is Being, simply considered; and if Being, simply considered, be its object, then Being in general is its object; and the thing it has an ultimate propensity to, is the highest good of Being in general. And it will seek the good of every individual Being unless it be conceived as not consistent with the
highest good of Being in general. In which case the good of a particular Being, or some Beings, may be given up for the sake of the highest good of Being in general. And particularly if there be any Being that is looked upon as rationally and irremediably opposite and an enemy to Being in general, then consent and adherence to Being in general will induce the truly virtuous heart to forfake that Being, and to oppose it.

AND further, if Being, simply considered, be the first object of a truly virtuous benevolence, then that Being who has most of Being, or has the greatest share of existence, other things being equal, so far as such a Being is exhibited to our faculties or set in our view, will have the greatest share of the propensity and benevolent affection of the heart. — I say, other things being equal, especially because there is a secondary object of virtuous benevolence, that I shall take notice of presently. Which is one thing that must be considered as the ground or motive to a purely virtuous benevolence. Pure benevolence in its first exercise is nothing else but Being's uniting, consent, or propensity to Being; appearing true and pure by its extending to Being in general, and inclining to the general highest good, and to each Being, whose welfare is consistent with the highest general good, in proportion to the Degree of existence * underhand, other things being equal.

The second object of a virtuous propensity of heart is benevolent Being. — — — A secondary ground of pure benevolence

* I say, — in proportion to the degree of existence, — because one Being may have more existence than another, as he may be greater than another. That which is great, has more existence, and is further from nothing, than that which is little. One Being may have every thing positive belonging to it, or every thing which goes to it's positive existence (in opposition to defect) in an higher degree than another; or a greater capacity and power, greater understanding, every faculty and every positive quality in an higher degree. An Arch-angel must be supposed to have more existence, and to be every way further removed from non-entity, than a worm, or a
lence is virtuous benevolence itself in its object. When any one under the influence of general benevolence, sees another Being possessed of the like general benevolence, this attaches his heart to him, and draws forth greater love to him, than merely his having existence: because so far as the Being beloved has love to Being in general, so far his own Being is, as it were, enlarged; extends to, and in some sort comprehends, Being in general: and therefore he that is governed by love to Being in general, must of necessity have complacence in him, and the greater degree of benevolence to him, as it were out of gratitude to him for his love to general existence, that his own heart is extended and united to, and so looks on its interest as its own. 'Tis because his heart is thus united to Being in general, that he looks on a benevolent propensity to Being in general, wherever he sees it, as the beauty of the Being in whom it is; an excellency, that renders him worthy of esteem, complacence, and the greater good-will.

But several things may be noted more particularly concerning this secondary ground of a truly virtuous love.

1. That loving a Being on this ground necessarily arises from pure benevolence to Being in general, and comes to the same thing. For he that has a simple and pure goodwill to general entity or existence, must love that temper in others, that agrees and conspires with itself. A spirit of consent to Being must agree with consent to Being. That which truly and sincerely seeks the good of others, must approve of, and love that which joins with him in seeking the good of others.

2. This which has been now mentioned as a secondary ground of virtuous love, is the thing wherein true moral or spiritual beauty primarily consists. Yea, spiritual beauty consists wholly in this, and the various qualities and exercises of mind which proceed from it, and the external actions which proceed from these internal qualities and exercises. And in these things consists all true virtue, viz. in this love of Being, and the qualities and acts which arise from it.
3. As all spiritual beauty lies in these virtuous principles and acts, so 'tis primarily on this account they are beautiful, viz. that they imply content and union with Being in general. This is the primary and most essential beauty of every thing that can justly be called by the name of virtue; or is any moral excellency in the eye of one that has a perfect view of things. I say,—the primary and most essential beauty,—because there is a secondary and inferior sort of beauty; which I shall take notice of afterwards.

4. This spiritual beauty, that is but a secondary ground of a virtuous benevolence, is the ground, not only of benevolence, but complacence, and is the primary ground of the latter; that is, when the complacence is truly virtuous. Love to us in particular, and kindness received, may be a secondary ground: but this is the primary objective foundation of it.

5. It must be noted, that the degree of the amableness or valuableness of true virtue, primarily consisting in content and a benevolent propensity of heart to Being in general, in the eyes of one that is influenced by such a spirit, is not in the simple proportion of the degree of benevolent affection seen, but in a proportion compounded of the greatness of the benevolent Being or the degree of Being and the degree of benevolence. One that loves Being in general, will necessarily value good-will to Being in general, wherever he sees it. But if he sees the same benevolence in two Beings, he will value it more in two, than in one only. Because it is a greater thing, more favorable to Being in general, to have two Beings to favor it, than only one of them. For there is more Being, that favors Being: both together having more Being than one alone. So, if one Being be as great as two, has as much existence as both together, and has the same degree of general benevolence, it is more favorable to being in general, than if there were general benevolence in a Being that had but half that share of existence. As a large quantity of gold, with the same degree of preciousness, i. e. with the same excellent quality of matter, is more valuable than a small quantity of the same metal.

6. It
6. It is impossible that any one should truly relish this beauty, consisting in general benevolence, who has not that temper himself. I have observed, that if any Being is possessed of such a temper, he will unavoidably be pleased with the same temper in another. And it may in like manner be demonstrated, that 'tis such a spirit, and nothing else, which will relish such a spirit. For if a Being, destitute of benevolence, should love benevolence to Being in general, it would prize and seek that which it had no value for. Because to love an inclination to the good of Being in general, would imply a loving and prizeing the good of Being in general. For how should one love and value a disposition to a thing, or a tendency to promote a thing, and for that very reason, because it tends to promote it, when the thing itself is what he is regardless of, and has no value for, nor desires to have promoted.

C H A P. II.

Shewing how that love, wherein true virtue consists, respects the divine Being and created Beings.

From what has been said, 'tis evident, that true virtue must chiefly consist in love to God; the Being of Beings, infinitely the greatest and best of Beings. This appears, whether we consider the primary or secondary ground of virtuous love. It was observed, that the first objective ground of that love, wherein true virtue consists, is Being, simply considered: and as a necessary consequence of this, that Being who has the most of Being, or the greatest share of universal existence, has proportionably the greatest share of virtuous benevolence, so far as such a Being is exhibited to the faculties of our minds, other things being equal. But God has infinitely the greatest share of existence, or is infinitely the greatest Being. So that all other Being, even that of all created things whatsoever, throughout the whole universe, is as nothing in comparison of the divine Being.
And if we consider the secondary ground of love, viz., beauty, or moral excellency, the same thing will appear. For as God is infinitely the greatest Being, so he is allowed to be infinitely the most beautiful and excellent: and all the beauty to be found throughout the whole creation, is but the reflexion of the diffused beams of that Being who hath an infinite fulness of brightness and glory. God’s beauty is infinitely more valuable than that of all other Beings upon both those accounts mentioned, viz. the degree of his virtue, and the greatness of the Being professed of this virtue. And God has sufficiently exhibited himself, in his Being, his infinite greatness and excellency: and has given us faculties, whereby we are capable of plainly discovering immense superiority to all other Beings, in these respects. Therefore he that has true virtue, consisting in benevolence to Being in general, and in that complacence in virtue, or moral beauty, and benevolence to virtuous Being, must necessarily have a supreme love to God, both of benevolence and complacence. And all true virtue must radically and essentially, and as it were summarily, consist in this. Because God is not only infinitely greater and more excellent than all other Being, but he is the head of the universal system of existence; the foundation and fountain of all Being and all beauty; from whom all is perfectly derived, and on whom all is most absolutely and perfectly dependant; of whom, and through whom, & to whom is all Being and all perfection; and whose Being and beauty is as it were the sum and comprehension of all existence and excellency: much more than the sun is the fountain and summary comprehension of all the light and brightness of the day.

If it should be objected, that virtue consists primarily in benevolence, but that our fellow-creatures, and not God, seem to be the most proper objects of our benevolence; insomuch as our goodness extended not to God, and we cannot be profitable to him.—To this I answer,

1. A benevolent propensity of heart is exercised, not only in seeking to promote the happiness of the Being, towards whom it is exercised, but also in rejoicing in his happiness. Even as gratitude for benefits received will not
only excite endeavours to requite the kindness we receive, by equally benefiting our benefactor, but also if he be above any need of us, or we have nothing to bestow, and are unable to repay his kindness, it will dispose us to rejoice in his prosperity.

2 Though we are not able to give any thing to God, which we have of our own, independantly; yet we may be the instruments of promoting his glory, in which he takes a true and proper delight. [As was shewn at large in the former treatise, on God's end in creating the world. Chap. i. sect. 4. Whither I must refer the reader for a more full answer to this objection.]

Whatever influence such an objection may seem to have on the minds of some, yet is there any that owns the Being of a God, who will deny that any love or benevolent affection, is due to God, and proper to be exercised towards him? If no benevolence is to be exercised towards God, because we cannot profit him, then for the same reason, neither is gratitude to be exercised towards him for his benefits to us, because we cannot requite him. But where is the man, who believes a God and a providence, that will lay this?

There seems to be an inconsistence in some writers on morality, in this respect, that they don't wholly exclude a regard to the Deity out of their schemes of morality, but yet mention it so slightly, that they leave me room and reason to suspect they esteem it a less important and a subordinate part of true morality; and insist on benevolence to the created system in such a manner, as would naturally lead one to suppose, they look upon that as by far the most important and essential thing in their scheme. But why should this be? If true virtue consists partly in a respect to God, then doubtless it consists chiefly in it. If true morality requires that we should have some regard, some benevolent affection to our creator, as well as to his creatures, then doubtless it requires the first regard to be paid to him; and that he be every way the supremem object of our benevolence. If his being above our reach, and beyond all capacity of being profited by us, don't hinder but that
that notwithstanding he is the proper object of our love, then it
don't hinder that he should be loved according to his dignity,
or according to the degree in which he has those things where-
in worthiness of regard consists, so far as we are capable of it.
But this worthiness none will deny, consists in these two
things, greatness and moral goodness. And those that own a
God, don't deny that he infinitely exceeds all other Beings
in these. If the Deity is to be look'd upon as within that;
system of Beings which properly terminates our benevo-
lence, or belonging to that whole, certainly he is to be re-
garded as the head of the system, and the chief part of it;
if it be proper to call him a part, who is infinitely more
than all the rest, and in comparison of whom and without
whom all the rest are nothing, either as to beauty or ex-
istence. And therefore certainly, unless we will be atheists,
we must allow that true virtue does primarily and most es-
tentially consist in a supreme love to God; and that where
this is wanting, there can be no true virtue.

But this being a matter of the highest importance, I
shall say something further to make it plain, that love to
God is most essential to true virtue; and that no benevo-
lence whatsoever to other Beings can be of the nature of
true virtue, without it.

And therefore let it be supposed, that some Beings, by
natural instinct or by some other means, have a determina-
tion of mind to union and benevolence to a particular person,
or private system, * which is but a small part of the univer-
sal system of Being: and that this disposition or determina-
tion of mind is independant on, or not subordinate to be-
nevolence.

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* It may be here noted, that when hereafter I use such a
phrase as private system of Beings, or others similar, I there-
by intend any system or society of Beings that contains but
a small part of the great system comprehending the univer-
sality of existence. I think, that may well be called a
private system, which is but an infinitely small part of this
great whole we stand related to. I therefore also call that
affection, private affection, which is limited to so narrow a
circle: and that general affection or benevolence, which
has Being in general for its object.
nevolence, to Being in general. Such a determination, disposition, or affection of mind is not of the nature of true virtue.

This is allowed by all with regard to *self love*; in which, good-will is confined to one single person only. And there are the same reasons, why any other private affection or good-will tho' extending to a society of persons, independent of, and unsubordinate to, benevolence to the universality, should not be esteemed truly virtuous. For, notwithstanding it extends to a number of persons, which taken together are more than a single person, yet the whole falls infinitely short of the universality of existence; and if put in the scales with it, has no greater proportion to it than a single person.

However, it may not be amis more particularly to consider the reasons why private affections, or good-will limited to a particular circle of Beings, falling infinitely short of the whole existence, and not dependent upon it, nor subordinate to general benevolence, cannot be of the nature of true virtue.

1. Such, a private affection, detached from general benevolence and independent on it, as the case may be, will be against general benevolence, or of a contrary tendency; and will set a person against general existence, and make him an enemy to it. — As it is with *selfishness*, or when a man is governed by a regard to his own private interest, independent of regard to the publick good, such a temper exposes a man to act the part of an enemy to the publick. As, in every case wherein his private interest feems to clash with the publick; or in all those cases wherein such things are presented to his view, that suit his personal appetites or private inclinations, but are inconsistent with the good of the publick. On which account a selfish, contracted, narrow spirit is generally abhorred, and is esteemed base and fordid. — But if a man's affection takes in half a dozen more and his regards extend so far beyond his own single person as to take in his children and family; or if it reaches further still, to a larger circle, but falls infinitely short of the universal system, and is exclusive of Being in general; his
private affection exposes him to the same thing, viz. to pursue the interest of its particular object in opposition to general existence, which is certainly contrary to the tendency of true virtue; yea, directly contrary to the main and most essential thing in its nature, the thing on account of which chiefly its nature and tendency is good. For the chief and most essential good that is in virtue, is its favouring Being in general. Now certainly, if private affection to a limited system had in itself the essential nature of virtue, it would be impossible, that it should in any circumstance whatsoever have a tendency and inclination directly contrary to that wherein the essence of virtue chiefly consists.

2. Private affections, if not subordinate to general affection, is not only liable, as the case may be, to issue in enmity to Being in general, but has a tendency to it as the case certainly is, and must necessarily be. For he that is influenced by private affection, not subordinate to regard to Being in general, sets up its particular or limited object above Being in general; and this most naturally tends to enmity against the latter, which is by right the great supreme, ruling, and absolutely sovereign object of our regard. Even as the setting up another prince as supreme in any kingdom, distinct from the lawful sovereign, naturally tends to enmity against the lawful sovereign. Wherever it is sufficiently published, that the supreme, infinite, and all-comprehending Being requires a supreme regard to himself; and insists upon it, that our respect to him should universally rule in our hearts, and every other affection be subordinate to it, and this under the pain of his displeasure (as we must suppose it is in the world of intelligent creatures, if God maintains a moral kingdom in the world) then a consciousness of our having chosen and set up another prince to rule over us, and subjected our hearts to him, and continuing in such an act, must unavoidably excite enmity, and fix us in a stated opposition, to the supreme Being. This demonstrates, that affection to a private society or system, independent on general benevolence, cannot be of the nature of true virtue, nor this would be absurd, that it has the nature and essence of true virtue, and yet at the same time has a tendency opposing true virtue.
3. Not only would affection to a private system, unsubordinate to regard to Being in general, have a tendency to opposition to the supreme object of virtuous affection, as its effect and consequence, but would become itself an opposition to that object. Considered by itself in its nature, detached from its effects, it is an instance of great opposition to the rightful supreme object of our respect. For it exalts its private object above the other great and infinite object; and lets that up as supreme, in opposition to this. It puts down Being in general, which is infinitely superior in itself and infinitely more important, in an inferior place; yea, subjects the supreme general object to this private infinitely inferior object: which is to treat it with great contempt and truly to act in opposition to it, and to act in opposition to the true order of things, and in opposition to that which is infinitely the supreme interest; making this supreme and infinitely important interest, as far as in us lies, to be subject to, and dependent on, an interest infinitely inferior. This is to act against it, and to act the part of an enemy to it. He that takes a subject and exalts him above his prince, lets him as supreme instead of the prince, and treats his prince wholly as a subject, therein acts the part of an enemy to his prince.

From these things, I think, it is manifest, that no affection limited to any private system, not dependent on, nor subordinate to Being in general, can be of the nature of true virtue; and this, whatever the private system be, let it be more or less extensive, consisting of a greater or smaller number of individuals, so long as it contains an infinitely little part of universal existence, and to bears no proportion to the great all comprehending system. And consequently, that no affection whatsoever to any creature, or any system of created beings, which is not dependent on, nor subordinate to a propensity or union of the heart to God, the supreme and infinite Being, can be of the nature of true virtue.

From hence also it is evident, that the divine virtue, or the virtue of the divine mind, must consist primarily in love to himself, or in the mutual love and friendship which subsists eternally and necessarily between the several persons in
in the God-head, or that infinitely strong propensity there
is in these divine persons one to another. There is no
need of multiplying words, to prove that it must be thus,
on a supposition that virtue in its most essential nature, con-
stant in benevolent affection or propensity of heart towards
Being in general; and so flowing out to particular Beings,
in a greater or lesser degree, according to the measure of
existence and beauty which they are possessed of. It
will also follow from the foregoing things, that God's good-
ness and love to created Beings, is derived from, and sub-
ordinate to his love to himself. [In what manner it is so,
I have endeavoured in some measure to explain in the pre-
ceeding discourse of God's end in creating the world.]

With respect to the manner in which a virtuous love in
created Beings, one to another, is dependent on, and derived
from love to God, this will appear by a proper consideration of
what has been said; that it is sufficient to render love to
any created Being virtuous, if it arise from the temper of
mind wherein consists a disposition to love God supremely.
Because it appears from what has been already observed,
all that love to particular Beings, which is the fruit of a be-
nevolent propensity of heart to Being in general, is virtuous
love. But, as has been remark'd, a benevolent propensity
of heart to Being in general, and a temper or disposition to
love God supremely, are in effect the same thing. There-
fore, if love to a created Being comes from that temper or
propensity of the heart, it is virtuous. However, every
particular exercise of love to a creature may not sensibly arise
from any exercise of love to God, or an explicit considera-
tion of any similitude, conformity, union or relation to
God, in the creature beloved.

The most proper evidence of love to a created Being, its
arising from that temper of mind wherein consists a supreme
propensity of heart to God, seems to be the agreeableness of
the kind and degree of our love to God's end in our creation
and in the creation of all things, and the coincidence of the
exercises of our love, in their manner, order, and measure,
with the manner in which God himself exercises love
to the creature in the creation and government of the
world, and the way in which God as the first cause and su-
preme
preme disposer of all things, has respect to the creature's happiness, in subordination to himself as his own supreme end. For the true virtue of created Beings is doubtless their highest excellency, and their true goodness, and that by which they are especially agreeable to the mind of their creator—but the true goodness of a thing (as was observed before) must be its agreeableness to its end, or its fitness to answer the design for which it was made. Or, at least, this must be its goodness in the eyes of the workman. Therefore they are good moral agents whose temper of mind or propensity of heart is agreeable to the end for which God made moral agents. But, as has been shewn, the last end for which God has made moral agents, must be the last end for which God has made all things: it being evident, that the moral world is the end of the rest of the world; the inanimate and unintelligent world being made for the rational and moral world, as much as a house is prepared for the inhabitants.

By these things it appears, that a truly virtuous mind, being as it were under the sovereign dominion of love to God, does above all things seek the glory of God, and makes this his supreme, governing, and ultimate end: consisting in the expression of God's perfections in their proper effects, and in the manifestation of God's glory to created understandings, and the communications of the infinite fulness of God to the creature; in the creature's highest esteem of God, love to God, and joy in God, and in the proper exercises and expressions of these.—And so far as a virtuous mind exercises true virtue in benevolence to created Beings, it chiefly seeks the good of the creature, consisting in its knowledge or view of God's glory and beauty, its union with God, and conformity to him, love to him, and joy in him. And that temper or disposition of heart, that content, union, or propensity of mind to Being in general, which appears chiefly in such exercises, is virtue, truly so called; or in other words, true grace and real holiness. And no other disposition or affection but this is of the nature of true virtue.

Corollary. Hence it appears, that these schemes of religion or moral philosophy, which, however well in some respects
respects, they may treat of benevolence to mankind, and other virtues depending on it, yet have not a supreme regard to God, and love to him, laid in the foundation, and all other virtues handled in a connection with this, and in a subordination to this, are not true schemes of philosophy, but are fundamentally and essentially defective. And whatever other benevolence or generosity towards mankind, and other virtues, or moral qualifications which go by that name, any are possessed of, that are not attended with a love to God which is altogether above them, and to which they are subordinate, and on which they are dependent, there is nothing of the nature of true virtue or religion in them. And it may be asserted in general, that nothing is of the nature of true virtue, in which God is not the first and the last; or, which with regard to their exercises in general, have not their first foundation and source in apprehensions of God's supreme dignity and glory, and in answerable esteem and love of him, and have not respect to God as the supreme end.

CHAP. III.

Concerning the secondary and inferior kind of beauty.

Though this which has been spoken of, alone, is justly esteemed the true beauty of moral agents, or spiritual Beings: this alone being what would appear beautiful in them, upon a clear & comprehensive view of things: and therefore alone is the moral amableness of Beings that have understanding and will, in the eyes of him that perfectly sees all things as they are. Yet there are other qualities, other sensations, propensities and affections of mind, and principles of action, that often obtain the epithet of virtuous, and by many are supposed to have the nature of true virtue: which are entirely of a distinct nature from this, and have nothing of that kind; and therefore are erroneously confounded with real virtue:—
as may particularly and fully appear from things, which will be observed in this and the following chapters.

That consent, agreement, or union of Being to Being, which has been spoken of, viz. the union or propensity of minds to mental or spiritual existence, may be called the highest, and first, or primary beauty, that is to be found among things that exist: being the proper and peculiar beauty of spiritual and moral Beings, which are the highest and first part of the universal system, for whose sake all the rest has existence. Yet there is another, interior, secondary beauty, which is some image of this, and which is not peculiar to spiritual Beings, but is found even in inanimate things: which consists in a mutual consent and agreement of different things, in form, manner, quantity, and visible end or design; called by the various names of regularity, order, uniformity, symmetry, proportion, harmony, &c. Such is the mutual agreement of the various sides of a square, or equilateral triangle, or of a regular polygon. Such is, as it were, the mutual consent or the different parts of the periphery of a circle, or surface of a sphere, and of the corresponding parts of an ellipsis. Such is the agreement of the colours, figures, dimensions, and distances of the different spots on a chess board. Such is the beauty of the figures on a piece of chintz, or brocade. Such is the beautiful proportion of the various parts of an human body, or countenance. And such is the sweet mutual consent and agreement of the various notes of a melodious tune. This is the same that Mr. Hutchinson, in his treatise on beauty, expresses by uniformity in the midst of variety. Which is no other than the consent or agreement of different things, in form, quantity, &c. He observes, that the greater the variety is, in equal uniformity, the greater the beauty. Which is no more than to say, the more there are of different mutually agreeing things, the greater is the beauty. And the reason of that is, because 'tis more considerable to have many things consent one with another, than a few only.

The beauty which consists in the visible fitness of a thing to its use, and unity of design, is not a distinct sort of beauty from this. For it's to be observed, that one thing which
which contributes to the beauty of the agreement & proportion of various things, is their relation one to another; which connects them, and introduces them together into view and consideration, and whereby one suggests the other to the mind, and the mind is led to compare them and so to expect and desire agreement. Thus the uniformity of two or more pillars, as they may happen to be found in different places, is not an equal degree of beauty, as that uniformity in so many pillars in the corresponding parts of the same building. So means and an intended effect are related one to another. The answerableness of a thing to its use is only the proportion, fitness, and agreeing of a cause or means to a visibly designed effect, and so an effect suggested to the mind by the idea of the means. This kind of beauty is not entirely different from that beauty which there is in fitting a mortise to its tenon. Only when the beauty consists in unity of design, or the adaptedness of a variety of things to promote one intended effect, in which all conspire, as the various parts of an ingeniously complicated machine, there is a double beauty, as there is a twofold agreement and conformity. First, there is the agreement of the various parts to the designed end. Secondly, thro' this, viz. the designed end or effect, all the various particulars agree one with another as the general medium of their union whereby they being united in this third, they thereby are all united one to another.

The reason, or at least one reason why God has made this kind of mutual consent and agreement of things beautiful and grateful to those intelligent Beings that perceive it, probably is, that there is in it some image of the true, spiritual original beauty, which has been spoken of: consisting in Being's consent to Being, or the union of minds or spiritual Beings in a mutual propensity and affection of heart. The other is an image of this, because by that uniformity diverse things become as it were one, as it is in this cordial union. And it pleases God to observe analogy in his works, as is manifest in fact in innumerable instances; and especially to establish inferior things in an analogy to superior. Thus, in how many instances has he formed brutes in analogy to the
the nature of mankind? and plants, in analogy to animals, with respect to the manner of their generation, nutrition, &c. And so he has constituted the external world in an analogy to things in the spiritual world, in numberless instances; as might be shewn, if it were necessary, and here were proper place and room for it. — Why such analogy in God's works pleases him, 'tis not needful now to inquire. It is sufficient that he makes an agreement or consent of different things, in their form, manner, measure, &c. to appear beautiful, because here is some image of an higher kind of agreement and consent of spiritual Beings. It has pleased him to establish a law of nature, by virtue of which the uniformity and mutual correspondence of a beautiful plant, and the respect which the various parts of a regular building seem to have one to another, and their agreement and union, &c. the consent or concord of the various notes of a melodious tune, should appear beautiful; because there-in is some image of the consent of mind, of the different members of a society or system of intelligent Beings, sweetly united in a benevolent agreement of heart. — And here by the way, I would further observe, probably 'tis with regard to this image or resemblance, which secondary beauty has of true spiritual beauty, that God has so constituted nature, that the presenting of this inferior beauty, especially in those kinds of it which have the greatest resemblance of the primary beauty, as the harmony of sounds, and the beauties of nature, have a tendency to assist those whole hearts are under the influence of a truly virtuous temper, to dispose them to the exercises of divine love, and enliven in them a sense of spiritual beauty.

From what has been said we may see, that there are two sorts of agreement or consent of one thing to another. (1.) There is a cordial agreement; that consisits in concord and union of mind and heart: which, if not attended (viewing things in general) with more discord than concord, is true virtue, and the original or primary beauty, which is the only true moral beauty. — (2.) There is a natural union or agreement: which, tho' some image of the other, is entirely a distinct thing; the will, disposition, or affection of the heart having no concern in it, but consisting only in uniformity and consent of nature, form, quantity, &c. (as
before described) wherein lies an inferior secondary sort of beauty, which may, in distinction from the other, be call'd natural beauty. — This may be sufficient to let the reader know how I shall hereafter use the phrases of cordial, and natural agreement; and moral, spiritual, divine, and primary original beauty, and secondary, or natural beauty.

Concerning this latter, inferior kind of beauty, the following things may be observed.

1. The cause why secondary beauty is grateful to Men, is only a law of nature, which God has fixed, or an instinct he has given to mankind; and not their perception of the same thing which God is pleased to have regard to, as the ground or rule by which he has established such a law of nature. — This appears in two things.

(1.) That which God has respect to, as the rule or ground of this law of nature he has given us, whereby things having a secondary beauty are made grateful to men, is their mutual agreement and proportion, in measure, form &c. But in many instances persons that are gratify'd, and have their minds affected, in presenting this beauty, don't reflect on that particular agreement and proportion, which according to the law of nature is the ground and rule of beauty in the case, yea, are ignorant of it. Thus, a man may be pleased with the harmony of the notes in a tune, and yet know nothing of that proportion or adjustment of the notes, which by the law of nature is the ground of the melody. He knows not, that the vibrations in one note regularly coincide with the vibrations in another; that the vibrations of a note coincide in time with two vibrations of its octave; and that two vibrations of a note coincide with three of its fifth, &c. — Yea, he may not know, that there are vibrations of the air in the case, or any corresponding motions in the organs of hearing, in the auditory nerve, or animal spirits. — So, a man may be affected and pleased with a beautiful proportion of the features in a face, and yet not know what that proportion is, or what measures, quantities, and distances it consists in.
In this a sensation of secondary beauty differs from a sensation of primary and spiritual beauty, consisting in a spiritual union and agreement. What makes the latter grateful, is perceiving the union itself. 'Tis the immediate view of that wherein the beauty fundamentally lies, that is pleasing to the virtuous mind.

(2.) As was observ’d before, God in establishing such a law that mutual natural agreement of different things, in form, quantity, &c. should appear beautiful or grateful to men, seems to have had regard to the image and resemblance there is in such a natural agreement, of that spiritual cordial agreement, wherein original beauty consists, as one reason why he established such a law. But it is not any reflection upon, or perception of, such a resemblance of this to spiritual beauty, that is the reason why such a form or state of objects appear beautiful to men: but their sensation of pleasure, on a view of this secondary beauty is immediately owing to the law God has established, or the instinct he has given.

2. Another thing observable concerning this kind of beauty, is, that it affects the mind more (other things being equal) when taken notice of in objects which are of considerable importance, than in little trivial matters. Thus, the symmetry of the parts of a human body, or countenance, affects the mind more than the beauty of a flower. So, the beauty of the solar system, more than as great and as manifold an order and uniformity in a tree. And the proportions of the parts of a church, or a palace, more than the same proportions in some little flight compositions, made to please children.

3. It may be observed (which was hinted before) that not only uniformity and proportion, &c. of different things is requisite in order to this inferior beauty, but some relation or connexion of the things thus agreeing one with another. As, the uniformity or likeness of a number of pillars, scattered hither and thither, does not constitute beauty, or at least by no means in an equal degree as uniformity in pillars connected in the same building, in parts that have relation one to another. So, if we see things unlike,
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unlike, and very disproportion'd, in distant places, which have no relation to each other, this excites no such idea of deformity, as disagreement and inequality or disproportion in things, related and connected: and the nearer the relation and the stricter the connection, so much the greater and more disgusting is the deformity, consisting in their disagreement.

4. This secondary kind of beauty, consisting in uniformity and proportion, not only takes place in material and external things, but also in things immaterial; and is, in very many things, plain and sensible in the latter, as well as the former: and when it is so, there is no reason why it should not be grateful to them that behold it, in these, as well as the other, by virtue of the same sense or the same determination of mind to be gratify'd with uniformity and proportion. If uniformity and proportion be the things that affect, and appear agreeable to, this sense of beauty, then why should not uniformity and proportion affect the same sense in immaterial things, as well as material, if there be equal capacity of discerning it in both? and indeed more in spiritual things (ceteris paribus) as these are more important than things meerly external and material?

This is not only reasonable to be supposed, but is evident in fact, in numberless instances. There is a beauty of order in society, besides what consists in benevolence, or can be refer'd to it, which is of the secondary kind. As, when the different members of society have all their appointed office, place and station, according to their several capacities and talents, and every one keeps his place, and continues in his proper business. In this there is a beauty, not of a different kind from the regularity of a beautiful building, or piece of skilful architecture, where the strong pillars are set in their proper place, the pilasters in a place fit for them, the square pieces of marble in the pavement in a place suitable for them, the panels in the walls and partitions in their proper places, the cornish in places proper for them, &c. As the agreement of a variety in one common design, of the parts of a building, or complicated machine, is one instance of that regularity, which belongs to the secondary kind of beauty, so there is the same
fame kind of beauty in immaterial things, in what is called 
*wisdom*, consisting in the united tendency of thoughts, ideas, 
and particular volitions, to one general purpose: which is 
a distinct thing from the goodness of that general purpose, 
as being useful and benevolent.

So there is a beauty in the virtue called *justice*, which 
confists in the agreement of different things, that have 
relation to one another, in nature, manner, and measure: 
and therefore is the very same sort of beauty with that 
uniformity and proportion, which is observabile in those 
external and material things that are esteemed beautiful. 
There is a natural agreement and adaptedness of things 
that have relation one to another, and an harmonious cor-
responding of one thing to another: that he which from 
his will *does* evil to others, should receive evil from the will 
of others, or from the will of him or them whole business 
it is to take care of the injured, and to act in their behalf: 
and that he should suffer evil in proportion to the evil of his 
doings. Things are in natural regularity and mutual a-
greement, not in a metaphorical but literal sense, when he 
whose heart opposes the general system, should have the 
hearts of that system, or the heart of the head and ruler of 
the system, against him: and that in consequence, he should 
receive evil, in proportion to the evil tendency of the op-
position of his heart. —— So, there is a like agreement 
in nature and measure, when he that loves, has the proper 
returns of love: when he that from his heart promotes the 
good of another, has his good promoted by the other; as 
there is a kind of justice in a becoming gratitude.

Indeed most of the duties incumbent on us, if well con-
sidered, will be found to partake of the nature of justice. 
There is some natural agreement of one thing to another; 
some adaptedness of the agent to the object; some answer-
ableness of the act to the occasion; some equality and pro-
portion in things of a similar nature, and of a direct relation-
on one to another. So it is in relative duties; duties of 
children to parents, and of parents to children; duties of 
husbands and wives; duties of rulers and subjects; duties of 
friendship and good neighbourhood; and all duties that 
we owe to God, our creator, preserver, and benefactor; and
all duties whatsoever, considered as required by God, and as branches of our duty to him, and also considered as what are to be performed with a regard to Christ, as acts of obedience to his precepts, and as testimonies of respect to him, and of our regard to what he has done for us, the virtues and temper of mind he has exercised towards us, and the benefits we have or hope for theretrom.

It is this secondary kind of beauty, which belongs to the virtues and duties required of us, that Mr. Wolstone seems to have had in his eye, when he resolved all virtue into an agreement of inclinations, volitions and actions with truth. He evidently has respect to the justice there is in the virtues and duties that are proper to be in one Being towards another; which consists in one Being's expressing such affections and using such a conduct towards another, as hath a natural agreement and proportion to what is in them, and what we receive from them: which is as much a natural conformity of affection and action with its ground, object and occasion, as that which is between a true proposition and the thing spoken of in it.

But there is another and higher beauty in true virtue, and in all truly virtuous dispositions and exercises, than what consists in any uniformity or similarity of various things; viz. the union of heart to Being in general, or to God the Being of Beings, which appears in those virtues; and which those virtues, when true, are the various expressions or effects of. Benevolence to Being in general, or to Being simpliciter considered, is entirely a distinct thing from uniformity in the midst of variety, and is a superior kind of beauty.

'Tis true, that benevolence to Being in general, when a person hath it, will naturally incline him to justice, or proportion in the exercises of it. He that loves Being, simpliciter considered, will naturally (as was observed before) other things being equal, love particular Beings, in a proportion compounded of the degree of Being, & the degree of virtue or benevolence to Being, which they have. And that is to love Beings in proportion to their dignity. For the dignity of any Being consists in those two things. Respect to Being,
Being, in this proportion, is the first and most general kind of justice; which will produce all the subordinate kinds. So that, after benevolence to Being in general exists, the proportion which is observed in objects, may be the cause of the proportion of benevolence to those objects: but no proportion is the cause or ground of the existence of such a thing as benevolence to Being. The tendency of objects to excite that degree of benevolence, which is proportionable to the degree of Being, &c. is the consequence of the existence of benevolence; and not the ground of it. Even as a tendency of bodies, one to another, by mutual attraction, in proportion to the quantity of matter, is the consequence of the Being of such a thing as mutual attraction; and not attraction the effect of proportion.

By this it appears, that just affections and acts have a beauty in them, distinct from, and superior to, the uniformity and equality there is in them: for which, he that has a truly virtuous temper, relishes and delights in them. And that is the expression and manifestation there is in them of benevolence to Being in general. And besides this, there is the agreement of justice to the will and command of God: and also something in the tendency and consequences of justice, that is agreeable to general benevolence, viz. as in many respects it tends to the glory of God, and the general good. Which tendency also makes it beautiful to a truly virtuous mind. So that the tendency of general benevolence to produce justice, also the tendency of justice to produce effects agreeable to general benevolence, both render justice pleasing to a virtuous mind. And it is on these accounts chiefly, that justice is grateful to a virtuous taste, or a truly benevolent heart. But, tho' it be true, there is that in the uniformity and proportion there is in justice, which is grateful to a benevolent heart, as this uniformity and proportion tends to the general good; yet that is no argument, that there is no other beauty in it but its agreeing with benevolence. For so the external regularity and order of the natural world gratifies benevolence, as it is profitable, and tends to the general good; but that is no argument, that there is no other sort of beauty in external uniformity and proportion, but only its suits benevolence by tending to the general good.
5. From all that has been observed concerning this secondary kind of beauty, it appears that that disposition or sense of the mind, which consists in determination of mind to approve and be pleased with this beauty, considered simply and by itself, has nothing of the nature of true virtue, and is entirely a different thing from a truly virtuous taste. For it has been shewn, that this kind of beauty is entirely diverse from the beauty of true virtue, whether it takes place in material or immaterial things. And therefore it will follow, that a taste of this kind of beauty is entirely a different thing from a taste of true virtue. Who will affirm, that a disposition to approve of the harmony of good music, or the beauty of a square, or equilateral triangle, is the same with true holiness, or a truly virtuous disposition of mind! 'Tis a relish of uniformity and proportion, that determines the mind to approve these things. And if this be all, there is no need of any thing higher, or of any thing in any respect diverse, to determine the mind to approve and be pleased with equal uniformity and proportion among spiritual things which are equally discerned. 'Tis virtuous to love true virtue, as that denotes an agreement of the heart with virtue. But it argues no virtue, for the heart to be pleased with that which is entirely distinct from it.

Tho' it be true, there is some analogy in it to spiritual and virtuous beauty; as much as material things can have analogy to things spiritual (of which they can have no more than a shadow) yet, as has been observed, men do not approve it because of any such analogy perceived.

And not only reason, but experience plainly shows, that men's approbation of this kind of beauty, does not spring from any virtuous temper, and has no connexion with virtue. For, otherwise, men's delight in the beauty of squares, and cubes, and regular polygons in the regularity of buildings, and the beautiful figures in a piece of embroidery, would encrease in proportion to men's virtue; and would be raised to a great height in some eminently virtuous or holy men; but would be almost wholly lost in some others that are very vicious and lewd. 'Tis evident in fact, that a relish of these things does not depend on general benevolence, or any benevolence at all to any Being whatsoever, any
any more than a man's loving the taste of honey, or his
being pleased with the smell of a rose. A taste of this in-
superior beauty in things immaterial, is one thing which has
been mistaken by some moralists, for a true virtuous prin-
ciple, implanted naturally in the hearts of all mankind.

CHAP. IV.

Of self-love, and its various influence, to
cause love to others, or the contrary.

MANY assert, that all love arises from self-love. In
order to determine this point, it should be clearly de-
termined what is meant by self-love.

SELF-LOVE, I think, is generally defined—— a man's
love of his own happiness. Which is short, and may be
thought very plain: but indeed is an ambiguous definition,
as the pronoun, his own, is equivocal, and liable to be taken
in two very different senses. For a man's own happiness may
either be taken universally, for all the happiness or pleasure
which the mind is in any regard the subject of, or whatever
is grateful and pleasing to men; or it may be taken for
the pleasure a man takes in his own proper, private, and se-
parate good. And so, self-love may be taken two ways.

1. SELF-LOVE may be taken for the same as his loving
whatever is grateful or pleasing to him. Which comes
only to this, that self-love is a man's liking, and being suited
and pleased in that which he likes, and which pleases him;
or, that 'tis a man's loving what he loves. For whatever a
man loves, that thing is grateful and pleasing to him, whe-
ther that be his own peculiar happiness, or the happiness
of others. And if this be all that they mean by self-love, no
wonder they suppose that all love may be resolved into
self-love. For it is undoubtedly true, that whatever a man
loves, his love may be resolved into his loving what he
loves,—— if that be proper speaking—— If by self-love is
meant nothing else but a man's loving what is grateful or
pleasing to him, and being averse to what is disagreeable,
this is calling, that self-love, which is only a general capacity of loving, or hating; or a capacity of being either pleased or displeased: which is the same thing as a man's having a faculty of will. For if nothing could be either pleasing or displeasing, agreeable or disagreeable to a man, then he could incline to nothing, and will nothing. But if he is capable of having inclination, will and choice, then what he inclines to, and chooses, is grateful to him; whatever that be, whether it be his own private good, the good of his neighbours, or the glory of God. And so far as it is grateful or pleasing to him, so far it is a part of his pleasure, good, or happiness.

But if this be what is meant by self-love, there is an impropriety and absurdity even in the putting of the question, Whether all our love, or our love to each particular object of our love, don't arise from self-love? For that would be the same as to enquire, Whether the reason why our love is fix'd on such and such particular objects, is not, that we have a capacity of loving some things? This may be a general reason why men love or hate any thing at all; and therein differ from stones and trees, which love nothing, and hate nothing. But it can never be a reason why men's love is placed on such and such objects. That a man, in general, loves and is pleased with happiness, or (which is the same thing) has a capacity of enjoying happiness, cannot be the reason why such and such things become his happiness: as for instance, why the good of his neighbour, or the happiness and glory of God, is grateful and pleasing to him, and so becomes a part of his happiness.

Or if what they mean, who say that all love comes from self-love, be not, that our loving such and such particular persons and things, arises from our love to happiness in general, but from a love to love our own happiness, which consists in these objects; so, the reason why we love benevolence to our friends, or neighbours, is, because we love our happiness, consisting in their happiness, which we take pleasure in: — till the notion is absurd. For here the effect it made the cause of that, of which it is the effect: our happiness, consisting in the happiness of the person beloved,
love, is made the cause of our love to that person. Whereas, the truth plainly is, that our love to the person is the cause of our delighting, or being happy in his happiness. How comes our happiness to consist in the happiness of such as we love, but by our hearts being first united to them in affection, so that we as it were, look on them as our selves, and so on their happiness as our own?

Men who have benevolence to others, have pleasure when they see others happiness, because seeing their happiness gratifies some inclination that was in their hearts before. They before inclined to their happiness; which was by benevolence or good-will; and therefore when they see their happiness, their inclination is suited, and they are pleased. But the being of inclinations and appetites is prior to any pleasure in gratifying these appetites.

2. Self-love, as the phrase is used in common speech, most commonly signifies a man's regard to his confined private self, or love to himself with respect to his private interest.

By private interest I mean that which most immediately consists in those pleasures, or pains, that are personal. For there is a comfort, and a grief, that some have in others pleasures, or pains; which are in others originally, but are derived to them, or in some measure become their's, by virtue of a benevolent union of heart with others. And there are other pleasures and pains that are originally our own, and not what we have by such a participation with others. Which consist in perceptions agreeable, or contrary, to certain personal inclinations implanted in our nature; such as the sensitive appetites and aversions. Such also is the disposition or the determination of the mind to be pleased with external beauty, and with all inferior secondary beauty, consisting in uniformity, proportion, &c. whether in things external or internal, and to dislike the contrary deformity. Such also is the natural disposition in men to be pleased in a perception of their being the objects of the honor and love of others, and displeased with others hatred and contempt. For pleasures and uneasinesses of this kind are doubtless as much owing to an immediate determination.
tion of the mind by a fixed law of our nature, as any of the
pleasures or pains of external sense. And these pleasures are
properly of the private and personal kind; being not by any
participation of the happiness or sorrow of others; through
benevolence. 'Tis evidently meer self-love, that appears
in this disposition. It is easy to see, that a man's love to
himself will make him love love to himself, and hate hatred
to himself. And as God has constituted our nature, self-
love is exercised in no one disposition more than in this.
Men, probably, are capable of much more pleasure and
pain thro' this determination of the mind, than by any other
personal inclination, or aversion, whatsoever. Tho' perhaps
we don't so very often see instances of extreme suffering by
this means, as by some others, yet we often see evidences of
men's dreading the contempt of others more than death:
and by such instances may conceive something what men
would suffer, if universally hated and despised; and may
reasonably infer something of the greatnels of the misery,
that would arise under a sense of universal abhorrence, in a
great view of intelligent Being in general, or in a clear view
of the Deity, as incomprehensibly and immensely great, so
that all other Beings are as nothing and vanity,—to-
gether with a sense of his immediate continual presence,
and an infinite concern with him and dependence upon
him,—and living constantly in the midst of most clear
and strong evidences and manifestations of his hatred and
contempt and wrath.

But to return,—These things may be sufficient to
explain what I mean by private interest; in regard to
which, self-love, most properly so called, is immediately
exercised.

And here I would observe, that if we take self-love in
this sense, so love to some others may truly be the effect
of self-love; i.e. according to the common method and
order, which is maintain'd in the laws of nature. For no
created thing has power to produce an effect any otherwise
than by virtue of the laws of nature. Thus, that a man
should love those that are of his party, when there are dif-
fent parties contending one with another; and that are
warmly engaged on his side, and promote his interest,—
this
this is the natural consequence of a private self-love. Indeed there is no metaphysical necessity, in the nature of things, that because a man loves himself, and regards his own interest, he therefore should love those that love him, and promote his interest; i.e. to suppose it to be otherwise, implies no contradiction. It will not follow from any absolute metaphysical necessity, that because bodies have solidity, cohesion, and gravitation towards the centre of the earth, therefore a weight suspended on the beam of a balance should have greater power to counter-balance a weight on the other side, when at a distance from the fulcrum, than when it is near. It implies no contradiction, that it should be otherwise: but only as it contradicts that beautiful proportion and harmony, which the author of nature observes in the laws of nature he has established. Neither is there any absolute necessity, the contrary implying a contradiction, that because there is an internal mutual attraction of the parts of the earth, or any other sphere, whereby the whole becomes one solid coherent body, therefore other bodies that are around it, should also be attracted by it, and those that are nearest, be attracted most. But according to the order and proportion generally observed in the laws of nature, one of these effects is connected with the other, so that it is justly look'd upon as the same power of attraction in the globe of the earth, which draws bodies about the earth towards its centre, with that which attracts the parts of the earth themselves one to another; only exerted under different circumstances. By a like order of nature, a man's love to those that love him, is no more than a certain expression or effect of self-love. No other principle is needful in order to the effect, if nothing intervenes to counter-vail the natural tendency of self-love. Therefore there is no more true virtue in a Man's thus loving his friends meerly from self-love, than there is in self-love itself, the principle from whence it proceeds. So, a man's being disposed to hate those that hate him, or to resent injuries done him, arises from self-love in like manner as the loving those that love us, and being thankful for kindness shewn us.

But it is said by some, that 'tis apparent, there is some other principle concerned in exciting the passions of gratitude
tude and anger, besides self-love, viz. a moral sense, or sense of moral beauty and deformity, determining the minds of all mankind to approve of, and be pleased with virtue, and to disapprove of vice, and behold it with dispraise; and that their seeing or supposing this moral beauty or deformity, in the kindness of a benefactor, or opposition of an adversary, is the occasion of these affections of gratitude or anger. Otherwise, why are not these affections excited in us towards inanimate things, that do us good, or hurt? Why don't we experience gratitude to a garden, or fruitful field? And why are we not angry with a tempest, or blasting mildew, or an overflowing stream? We are very differently affected towards those that do us good from the virtue of generosity, or hurt us from the vice of envy and malice, than towards things that hurt or help us, which are destitute of reason and will.—— Now concerning this, I would make several remarks.

1. Those who thus argue, that gratitude and anger can't proceed from self-love, might argue in the same way and with equal reason, that neither can these affections arise from love to others: which is contrary to their own scheme.

They say, that the reason why we are affected with gratitude and anger towards men, rather than things without life, is moral sense: which they say, is the effect of that principle of benevolence or love to others, or love to the public, which is naturally in the hearts of all mankind.—— But now I might say, according to their own way of arguing, gratitude and anger cannot arise from love to others, or love to the public, or any sense of mind that is the fruit of public affection. For, how differently are we affected towards those that do good or hurt to the public from understanding and will, and from a general public spirit, or public motive,—— I say, how differently affected are we towards these, from what we are towards such inanimate things as the sun and the clouds, that do good to the public, by enlightening and enlivening beams and refreshing flowers; or mildew, and an overflowing stream, that does hurt to the public, by destroying the fruits of the earth? Yea, if such a kind of argument be good, it will prove that
gratitude and anger cannot arise from the united influence of self-love, and public love, or moral sense arising from public affection. For, if so, why are we not affected towards inanimate things, that are beneficial or injurious both to us and the public, in the same manner as to them that are profitable or hurtful to both on choice and design, and from benevolence, or malice?

2. On the supposition of its being indeed so, that men love those who love them, & are angry with those who hate them, from the natural influence of self-love; 'tis not at all strange that the author of nature, who observes order, uniformity and harmony in establishing its laws, should so order that it should be natural for self-love to cause the mind to be affected differently towards exceedingly different objects; and that it should cause our heart to extend itself in one manner towards inanimate things, which gratify self-love, without sense or will, and in another manner towards Beings which we look upon as having understanding and will, like ourselves, and exerting these faculties in our favor, and promoting our interest from love to us. No wonder, seeing we love ourselves, that it should be natural to us to extend something of that same kind of love which we have for ourselves, to them who are the same kind of Beings as ourselves, and comply with the inclinations of our self-love, by expressing the same sort of love towards us.

3. If we should allow that to be universal, that in gratitude and anger there is the exercise of some kind of moral sense (as 'tis granted, there is something that may be so called.) All the moral sense, that is essential to those affections, is a sense of DESERT; which is to be refer'd to that sense of justice, before spoken of, consisting in an apprehension of that secondary kind of beauty, that lies in uniformity and proportion: which solves all the difficulty in the objection. — This, or some appearance of it, to a narrow private view, indeed attends all anger and gratitude. Others love and kindness to us, or their ill-will and injuriousness, appears to us to deserve our love, or our resentment. Or, in other words, it seems to us no other than just, that as they love us, and do us good, we also should love them, and
and do them good. And so it seems just, that when others' hearts oppose us, and they from their hearts do us hurt, our hearts should oppose them, and that we should desire they themselves may suffer in like manner as we have suffered: i.e. there appears to us to be a natural agreement, proportion, and adjustment between these things. Which is indeed a kind of moral sense, or sense of a beauty in moral things. But, as was before shown, it is a moral sense of a secondary kind, and is entirely different from a sense of relish of the original essential beauty of true virtue; and may be without any principle of true virtue in the heart. Therefore doubtless 'tis a great mistake in any to suppose, all that moral sense which appears and is exercised in a sense of defect, is the same thing as a love of virtue, or a disposition and determination of mind to be pleased with true virtuous beauty, consisting in publick benevolence. Which may be further confirm'd, if it be considered that even with respect to a sense of justice or defect, consisting in uniformity [and agreement between others actions towards us, and our actions towards them, in a way of well-doing, or of ill-doing] 'tis not absolutely necessary to the being of these passions of gratitude and anger, that there should be any notion of justice in them, in any publick or general view of things; — as will appear by what shall be next observed.

4. Those authors, who hold that that moral sense which is natural to all man-kind, consists in a natural relish of the beauty of virtue, and so arises from a principle of true virtue implanted by nature in the hearts of all, — they hold that true virtue consists in publick benevolence. Therefore, if the affections of gratitude and anger necessarily imply such a moral sense as they suppose, then these affections imply some delight in the publick good, and an aversion of the mind to publick evil. And if this were so, then every time any man feels anger for opposition he meets with, or gratitude for any favour, there must be at least a supposition of a tendency to publick injury in that opposition, and a tendency to publick benefit in the favour that excites his gratitude. But how far is this from being true? As, in such instances as these, which, I presume, none will deny to be possible, or unlike to any thing that ever
ever happens among mankind. A ship's crew enter into a conspiracy against the master, to murder him, and run away with the ship, and turn pirates: but before they bring their matters to a ripeness for execution, one of them repents, and opens the whole design; whereupon the rest are apprehended and brought to justice. The crew are enraged with him that has betray'd them, and earnestly seek opportunity to revenge themselves upon him.——And for an instance of gratitude, a gang of robbers that have long infested the neighbouring country, have a particular house whither they resort, and where they meet from time to time, to divide their booty or prey, and hold their consultations for carrying on their pernicious designs. The magistrates and officers of the country, after many fruitless endeavours to discover their secret haunt and place of resort, at length by some means are well informed where it is, and are prepared with sufficient force to surprize them, and seize them all, at the place of rendezvous, at an hour appointed when they understand they will all be there. A little before the arrival of the appointed hour, while the officers with their bands are approaching, some person is so kind to these robbers, as to give them notice of their danger, so as just to give them opportunity to escape. They are thankful to him, and give him a handful of money for his kindness.——Now in such instances, I think, it is plain, that there is no supposition of a public injury in that which is the occasion of their anger; yea, they know the contrary. Nor is there any supposition of public good in that which excites their gratitude; neither has public benevolence, or moral sense, consisting in a determination to approve of what is for the public good, any influence at all in the affair. And though there be some affection, besides a sense of uniformity and proportion, that has influence in such anger and gratitude, it is not public affection or benevolence, but private affection; yea, that affection which is to the highest degree private, consisting in a man's love of his own person.

5. The passion of anger, in particular, seems to have been unluckily chosen as a medium to prove a sense and determination to delight in virtue, consisting in benevolence, natural to all mankind,

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For, if that moral sense which is exercised in anger, were that which arose from a benevolent temper of heart, being no other than a sense or relish of the beauty of benevolence, one would think, a disposition to anger should increase, at least in some proportion, as a man had more of a sweet, benign, and benevolent temper: which seems something disagreeable to reason, as well as contrary to experience, which shews that the less men have of benevolence, and the more they have of a contrary temper, the more are they disposed to anger and deep resentment of injuries.

And though gratitude be that which many speak of as a certain noble principle of virtue, which God has implanted in the hearts of all mankind; and though it be true, there is a gratitude, that is truly virtuous, and the want of gratitude, or an ungrateful temper, is truly vicious, and argues an abominable depravity of heart (as I may have particular occasion to shew afterwards) yet I think, what has been observed, may serve to convince such as impartially consider it, not only that not all anger, or hating those which hate us, but also that not all gratitude, or loving those which love us, arises from a truly virtuous benevolence of heart.

Another sort of affections, which may be properly refer'd to self-love, as its source, and which might be expected to be the fruit of it, according to the general analogy of nature's laws, is affections to such as are near to us by the ties of nature; that we look upon as those whose Beings we have been the occasions of, and that we have a very peculiar propriety in, and whose circumstances, even from the first beginning of their existence, do many ways lead them, as it were necessarily, to an high esteem of us, and to treat us with great dependence, submission and compliance; and whom the constitution of the world makes to be united in interest, and accordingly to act as one in innumerable affairs, with a communion in each other's affections, desires, cares, friendship, enmities, and pursuits. Which is the case of men's affection to their children.——

And in like manner self-love will also beget in a man some degree of affections towards others, with whom he has connection in any degree parallel.——As to the opinion of those
those that ascribe the natural affection there is between parents and children, to a particular instinct of nature, I shall take notice of it afterwards.

And as men may love persons and things from self-love, so may love to qualities and characters arise from the same source. Some represent as though there were need of a great degree of metaphysical refining, to make it out, that men approve of others from self-love, whom they hear of at a distance, or read of in history, or see represented on the stage, from whom they expect no profit or advantage. But perhaps it is not considered, that what we approve of in the first place, is the character; and from the character we approve the person. And is it a strange thing, that men should from self-love like a temper or character, which in its nature and tendency falls in with the nature and tendency of self-love; and which, we know by experience and self-evidence, without metaphysical refining, in the general tends to men's pleasure and benefit?——And on the contrary, should dislike what they see tends to men's pain and misery?——Is there need of a great degree of subtilty and abstraction, to make it out, that a child, which has heard and seen much, strongly to fix an idea, of the pernicious deadly nature of the rattlesnake, should have aversion to that species or form, from self-love; so as to have a degree of this aversion and disgust excited by seeing even the picture of that animal? And that from the same self-love it should be pleased and entertain'd with a lively figure and representation of some pleasant fruit, which it has often tasted the sweetness of? or, with the image of some bird, which, it has always been told, is innocent, and whose pleasant singing it has often been entertain'd with?——

Though, the child neither fears being bitten by the picture of the snake, nor expects to eat of the painted fruit, or to hear the figure of the bird sing. I suppose none, will think it difficult to allow, that such an approbation or disgust of a child may be accounted for from its natural delight in the pleasures of taste and hearing, and its aversion to pain and death, through self-love, together with the habitual connection of these agreeable or terrible ideas with the form and qualities of these objects, the ideas of which are impressed on the mind of the child by their images.
And where is the difficulty of allowing, that a child or man may hate the general character of a spiteful and malicious man, for the like reason as he hates the general nature of a serpent; knowing, from reason, instruction, and experience, that malice in men is pernicious to mankind, as well as spite or poison in a serpent? And if a man may from self-love disapprove the vices of malice, envy, and others of that sort, which naturally tend to the hurt of mankind, why may he not from the same principle approve the contrary virtues of meekness, peaceableness, benevolence, charity, generosity, justice, and the social virtues in general; which, he as easily and clearly knows, naturally tend to the good of mankind?

'Tis undoubtedly true, that some have a love to these virtues from a higher principle. But yet I think it as certainly true, that there is generally in mankind, a sort of approbation of them, which arises from self-love.

Besides what has been already said, the same thing further appears from this; that men commonly are most affected towards, and do most highly approve, those virtues which agree with their interest most, according to their various conditions in life. We see that persons of low condition are especially enamoured with a condescending, accessible, affable temper in the great; not only in those whose condescension has been exercised towards themselves; but they will be peculiarly taken with such a character when they have accounts of it from others, or when they meet with it in history, or even in romance. The poor will most highly approve and commend liberality. The weaker sex, who especially need assistance and protection, will peculiarly esteem and applaud fortitude and generosity in those of the other sex, they read or hear of, or have represented to them on a stage.

As I think it plain from what has been observed, that men may approve, and be disposed to commend a benevolent temper, from self-love, so the higher the degree of benevolence is, the more may they approve of it. Which will account for some kind of approbation, from this principle, even of love to enemies; viz. as a man's loving his enemies
enemies is an evidence of a high degree of benevolence of
temper;—the degree of it appearing from the obstacles
it overcomes.

And it may be here observed, that the consideration of
the tendency and influence of self-love may show, how
men in general may approve of justice from another ground,
besides that approbation of the secondary beauty there is
in uniformity and proportion, which is natural to all. Men
from their infancy see the necessity of it, not only that it is
necessary for others, or for human society; but they find
the necessity of it for themselves, in instances that contin-
ually occur: which tends to prejudice them in its favor,
and to fix an habitual approbation of it from self-love.

And again, that foregoing approbation of justice
and desert, arising from a sense of the beauty of natural a-
greement and proportion, will have a kind of reflex, and
indirect influence to cause men to approve benevolence,
and disapprove malice; as men see that he who hates and
injures others, deserves to be hated and punished, and that
he who is benevolent, and loves others, and does them
good, deserves himself also to be loved & rewarded by others,
as they see the natural congruity or agreement and mutual
adaptedness of these things. And having always seen this,
malevolence becomes habitually connected in the mind
with the idea of being hated and punished, which is dif-
agreeable to self-love; and the idea of benevolence is habi-
tually connected and associated with the idea of being lov-
ed and rewarded by others, which is grateful to self-love.
And by virtue of this association of ideas, benevolence it-
selves becomes grateful, and the contrary displeasing.

Some vices may become in a degree odious by the in-
fluence of self-love, thro' an habitual connection of ideas of
contempt with it; contempt being what self-love abhors.
So it may often be with drunkenness, gluttony, sottishness,
cowardice, sloth, niggardliness.—The idea of contempt
becomes associated with the idea of such vices, both because
we are used to observe that these things are commonly ob-
jects of contempt, and also find that they excite contempt
in ourselves.—Some of them appear marks of littlenes,
Of small abilities, and weakness of mind, and insufficiency for any considerable effects among mankind. — By others, men's influence is contracted into a narrow sphere, and by such means persons become of less importance, and more insignificant among mankind. And things of little importance are naturally little accounted of. — And some of these ill qualities are such as mankind find it their interest to treat with contempt, as they are very hurtful to human society.

There are no particular moral virtues whatsoever, but what in some or other of these ways, & most of them in several of these ways, come to have some kind of approbation from self love, without the influence of a truly virtuous principle; nor any particular vices, but what by the same means meet with some disapprobation.

This kind of approbation and dislike, thro' the joint-influence of self-love and association of ideas, is in very many vastly heightened by education; as this is the means of a strong, close, and almost irrefragable association, in innumerable instances, of ideas which have no connexion any other way than by education; and of greatly strengthening that association, or connexion, which persons are led into by other means: as any one would be convinced, perhaps more effectually than in most other ways, if they had opportunity of any considerable acquaintance with American savages and their children.

CHAP. V.

Of natural conscience, and the moral sense.

There is yet another disposition or principle, of great importance, natural to mankind; which, if we consider the conscience and harmony of nature's laws, may also be looked upon as in some sort arising from self-love, or self-union: and that is a disposition in man to be uneasy in a consciousness of being inconsistent with himself, and as it were, against himself, in his own actions. This appears particularly in the inclination of
of the mind to be uneasy in the consciousness of doing that to others, which he should be angry with them for doing to him; if they were in his case, and he in theirs; or, of forbearing to do that to them, which he would be displeased with them for neglecting to do to him.

I have observed from time to time, that in pure love to others (i.e. love not arising from self-love) there is an union of the heart with others: a kind of enlargement of the mind, whereby it so extends itself as to take others into a man's self: and therefore it implies a disposition to feel, to desire, and to act as tho' others were one with ourselves. So, self-love implies an inclination to feel and act as one with ourselves: which naturally renders a tolerable inconsistency with ourselves, and self-opposition, in what we ourselves chuse and do, to be uneasy to the mind: which will cause uneasiness or mind to be the consequence of a malevolent and unjust behaviour towards others and a kind of disapprobation of acts of this nature, and an approbation of the contrary. To do that to another, which we should be angry with him for doing to us, and to hate a person for doing that to us, which we should incline to and insist on doing to him, if we were exactly in the same case, is to disagree with ourselves, and contradict ourselves. It would be, for ourselves both to chuse and adhere to, and yet to refuse and utterly reject, as it were the very same thing. No wonder, this is contrary to nature. No wonder, that such a self-opposition, and inward war with a man's self, naturally begets uneasiness, and raises disturbance in his mind.

A thus approving of actions, because we therein act as in agreement with ourselves, or as one with ourselves, and a thus disapproving and being uneasy in the consciousness of disagreeing and being inconsistent with ourselves in what we do, is quite a different thing from approving or disapproving actions because in them we agree and are united with Being in general: which is loving or hating actions from a sense of the primary beauty of true virtue, and odiousness of sin. — The former of these principles is private: the latter is public and truly benevolent in the highest sense. The former (i.e. an inclination to agree with
with ourselves) is a natural principle: but the latter (i.e. an agreement or union of heart to the great system, and to God, the head of it, who is all and all in it) is a divine principle.

In that uneasiness now mentioned, consists very much of that inward trouble men have from reflections of conscience: and when they are free from this uneasiness, and are conscious to themselves, that in what they have acted towards others, they have done the same which they should have expected from them in the same case, then they have what is called peace of conscience, with respect to these actions. And there is also an approbation of conscience, of the conduct of others towards ourselves. As when we are blamed, condemned, or punished by them, and are conscious to ourselves that if we were in their case, and they in ours, we should in like manner, blame, condemn, and punish them. And thus men's consciences may justify God's anger and condemnation. When they have the ideas of God's greatness, their relation to him, the benefits they have received from him, the manifestations he has made of his will to them, &c. strongly impressed on their minds, a consciousness is excited within them of those resentments, which would be occasion'd in themselves by an injurious treatment in any wise parallel.

There is such a consciousness as this oftentimes within men, imply'd in the thoughts and views of the mind, which perhaps on reflection they could hardly give an account of. Unless men's consciences are greatly stupify'd, it is naturally and necessarily suggested; and does habitually, spontaneously, instantaneously, and as it were insensibly arise in the mind. And the more so for this reason, viz. that we have not, nor ever had from our infancy, any other way to conceive of any thing which other persons act or suffer, or of any thing about intelligent, moral agents, but by recalling and exciting the ideas of what we ourselves are conscious of in the acts, passions, sensations, volitions, &c. which we have found in our own minds; and by putting the ideas which we obtain by this means, in the place of another; or as it were substituting ourselves in their place. Thus, we have no conception, in any degree, what understanding,
understanding, perception, love, pleasure, pain, or desire are in others, but by putting ourselves as it were in their stead, or transferring the ideas we obtain of such things in our own minds by consciousness, into their place; making such an alteration, as to degree and circumstances, as what we observe of them requires. This is thus in all moral things that we conceive of in others, which are all mental, and not corporeal things; and every thing that we conceive of, belonging to others, more than shape, size, complexion, situation, and motion of their bodies. And this is the only way that we come to be capable of having ideas of any perception or act even of the Godhead. We never could have any notion what understanding or volition, love or hatred are, either in created spirits or in God, if we had never experienced what understanding and volition, love and hatred are in our own minds. Knowing what they are by consciousness, we can add degrees, and deny limits, and remove changeableness and other imperfections, and ascribe them to God. Which is the only way we come to be capable of conceiving of any thing in the Deity.

But though it be so, that men in thinking of others do as it were put themselves in their place, they do it so naturally, or rather habitually, instantaneously, and without set purpose, that they do it insensibly, and can scarce give any account of it, and many would think strange if they were told of it. So it may be in men's substituting themselves in others place in such exercises of conscience as have been spoken of: and the former substitution leads to the latter, in one whose conscience is not greatly stupified. For in all his thoughts of the other person, in whatever he apprehends or conceives of his moral conduct to others or to himself, if it be in loving or hating him, approving or condemning him, rewarding or punishing him, he necessarily as it were puts himself in his stead, for the forementioned reason; and therefore the more naturally, easily and quietly sees whether he being in his place should approve or condemn, be angry or pleased as he is.
Natural conscience consists in these two things.

1. In that which has now been spoken of: that disposition to approve or disapprove the moral treatment which passes between us and others, from a determination of the mind to be easy, or uneasy, in a consciousness of our being consistent, or inconsistent with ourselves. Hereby we have a disposition to approve our own treatment of another, when we are conscious to ourselves that we treat him so as we should expect to be treated by him, were he in our case and we in his; and to disapprove of our own treatment of another, when we are conscious that we should be displeased, with the like treatment from him, if we were in his case. So we in our consciences approve of another's treatment of us, if we are conscious to ourselves, that if we were in his case, and he in ours, we should think it just to treat him as he treats us; and disapprove his treatment of us, when we are conscious that we should think it unjust, if we were in his case. Thus men's consciences approve or disapprove the sentence of their judge, by which they are acquitted or condemned. But this is not all that is in natural conscience. Besides this approving or disapproving from uneasiness as being inconsistent with ourselves, there is another thing that must precede it, and be the foundation of it. As for instance, when my conscience disapproves my own treatment of another, being conscious to myself, that were I in his case, I should be displeased and angry with him for so treating me, the question might be asked, but what would be the ground of that supposed disapprobation, displeasure and anger, which I am conscious would be in me in that case? That disapprobation must be on some other grounds.

Therefore,

2. The other thing which belongs to the approbation or disapprobation of natural conscience, is the sense of desert, which was spoken of before: consisting, as was observed, in a natural agreement, proportion and harmony between malevolence or injury and resentment and punishment; or between loving and being loved, between shewing kindness and being rewarded, &c. Both these kinds of
of approving or disapproving concur in the approbation or disapprobation of conscience: the one founded on the other. Thus, when a man’s conscience disapproves of his treatment of his neighbour, in the first place he is conscious that if he were in his neighbour’s stead, he should resent such treatment, from a sense of justice, or from a sense of uniformity and equality between such treatment and resentment and punishment; as before explained. And then in the next place he perceives, that therefore he is not consistent with himself, in doing what he himself should resent in that case; and hence disapproves it, as being naturally averse to opposition to himself.

AproBATION and disapprobation of conscience, in the sense now explained, will extend to all virtue and vice; to every thing whatsoever that is morally good or evil, in a mind which does not confine its view to a private sphere, but will take things in general into its consideration, & is free from speculative error. For, as all virtue or moral good may be resolved into love to others, either God or creatures, so men easily see the uniformity and natural agreement there is between loving others, and being accepted and favored by others. And all vice, sin, or moral evil summarily consisting in the want of this love to others, or in the contrary, viz. hatred or malevolence, so men easily see the natural agreement there is between hating and doing ill to others, and being hated by them and suffering ill from them, or from him that acts for all and has the care of the whole System. And as this sense of equality and natural agreement extends to all moral good and evil, so this lays a foundation of an equal extent with the other kind of approbation and disapprobation, which is grounded upon it, arising from an aversion to self-inconsistency and opposition. For in all cases of benevolence or the contrary towards others, we are capable of putting ourselves in the place of others, and are naturally led to do it, and so of reflecting, or being conscious to ourselves, how we should like or dislike such treatment from others. Thus natural conscience, if the understanding be properly enlightened, and errors and blinding stupifying prejudices are removed, concurs with the law of God, and is of equal extent with it, and joins its voice with it in every article.
AND thus, in particular, we may see in what respect this natural conscience that has been described, extends to true virtue, confiding in union of heart to Being in general, and supreme love to God. For, altho' it sees not, or rather does not taste its primary and essential beauty, i.e. it tastes no sweetness in benevolence to Being in general, simply considered, or loves it not for Being in general's sake (for nothing but general benevolence itself can do that) yet this natural conscience, common to mankind, may approve of it from that uniformity, equality and justice, which there is in it, and the dement which is seen in the contrary, confiding in the natural agreement between the contrary and being hated or Being in general. Men by natural conscience may see the justice (or natural agreement) there is in yielding all to God, as we receive all from God; and the justice there is in being his that has made us, and being willingly so, which is the same as being dependent on his will, and conformed to his will in the manner of our Being, as we are for our Being itself, and in the conformity of our will to his will, on whose will we are universally and most perfectly dependent; and also the justice there is in our supreme love to God, from his goodness,—the natural agreement there is between our having supreme respect to him who exercises infinite goodness to us, and from whom we receive all well-being.—Besides that disagreement and discord appears worse to natural sense (as was observed before) in things nearly related and of great importance: and therefore it must appear very ill, as it respects the infinite Being, and in that infinitely great relation which there is between the creator and his creatures. And it is easy to conceive how that sense which is in natural conscience, should see the defect of punishment, which there is in the contrary of true virtue, viz. opposition and enmity to Being in general. For, this is only to see the natural agreement there is between opposing Being in general, and being opposed by Being in general; with a consciousness how that if we were infinitely great, we should expect to be regarded according to our greatness, and should proportionably resent contempt. Thus natural conscience, if well informed, will approve of true virtue, and will disapprove and condemn the want of it, and opposition to it; and yet without seeing the true beauty of it. Yea, if men's consciences were fully enlightened
enlightened, if they were delivered from being confined to a private sphere, and brought to view and consider things in general, and delivered from being perplex'd by sensual objects and appetites, as they will be at the day of judgment, they would approve nothing but true virtue, nothing but general benevolence, and those affections and actions that are consistent with it, and subordinate to it. For they must see that consent to Being in general, and supreme respect to the Being of Beings, is most just; and that every thing which is inconsistent with it, and interferes with it, or flows from the want of it, is unjust, and deserves the opposition of universal existence.

Thus has God established and ordered, that this principle of natural conscience, which though it implies no such thing as actual benevolence to Being in general, nor any delight in such a principle, simply consider'd, and so implies no truly spiritual sense or virtuous taste, yet should approve and condemn the same things that are approved and condemned by a spiritual sense or virtuous taste.

That moral sense which is natural to mankind, so far as it is disinterested, and not founded in association of ideas, is the same with this natural conscience that has been described. The sense of moral good and evil, and that disposition to approve virtue, and disapprove vice, which men have by natural conscience, is that moral sense, so much insisted on in the writings of many of late: a misunderstanding of which seems to have been the thing that has misled those moralists who have insisted on a disinterested moral sense, universal in the world of mankind, as an evidence of a disposition to true virtue, consisting in a benevolent temper, naturally implanted in the minds of all men. Some of the arguments made use of by these writers, do indeed prove that there is a moral sense or taste, universal among men, distinct from what arises from self-love. Though I humbly conceive, there is some confusion in their discourses on the subject, and not a proper distinction observed in the instances of men's approbation of virtue, which they produce. Some of which are not to their purpose, being instances of that approbation of virtue, that was described, which arises from self-love. But other instances
instances prove that there is a moral taste, or sense of moral
good and evil, natural to all, which don't properly arise
from self-love. Yet I conceive there are no instances of this
kind which may not be refer'd to natural conscience, and
particularly to that which I have observed to be primary in
the approbation of natural conscience, viz. a sense of desert
and approbation of that natural agreement there is, in manner
and measure, in justice. But I think it is plain from what
has been said, that neither this, nor any thing else wherein
consists the sense of moral good and evil, which there is in
natural conscience, is of the nature of a truly virtuous taste,
or determination of mind to relish and delight in the
essential beauty of true virtue, arising from a virtuous
benevolence of heart.

But it further appears from this,—If the approbation
of conscience were the same with the approbation of the
inclination of the heart, or the natural disposition and de-
termination of the mind, to love and be pleased with virtue,
then approbation and condemnation of conscience would
always be in proportion to the virtuous temper of the mind;
or rather, the degree would be just the same. In that person
who had a high degree of a virtuous temper, therefore,
the testimony of conscience in favor of virtue would be equa-
ly full: But he that had but little, would have as little
a degree of the testimony of conscience for virtue, & against
vice. But, I think, the case is evidently otherwise. Some
men, thro' the strength of vice in their hearts, will go on in sin
against clearer light and stronger convictions of conscience,
than others. If conscience's approving duty and disappro-
voking sin, were the same thing as the exercise of a virtuous
principle of the heart, in loving duty and hating sin, then
remorse of conscience will be the same thing as repentance:
and just in the same degree as the sinner feels remorse of
conscience for sin, in the same degree is his heart turned
from the love of sin to the hatred of it, inasmuch as they
are the very same thing.

Christians have the greatest reason to believe, from the
scriptures, that in the future day of the revelation of the
righteous judgment of God, when sinners shall be call'd to
answer before their judge, and all their wickedness, in all
its
its aggravations, brought forth, and clearly manifested in the perfect light of that day, and God will reprove them, and set their sins in order before them, their consciences will be greatly awakened and convinced, their mouths will be stopped, all stupidity of conscience will be at an end, and conscience will have its full exercise: and therefore their consciences will approve the dreadful sentence of the judge against them, and seeing that they have deserved to great a punishment, will join with the judge in condemning them. And this, according to the notion I am oppositing, would be the same thing as their being brought to the fullest repentance; their hearts being perfectly changed to hate sin and love holiness; and virtue or holiness of heart in them will be brought to the most full and perfect exercise. But how much otherwise, have we reason to suppose, it will then be? viz. That the sin and wickedness of their heart will come to its highest dominion and compleatest exercise; that they shall be wholly left of God, and given up to their wickedness, even as the devils are! When God has done waiting on sinners, and his spirit done thriving with them, he will not restrain their wickedness, as he does now. But sin shall then rage in their hearts, as a fire no longer restrained or kept under. 'Tis proper for a judge when he condemns a criminal, to endeavour so to set his guilt before him as to convince his conscience of the justice of the sentence. 'Tis the almighty will do effectually, and do to perfection, so as most thoroughly to awaken and convince the conscience. But if natural conscience, and the disposition of the heart to be pleased with virtue, were the same, then at the same time that the conscience was brought to its perfect exercise, the heart would be made perfectly holy; or, would have the exercise of true virtue and holiness in perfect benevolence of temper. But instead of this, their wickedness will then be brought to perfection, and wicked men will become very devils, and accordingly will be sent away as cursed into everlasting fire prepared for the devil and his angels.

But supposing natural conscience to be what has been described, all these difficulties and absurdities are wholly avoided. Sinners, when they see the greatness of the Being, whom they have lived in contempt of, and in rebelli-
on and opposition to, and have clearly set before them their obligations to him, as their creator, preserver, benefactor, &c. together with the degree in which they have acted as enemies to him, may have a clear sense of the desert of their sin, consisting in the natural agreement there is between such contempt and opposition of such a Being, and his despising and opposing them; between their being and acting as so great enemies to such a God, and their suffering the dreadful consequences of his being & acting as their great enemy; and their being conscious within themselves of the degree of anger, which would naturally arise in their own hearts in such a case, if they were in the place and state of their judge. In order to these things there is no need of a virtuous benevolent temper, relishing and delighting in benevolence, and loathing the contrary. The conscience may see the natural agreement between opposing and being opposed, between hating and being hated, without abhorring malevolence from a benevolent temper of mind, or without loving God from a view of the beauty of his holiness. These things have no necessary dependence one on the other.

CHAP. VI.

Of particular instincts of nature, which in some respects resemble virtue.

There are various dispositions and inclinations natural to men, which depend on particular laws of nature, determining their minds to certain affections and actions towards particular objects; which laws seem to be established chiefly for the preservation of mankind, tho' not only for this, but also for their comfortably subsisting in the world. Which dispositions may be called instincts.

Some of these instincts respect only ourselves personally: such are many of our natural appetites and aversions. Some of them are not wholly personal, but more social, and extend to others: such are the mutual inclinations between the
the sexes, &c. — Some of these dispositions are more external and sensitive: such are some of our natural inclinations that are personal; as those that relate to meat and drink. And of this sort also are some dispositions that are more social, and in some respects extend to others: as, the more sensitive inclinations of the sexes towards each other. Besides these instincts of the sensitive kind, there are others that are more internal and mental: consisting in affections of the mind, which mankind naturally exercise towards some of their fellow-creatures, or in some cases towards men in general. Some of these instincts that are mental and social, are what may be called kind affections; as having something in them of benevolence, or a resemblance of it. And others are of a different sort, having something in them that carries an angry appearance; such as the passion of jealousy between the sexes, especially in the male towards the female.

'Tis only the former of these two last mentioned sorts, that it is to my purpose to consider in this place, viz. those natural instincts which appear in benevolent affections, or which have the appearance of benevolence, and so in some respects resemble virtue. These I shall therefore consider; and shall endeavour to shew that none of them can be of the nature of true virtue.

That kind affection which is exercised towards those who are near one to another in natural relation, particularly the love of parents to their children, called natural affection, is by many refer'd to instinct. I have already considered this sort of love as an affection that arises from self-love; and in that view, and in that supposition have shewn, it cannot be of the nature of true virtue. But if any think, that natural affection is more properly to be refer'd to a particular instinct of nature, than to self-love, as its cause, I shall not think it a point worthy of any controversy or dispute. In my opinion, both are true; viz. that natural affection is owing to natural instinct, and also that it arises from self-love. It may be said to arise from instinct, as it depends on a law of nature. But yet it may be truly reckoned as an affection arising from self-love; because, tho' it arises from a law of nature, yet that is such a law as
The Nature of true Virtue.

According to the order and harmony everywhere observed among the laws of nature, is connected with, and follows from self-love: as was shewn before. However, it is not necessary to my present purpose, to insist on this. For if it be so, that natural affection to a man's children or family, or near relations, is not properly to be ascribed to self-love, as its cause, in any respect, but is to be esteemed an affection arising from a particular independent instinct of nature, which the creator in his wisdom has implanted in men for the preservation and well-being of the world of mankind, yet it cannot be of the nature of true virtue. For it has been observed, and I humbly conceive, proved before (chap. II.) that if any Being or Beings have by natural instinct, or any other means, a determination of mind to benevolence, extending only to some particular persons or private system, however large that system may be, or however great a number of individuals it may contain, so long as it contains but an infinitely small part of universal existence, and so bears no proportion to this great and universal system,—such limited private benevolence, not arising from, nor being subordinate to benevolence to Being in general, cannot have the nature of true virtue.

However, it may not be amiss briefly to observe now, that 'tis evident to a demonstration, those affections cannot be of the nature of true virtue, from these two things.

First, That they don't arise from a principle of virtue.—A principle of virtue, I think, is own'd by the most considerable of late writers on morality to be general benevolence or public affection: and I think it has been proved to be union of heart to Being simply considered; which implies a disposition to benevolence to Being in general. Now by the supposition, the affections we are speaking of do not arise from this principle; and that, whether we suppose they arise from self-love, or from particular instincts: because either of those sources is diverse from a principle of general benevolence. And,

Secondly, These private affections, if they do not arise from general benevolence, & they are not connected with it in their first existence, have no tendency to produce it. This appears
pears from what has been observed: for being not dependent on it, their detach'd and unsubordinate operation rather tends to, and implies opposition to Being in general, than general benevolence; as every one sees and owns with respect to self-love. And there are the very same reasons why any other private affection, confined to limits infinitely short of universal existence, should have that influence, as well as love that is confined to a single person. Now upon the whole, nothing can be plainer than that affections which don't arise from a virtuous principle, and have no tendency to true virtue, as their effect, cannot be of the nature of true virtue.

For the reasons which have been given, it is undeniably true, that if persons by any means come to have a benevolent affection limited to a party that is very large, or to the country or nation in general, of which they are a part, or the public community they belong to, tho' it be as large as the Roman empire was of old, yea, if there could be an instinct or other cause determining a person to benevolence towards the whole world of mankind, or even all created sensible natures throughout the universe, exclusive of union of heart to general existence and of love to God, nor derived from that temper of mind which disposes to a supreme regard to him, nor subordinate to such divine love, it cannot be of the nature of true virtue.

If what is called natural affection, arises from a particular natural instinct, so, much more indisputably, does that mutual affection which naturally arises between the sexes. I agree with Huchiston and Hume in this, that there is a foundation laid in nature for kind affections between the sexes, that are truly diverse from all inclinations to sensitive pleasure, and don't properly arise from any such inclination. There is doubtless a disposition both to a mutual benevolence and mutual complacency, that are not naturally and necessarily connected with any sensitive desires. But yet 'tis manifest such affections as are limited to opposite sexes, are from a particular instinct, thus directing & limiting them, and not arising from a principle of general benevolence; for this has no tendency to any such limitation. And tho' these affections don't properly arise from the sensitive desires
fires which are between the sexes, yet they are implanted by the author of nature chiefly for the same purpose, viz. the preservation or continuation of the world of mankind, to make persons willing to forfake father and mother, and all their natural relations in the families where they were born and brought up, for the sake of a stated union with a companion of the other sex, and to dispose to that union in bearing and going through with that series of labours, anxieties, and pains requisite to the Being, support and education of a family of children. Tho' not only for these ends, but partly also for the comfort of mankind as united in a marriage-relation.—But I suppose, few (if any) will deny, that the peculiar natural dispositions there are to mutual affection between the sexes, arise from an instinct or particular law of nature. And therefore it is manifest from what has been said already, that those natural dispositions cannot be of the nature of true virtue.

Another affection which is owing to a particular instinct, implanted in men for like purposes with other instincts, is that pity which is natural to mankind, when they see others in great distress. —'Tis acknowledged, that such an affection is natural to mankind. But I think it evident, that the pity which is general and natural, is owing to a particular instinct, and is not of the nature of true virtue. I am far from saying, that there is no such thing as a truly virtuous pity among mankind. For I am far from thinking, that all the pity or mercy which is any where to be found among them, arises meery from natural instinct, or, that none is to be found, which arises from that truly virtuous divine principle of general benevolence to sensitive Beings: Yet at the same time I think, this is not the case with all pity, or with that disposition to pity which is natural to mankind in common. I think I may be bold to say, this does not arise from general benevolence, nor is truly of the nature of benevolence, or properly called by that name.

If all that uneasiness on the sight of others extreme distress, which we call pity, were properly of the nature of benevolence, then they who are the subjects of this passion, must needs be in a degree of uneasiness in being sensible of the
the total want of happiness, of all such as they would be disposed to pity in extreme distress. For that certainly is the most direct tendency and operation of benevolence or good-will, to desire the happiness of its object. But now this is not the case universally, where men are disposed to exercise pity. There are many men, with whom that is the case in respect to some others in the world, that it would not be the occasion of their being sensibly affected with any uneasiness, to know they were dead (yea men who are not influenced by the consideration of a future state, but view death as only a cessation of all sensibility, and consequently an end of all happiness) who yet would have been moved with pity towards the same persons, if they had seen them under some very extreme anguish.—— Some men would be moved with pity by seeing a brute-creation under extreme and long torments, who yet suffer no uneasiness in knowing that many thousands of them every day cease to live, and so have an end put to all their pleasure, at butchers' shambles in great cities.—— Tis the nature of true benevolence to desire and rejoice in the prosperity and pleasure of the object of it; and that, in some proportion to its degree of prevalence. But persons may greatly pity those that are in extreme pain, whose positive pleasure they may still be very indifferent about. In this case, a man may be much moved and affected with uneasiness, who yet would be affected with no sensible joy in seeing signs of the same person's or Being's enjoyment of very high degrees of pleasure.

Yea, pity may not only be without benevolence, but may consist with true malevolence, or with such ill-will as shall cause men not only not to desire the positive happiness of another, but even to desire his calamity. They may pity such an one when his calamity goes beyond their hatred. A man may have true malevolence towards another, desiring no positive good for him, but evil: and yet his hatred not be infinite, but only to a certain degree. And when he sees the person whom he thus hates, in misery far beyond his ill-will, he may then pity him: because then the natural instinct begins to operate. For malevolence will not overcome the natural instinct, inclining to pity others in extreme calamity, any further than it goes, or to the limits
limits of the degree of misery it wishes to its object. Men may pity others under exquisite torment, when yet they would have been grieved if they had seen their prosperity. And some men have such a grudge against one or another, that they would be far from being uneasy at their very death, nay, would even be glad of it. And when this is the case with them, 'tis manifest that their heart is void of benevolence towards such persons, and under the power of malevolence. Yet at the same time they are capable of pitying even these very persons, if they should see them under a degree of misery very much disproportioned to their ill-will.

These things may convince us that natural pity is of a nature very different from true virtue, and not arising from a disposition of heart to general benevolence: but is owing to a particular instinct, which the creator has implanted in mankind, for the same purposes as most other instincts, viz. chiefly for the preservation of mankind, though not exclusive of their well-being. The giving of this instinct is the fruit of God's mercy, and an instance of his love of the world of mankind, & an evidence that though the world be so sinful, 'tis not God's design to make it a world of punishment: and therefore has many ways made a merciful provision for men's relief in extreme calamities: and among others has given mankind in general a disposition to pity; the natural exercises whereof extend beyond those whom we are in a near connection with, especially in case of great calamity; because commonly in such cases men stand in need of the help of others beside their near friends, and because commonly those calamities which are extreme, without relief, tend to men's destruction. This may be given as the reason why men are so made by the author of nature, that they have no instinct inclining as much to rejoice at the sight of others great prosperity and pleasure, as to be grieved at their extreme calamity, viz. because they don't stand in equal necessity of such an instinct as that in order to their preservation. But if pure benevolence were the source of natural pity, doubtless it would operate to as great a degree in congratulation, in cases of others great prosperity, as in compassion towards them in great misery.

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The instincts God has given to mankind in this world, which in some respects resemble a virtuous benevolence, are agreeable to the state that God designed mankind for here, where he intends their preservation, and comfortable subsistence. But in the world of punishment, where the state of the wicked inhabitants will be exceeding different, and God will have none of these merciful designs to answer, there, we have great reason to think, will be no such thing as a disposition to pity, in any case; as also there will be no natural affection toward near relations, and no mutual affection between opposite sexes.

To conclude what I have to say on the natural instinct disposing men to pity others in misery, I would observe, that this is a source of a kind of abhorrence in men of some vices, as cruelty and oppression; and so, of a sort of approbation of the contrary virtues, humanity, mercy, &c. Which aversion and approbation, however, so far as they arise from this cause only, are not from a principle of true virtue.

CHAP. VII.

The reasons why those things that have been mentioned, which have not the essence of virtue, have yet by many been mistaken for true virtue.

The first reason that may be given of this, is, that altho' they have not the specific and distinguishing nature and essence of virtue, yet they have something that belongs to the general nature of virtue.---The general nature of true virtue is love. It is expressed both in love of benevolence and complacence; but primarily in benevolence to persons and Beings, and consequently and secondarily in complacence in virtue,---as has been shewn. There is something of the general nature of virtue in those natural affections and principles that have been mentioned, in both those respects.
In many of these natural affections there is something of the appearance of love to persons. In some of them there appears the tendency and effect of benevolence, in part. Others have truly a sort of benevolence in them, tho' it be a private benevolence, and in several respects falls short of the extent of true virtuous benevolence, both in its nature and object.

The last mentioned passion, natural to mankind in their present state, viz. that of pity to others in distress, tho' not properly of the nature of love, as has been demonstrated, yet has partly the same influence and effect with benevolence. One effect of true benevolence is to cause persons to be uneasy, when the objects of it are in distress, and to desire their relief. And natural pity has the same effect.

Natural gratitude, tho' in every instance wherein it appears it is not properly called love, because persons may be moved with a degree of gratitude towards persons on certain occasions, whom they have no real and proper friendship for, as in the instance of Saul towards David, once and again, after David's sparing his life, when he had so fair opportunity to kill him: yet it has the same or like operation and effect with friendship, in part, for a season, and with regard to so much of the welfare of its object, as appears a deserved requital of kindness received. And in other instances it may have a more general and abiding influence, so as more properly to be called by the name of love. So that many times men from natural gratitude do really with a sort of benevolence love those who love them. From this, together with some other natural principles, men may love their near friends, love their own party, love their country, &c.

The natural disposition their is to mutual affection between the sexes, often operates by what may properly be called love. There is often times truly a kind both of benevolence and complacence. As there also is between parents and children.

Thus these things have something of the general nature of virtue, which is love: and especially the thing last mentioned
mentioned have something of a love of benevolence. What they are essentially defective in, is, that they are private in their nature; they don't arise from any temper of benevolence to Being in general, nor have they a tendency to any such effect in their operation. But yet agreeing with virtue in its general nature, they are beautiful within their own private sphere; i.e., they appear beautiful if we confine our views to that private system, and while we shut all other things they stand in any relation to, out of our consideration. If that private system contain'd the sum of universal existence, then their benevolence would have true beauty; or, in other words, would be beautiful, all things considered: but now it is not so. These private systems are so far from containing the sum of universal Being, or comprehending all existence which we stand related to, that it contains but an infinitely small part of it. The reason why men are so ready to take these private affections for true virtue, is the narrowness of their views: and above all, that they are so ready to leave the divine Being out of their view, and to neglect him in their consideration, or to regard him in their thoughts as tho' he were not properly belonging to the system of real existence, but as a kind of shadowy, imaginary Being. And tho' most men allow that there is a God, yet in their ordinary view of things, his Being is not apt to come into the account; and to have the influence and effect of a real existence, as 'tis with other Beings which they see, and are conversant with by their external senses. In their views of beauty and deformity, and in the inward sensations of disapprobation which rise in their minds, 'tis not a thing natural to them to be under the influence of a view of the Deity, as part of the system, and as the head of the system, and he who is all in all, in comparison of whom all the rest is nothing, and with regard to whom all other things are to be viewed, and their minds to be accordingly impress'd and affected.

Yea, we are apt thro' the narrowness of our views, in judging of the beauty of affections and actions to limit our consideration to only a small part of the created system. When private affections extend themselves to a considerable number, we are very ready to look upon them as truly virtuous, and accordingly to applaud them highly.
Thus it is with respect to love to a large party, or a man's love to his country. For tho' his private system contains but a small part even of the world of mankind, yet being a considerable number, thro' the contracted limits of the mind and the narrowness of his views, they are ready to fill his mind and engross his sight, and to seem as if they were all. Hence among the Romans love to their country was the highest virtue: tho' this affection of theirs, so much extolled among them, was employ'd as it were for the destruction of the rest of the world of mankind.—The larger the number is, that private affection extends to, the more apt men are, thro' the narrowness of their sight, to mistake it for true virtue; because then the private system appears to have more of the image of the universal system. Whereas, when the circle it extends to, is very small, it is not so apt to be look'd upon virtuous, or not so virtuous. As, a man's love to his own children.—

And this is the reason why self-love is by nobody mistaken for true virtue. For tho' there be something of the general nature of virtue in this, here is love and good-will, yet the object is so private, the limits so narrow, that it by no means engrosses the view; unless it be of the person himself, who thro' the greatnes of his pride may imagine himself as it were all. The minds of men are large enough to take in a vastly greater extent: and tho' self-love is far from being useless in the world, yea, 'tis exceeding necessary to society, besides its directly and greatly seeking the good of one, yet every body sees that if it be not subordinate to, and regulated by, another more extensive principle, it may make a man a common enemy to the system he is related to. And tho' this is as true of any other private affection, notwithstanding its extent may be to a system that contains thousands of individuals, and those private systems bear no greater proportion to the whole of universal existence, than one alone, yet they bear a greater proportion to the extent to the view and comprehension of men's minds, and are more apt to be regarded as if they were all, or at least as some resemblance of the universal system.

Thus I have observed how many of these natural principles, which have been spoken of, resemble virtue in its primary operation, which is benevolence. Many of them also
also have a resemblance of it in its secondary operation, which is its approbation of and complacence in virtue itself. Several kinds of approbation of virtue have been taken notice of, as common to mankind, which are not of the nature of a truly virtuous approbation, consisting in a sense and relish of the essential beauty of virtue, consisting in a Being's cordial union to Being in general, from a spirit of love to Being in general. As particularly, the approbation of conscience, from a sense of the inferior and secondary beauty which there is in virtue, consisting in uniformity, and from a sense of desert, consisting in a sense of the natural agreement of loving and being beloved, shewing kindness and receiving kindness. So from the same principle, there is a disapprobation of vice, from a natural opposition to deformity and disproportion, and a sense of evil desert, or the natural agreement there is between hating and being hated, opposing and being opposed, &c. together with a painful sensation naturally arising in a sense of self-opposition and inconstancy. — Approbation of conscience is the more readily mistaken for a truly virtuous approbation, because by the wise constitution of the great governor of the world (as was observed) when conscience is well informed, and thoroughly awakened, it agrees with the latter fully and exactly, as to the object approved, tho' not as to the ground and reason of approving. It approves all virtue, and condemns all vice. It approves true virtue, and indeed approves nothing that is against it, or that falls short of it; as was shewn before. And indeed natural conscience is implanted in all mankind, there to be as it were in God's stead, and to be an internal judge or rule to all, whereby to distinguish right and wrong.

It has also been observed, how that virtue, consisting in benevolence, is approved, and vice, consisting in ill-will, is disliked, from the influence of self-love, together with association of ideas, in the same manner as men dislike those qualities in things without life or reason, with which they have always connected the ideas of hurtfulness, malignancy, perniciousness; but like those things with which they habitually connect the ideas of profit, pleasantness, comfortableness, &c. This sort of approbation or liking of virtue, and dislike of vice, is easily mistaken for true virtue, not only because those things are approved by it that have the
nature of virtue, and the things disliked have the nature of vice, but because here is much of resemblance of virtuous approbation, it being complacence from love; the difference only lying in this, that it is not from love to Being in general, but from self-love.

There is also, as has been shown, a liking of some virtues, and dislike of some vices, from the influence of the natural instinct of pity. This men are apt to mistake for the exercise of true virtue, on many accounts. Here is not only a kind of complacence, and the objects of complacence are what have the nature of virtue, and the virtues indeed very amiable, such as humanity, mercy, tenderness of heart, &c. and the contrary very odious; but besides, the approbation is not merely from self-love, but from compassion, an affection that respects others, and resembles benevolence, as has been shown.

Another reason, why the things which have been mentioned, are mistaken for true virtue, is, that there is indeed a true negative moral goodness in them. By a negative moral goodness, I mean the negation or absence of true moral evil. They have this negative moral goodness, because a being without them would be an evidence of a much greater moral evil. Thus, the exercise of natural conscience in such and such degrees, wherein appears such a measure of an awakening or sensibility of conscience, tho' it be not of the nature of real positive virtue or true moral goodness, yet has a negative moral goodness; because in the present state of things, it is an evidence of the absence of that higher degree of wickedness, which causes great insensibility or flippidity of conscience. For sin, as was observed, is not only against a spiritual and divine sense of virtue, but is also against the dictates of that moral sense which is in natural conscience. No wonder, that this sense being long opposed and often conquered, grows weaker. All sin has its source from selfishness, or from self-love, not subordinate to regard to Being in general. And natural conscience chiefly consists in a sense of defect, or the natural agreement between sin and misery. But if self were indeed all, and so more considerable than all the world besides, there would be no ill defect in his regarding himself above all, and making all other
other interests give place to private interest. — And no won-
der that men by long acting from the selfish principle, and
by being habituated to treat themselves as if they were all;
increase in pride, and come as it were naturally to look on
themselves as all, and so to lose entirely the sense of ill de-
sert in their making all other interests give place to their
own. — And no wonder that men by often repeating acts
of sin, without punishment, or any visible appearance of ap-
proaching punishment, have left and left sense of the con-
nection of sin with punishment. That sense which an a-
awakened conscience has of the desert of sin, consists chiefly
in a sense of its desert of resentment of the Deity, the foun-
tain and head of universal existence. But no wonder that
by a long continued worldly and sensuial life, men more
and more lose all sense of the Deity, who is a spiritual and
invisible Being. The mind being long involved in, and en-
gross'd by sensuial objects, becomes sensuial in all its opera-
tions, and excludes all views and impressions of spiritual
objects, and is unfit for their contemplation. Thus the
conscience and general benevolence are entirely different
principles, & sense of conscience differs from the holy com-
placence of a benevolent and truly virtuous heart. Yet
wickedness may by long habitual exercise greatly diminish
a sense of conscience. So that there may be negative mo-
rals goodness, in sensibility of conscience, as it may be an ar-
gument of the absence of that higher degree of wickedness,
which causeth stupidity of conscience.

So with respect to natural gratitude, tho' there may be no
virtue meerly in loving them that love us, yet the contrary
may be an evidence of a great degree of depravity, as it may
argue a higher degree of selfishness, so that a man is come
to look upon himself as all, and others as nothing, and so
their respect and kindness as nothing. Thus an increase
of pride diminishes gratitude. — So does sensuality, or the
increase of sensuial appetites, & coming more and more under
the power and impression of sensuial objects, tends by de-
grees to make the mind insensible to any thing else; and
those appetites take up the whole soul; and th'o' habit and
custom the water is all drawn out of other channels, in which
it naturally flows, and is all carried as it were into one
channel.
In like manner natural affection, and natural pity, tho' not of the nature of virtue, yet may be diminished greatly by the increase of those two principles of pride and sensuality, and as the consequence of this, being habitually disposed to envy, malice, &c. These lusts when they prevail to a high degree may overcome and diminish the exercise of those natural principles: even as they often overcome and diminish common prudence in a man, as to seeking his own private interest, in point of health, wealth, or honor, and yet no one will think it proves that a man's being cunning, in seeking his own personal and temporal interest has any thing of the nature and essence of true virtue.

Another reason why these natural principles and affections are mistaken for true virtue, is, that in several respects they have the same effect, which true virtue tends to; especially in these two ways——

1. The present state of the world is so ordered and constituted by the wisdom and goodness of its supreme ruler, that these natural principles for the most part tend to the good of the world of mankind. So do natural pity, gratitude, parental affection, &c. Herein they agree with the tendency of general benevolence, which seeks & tends to the general good. But this is no proof that these natural principles have the nature of true virtue. For self-love is a principle that is exceeding useful and necessary in the world of mankind. So are the natural appetites of hunger and thirst, &c. But yet nobody will assert, that these have the nature of true virtue.

2. These principles have a like effect with true virtue in this respect, that they tend several ways to restrain vice, and prevent many acts of wickedness.——So, natural affection, love to our party, or to particular friends, tends to keep us from acts of injustice towards these persons; which would be real wickedness——Pity preserves from cruelty, which would be real and great moral evil.——Natural conscience tends to restrain sin in general, in the present state of the world.——But neither can this prove these principles themselves to be of the nature of true virtue. For so is this present state of mankind ordered by a merciful
ciful God, that men’s self-love does in innumerable re-
spects restrain from acts of true wickedness; and not only
so, but puts men upon seeking true virtue: yet is not
itself true virtue, but is the source of all the wickedness
that is in the world.

Another reason why these inferior affections especially
some of them, are accounted virtuous, is, that there are af-
fections of the fame denomination, which are truly virtuous.
Thus, for instance, there is a truly virtuous pity, or a com-
passion to others under affliction or misery from general be-
novolence. Pure benevolence would be sufficient to excite
pity to another in calamity, if there were no particular in-
stinct, or any other principle determining the mind thereto.
It is easy to see how benevolence, which seeks another’s good
should cause us to desire his deliverance from evil. And this
is a source of pity far more extensive than the other. It
excites compassion in cases that are overlook’d by natural
instinct. And even in those cases to which instinct extends,
it mixes its influence with the natural principle, and guides
and regulates its operations. And when this is the case, the
pity which is exercised, may be called a virtuous compassia-
on.— So there is a virtuous gratitude, or a gratitude that
arises not only from self-love, but from a superior principle
of disinterested general benevolence. As ’tis manifest, that
when we receive kindness from such as we love already, we
are more disposed to gratitude, and disposed to greater de-
grees of it, than when the mind is destitute of any such
friendly prepossession. Therefore, when the superior prin-
ciple of virtuous love has a governing hand, and regulates
the affair, it may be called a virtuous gratitude.— So there
is a virtuous love of justice, arising from pure benevolence to
Being in general, as that naturally and necessarily inclines
the heart, that every particular Being should have such a
share of benevolence as is proportioned to its dignity, con-
sisting in the degree of its Being, and the degree of its vir-
tue. Which is entirely diverse from an apprehension of
justice, from a sense of the beauty of uniformity in variety:
as has been particularly shewn already. And so it is easy
to see how there may be a virtuous sense of desert different
from what is natural and common. And is a virtuous con-
scientiousness, or a sanctified conscience,—And as when na-
tral
tural affections have their operations mixed with the influence of virtuous benevolence, and are directed and determined hereby, they may be called virtuous, so there may be a virtuous love of parents to children, and between other near relatives, a virtuous love of our town, or country, or nation. Yea, and a virtuous love between the sexes, as there may be the influence of virtue mingled with instinct, and virtue may govern with regard to the particular manner of its operation, and may guide it to such ends as are agreeable to the great ends and purposes of true virtue.

Genuine virtue prevents that increase of the habits of pride and sensuality, which tend to over-bear and greatly diminish the exercises of the forementioned useful and necessary principles of nature. And a principle of general benevolence softens and sweetens the mind, and makes it more susceptible of the proper influence and exercise of the gentler natural instincts, and directs every one into its proper channel, and determines the exercise to the proper manner and measure, and guides all to the best purposes.

CHAP. VIII.

In what respects virtue or moral good is founded in sentiment; and how far it is founded in the reason and nature of things.

THAT which is called virtue, is a certain kind of beautiful nature, form or quality that is observed in things. That form or quality is called beautiful to any one beholding it to whom it is beautiful, which appears in itself agreeable or comely to him, or the view or idea of which is immediately pleasant to the mind. I say, agreeable in itself and immediately pleasant, to distinguish it from things which in themselves are not agreeable nor pleasant, but either indifferent or disagreeable, which yet appear eligible and agreeable indirectly for something else that is the consequence of them, or with which they are connected. Such a kind of indirect agreeableness or eligibleness in things, not for themselves, but
for some thing else, is not what is called beauty. But when a form or quality appears lovely, pleasing and delightful in itself, then it is called beautiful; and this agreeableness or gratefulness of the idea is what is called beauty. It is evident therefore by this, that the way we come by the idea or sensation or beauty, is by immediate sensation of the gratefulness of the idea called beautiful; and not by finding out by argumentation any consequences, or other things that it stands connected with; any more than tasting the sweetness of honey, or perceiving the harmony of a tune, is by argumentation on connections and consequences. And this manner of being affected with the immediate presence of the beautiful idea depends not, therefore, on any reasonings about the idea, after we have it, before we can find out whether it be beautiful, or not; but on the frame of our minds, whereby they are so made that such an idea, as soon as we have it, is grateful, or appears beautiful.

Therefore, if this be all that is meant by them who affirm, virtue is founded in sentiment and not in reason, that they who see the beauty there is in true virtue, don't perceive it by argumentation on its connections and consequences, but by the frame of their own minds, or a certain spiritual sense given them of God, whereby they immediately perceive pleasure in the presence of the idea of true virtue in their minds, or are directly gratified in the view or contemplation of this object, this is certainly true.

But if thereby is meant, that the frame of mind, or inward sense given them by God, whereby the mind is disposed to delight in the idea or view of true virtue, is given arbitrarily, so that if he had pleased he might have given a contrary sense and determination of mind, which would have agreed as well with the necessary nature of things, this I think is not true.

Virtue, as I have observed, consists in the cordial consent or union of Being to Being in general. And, as has also been observed, that frame of mind, whereby it is disposed to relish and be pleased with the view of this, is benevolence or union of heart itself to Being in general, or a universally benevolent frame of mind: because he whose temper is to
love Being in general, therein must have a disposition to approve and be pleased with love to Being in general. Therefore now the question is, whether God in giving this temper to a created mind, whereby it unites to or loves Being in general, acts so arbitrarily, that there is nothing in the necessary nature of things to hinder but that a contrary temper might have agreed or consisted as well with that nature of things, as this?

And in the first place I observe, that to assert this, would be a plain absurdity, and contrary to the very supposition. For here 'tis supposed, that virtue in its very essence consists in agreement or consent of Being to Being. Now certainly agreement itself to Being in general must necessarily agree better with general existence, than opposition & contrariety to it.

I observe secondly, that God in giving to the creature such a temper of mind, gives that which is agreeable to what is by absolute necessity his own temper and nature. For, as has been often observed, God himself is in effect Being in general; and without all doubt it is in itself necessary, and impossible it should be otherwise, that God should agree with himself, be united with himself, or love himself: and therefore, when he gives the same temper to his creatures, this is more agreeable to his necessary nature, than the opposite temper: yea, the latter would be infinitely contrary to his nature.

Let it be noted, thirdly, by this temper only can created Beings be united to, and agree with one another. This appears, because it consists in consent and union to Being in general; which implies agreement and union with every particular Being, except such as are opposite to Being in general, or excepting such cases wherein union with them is by some means inconsistent with union with general existence. But certainly if any particular created Being were of a temper to oppose Being in general, that would infer the most universal and greatest possible discord, not only of creatures with their creator, but of created Beings one with another.
Fourthly, I observe, there is no other temper but this, that a man can have, and agree with himself, or be without self-incongruity, i.e. without having some inclinations and relishes repugnant to others. And that for these reasons. Every Being that has understanding and will, necessarily loves happiness. For, to suppose any Being not to love happiness, would be to suppose he did not love what was agreeable to him; which is a contradiction: or at least would imply, that nothing was agreeable or eligible to him, which is the same as to lay, that he has no such thing as choice, or any faculty of will. So that every Being who has a faculty of will, must of necessity have an inclination to happiness. And therefore, if he be consistent with himself, and has not some inclinations repugnant to others, he must approve of those inclinations whereby Beings desire the happiness of Being in general, and must be against a disposition to the misery of Being in general: because otherwise he would approve of opposition to his own happiness. For, if a temper inclined to the misery of Being in general prevailed universally, 'tis apparent, it would tend to universal misery. But he that loves a tendency to universal misery, in effect loves a tendency to his own misery: and as he necessarily hates his own misery, he has then one inclination repugnant to another.—And besides, it necessarily follows from self-love, that men love to be loved by others; because in this others love agrees with their own love. But if men loved hatred to Being in general, they would in effect love the hatred of themselves; and so would be inconsistent with themselves, having one natural inclination contrary to another.

These things may help us to understand why that spiritual and divine sense, by which those that are truly virtuous and holy, perceive the excellency of true virtue, is in the sacred scriptures called by the name of light, knowledge, understanding, &c. If this divine sense were a thing arbitrarily given, without any foundation in the nature of things, it would not properly be called by such names. For, if there were no correspondence or agreement in such a sense with the nature of things, any more than there would have been in a diverse or contrary sense, the idea we obtain by this spiritual sense could in no respect be said to be a know-

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lledge or perception of any thing besides what was in our own minds. For this idea would be no representation of any thing without. But since it is otherwise, since it is agreeable, in the respects abovementioned, to the nature of things and especially since 'tis the representation and image of the moral perfection and excellency of the divine Being, hereby we have a perception of that moral excellency, of which we could have no true idea without it. And it being so, hereby persons have that true knowledge of God, which greatly enlightens the mind in the knowledge of divine things in general, and does (as might be shewn, if it were necessary to the main purpose of this discourse) in many respects assist persons to a right understanding of things in general, to understand which our faculties were chiefly given us, and which do chiefly concern our interest; and assist us to see the nature of them, and the truth of them, in their proper evidence. Whereas, the want of this spiritual sense, and the prevalence of those dispositions that are contrary to it, tends to darken and distract the mind, and dreadfully to delude and confound men's understandings.

And as to that moral sense, common to mankind, which there is in natural conscience, neither can this be truly said to be no more than a sentiment arbitrarily given by the creator, without any relation to the necessary nature of things: but is established in an agreement with the nature of things; so as no sense of mind that can be supposed, of a contrary nature and tendency could be. This will appear by these two things.

1. This moral sense, if the understanding be well informed, and be exercised at liberty and in an extensive manner, without being restrained to a private sphere, approves the very same things which a spiritual and divine sense approves; and those things only; though not on the same grounds, nor with the same kind of approbation. Therefore, as that divine sense has been already shewn to be agreeable to the necessary nature of things, so this inferior moral sense, being so far correspondent to that, must also so far agree with the nature of things.

2. It
2. It has been shewn, that this moral sense consists in approving the uniformity and natural agreement there is between one thing and another. So that by the supposition it is agreeable to the nature of things. For therein it consists, viz. a disposition of mind to consent to, or like, the agreement of the nature of things, or the agreement of the nature and form of one thing with another. And certainly such a temper of mind as likes the agreement of things to the nature of things, is more agreeable to the nature of things than an opposite temper of mind.

Here it may be observed—As the use of language is for mankind to express their sentiments or ideas to each other, so that those terms in language, by which things of a moral nature are signified, are to express those moral sentiments or ideas that are common to mankind; therefore 'tis, that moral sense which is in natural conscience, that chiefly governs the use of language among mankind, and is the mind's rule of language in these matters among mankind; 'tis indeed the general natural rule which God has given to all men, whereby to judge of moral good and evil. By such words, right and wrong, good and evil, when used in a moral sense, is meant in common speech that which deserves praise or blame, respect or resentment. But as has been often observ'd, mankind in general have a sense of desert, by this natural moral sense.

Therefore here may arise a question, which may deserve to be considered, viz. Seeing it is thus, that sentiment among mankind is the rule of language, as to what is called by the name of good and evil, worthy and unworthy; and 'tis apparent, that sentiment, at least as to many particulars, by some means or other is different in different persons, in different nations; that being thought to deserve praise by one, which by others is thought to be worthy of blame; how therefore can virtue and vice be any other than arbitrary, not at all determined by the nature of things, but by the sentiments of men with relation to the nature of things?

In order to the answering this question with clearness, it may be divided into two: viz. Whether men's sentiments or
of moral good and evil are not arbitrary, or rather casual and accidental? And, whether the way of their using words in what they call good and evil, is not arbitrary, without respect to any common sentiment in all, conformed to the nature of things?

As to the first, I would observe, that the general disposition or sense of mind exercised in a sense of desert of esteem or resentment, may be the same in all: though as to particular objects and occasions with regard to which it is exercised, it may be very various in different men or bodies of men, through the partiality or error that may attend the view or attention of the mind. In all, a notion of desert of love, or resentment, may consist in the same thing, in general, viz. a suitableness, or natural uniformity and agreement between the affections and acts of the agent, and the affections and treatment of others some way concerned; or the natural agreement between love (or something that some way implies love, or proceeds from it, or tends to it) and love; a natural agreement between treating well, and being well treated; the natural agreement between hating (or something that some way partakes of the nature of hatred) and being hated, &c. I say, this general notion of desert may be the same: and yet occasions and objects through variety of apprehensions about these occasions and objects, and the various manner in which they are viewed, by reason of the partial attention of the mind, may be extremely various; and example, custom, education, and association may have a hand in this, in ways innumerable. But 'tis needless to dwell long on this, since things which have been said by others (Mr. Hutcheson, in particular) may abundantly shew, that the differences which are to be found among different persons and nations, concerning moral good and evil, are not inconsistent with a general moral sense, common to all mankind.

Nor, secondly, is the use of the words, good and evil, right and wrong, when used in a moral sense, altogether unfixed and arbitrary, according to the variety of notions, opinions, and views, that occasion the aforementioned variety of sentiment. For tho' the signification of words is determined by use, yet that which governs in the use of terms is
is general or common use. And mankind, in what they would signify by terms, are obliged to aim at a consistent use: because it is easily found that the end of language, which is to be a common medium of manifesting ideas and sentiments, cannot be obtained any other way than by a consistent use of words; both that men should be content with themselves, and one with another, in the use of them. But men can't call any thing right or wrong, worthy or ill-deserving, consistently, any other way than by calling things so, which truly deserve praise or blame, i.e. things, wherein (all things considered) there is most uniformity in connecting with them praise or blame. There is no other way that they can use these terms consistently with themselves. Thus, if thieves or traitors may be angry with informers, that bring them to justice, and call their behaviour by odious names, yet herein they are inconsistent with themselves; because, when they put themselves in the place of those that have injured them, they approve the same things they condemn. And therefore such are capable of being convinced, that they apply these odious terms in an abusive manner. So, a nation that prosecutes an ambitious design of universal empire, by subduing other nations with fire and sword, may affix terms that signify the highest degrees of virtue, to the conduct of such as shew the most engaged, stable, resolute spirit in this affair, and do most of this bloody work. But yet they are capable of being convinced, that they use these terms inconsistently, and abuse language in it, and so having their mouths stopped.—And not only will men use such words inconsistently with themselves, but also with one another, by using them any otherwise than to signify true merit or ill-deserving, as before explained. For there is no way else, wherein men have any notion of good or ill-defert, that mankind in general can agree in. Mankind in general seem to suppose some general standard or foundation in nature for an universal confidence in the use of the terms whereby they express moral good and evil; which none can depart from but thro' error and mistake. (This is evidently supposed in all disputes they may have with another, about right and wrong; and in all endeavors used to evince or prove that any thing is either good or evil, in a moral sense,